Skip to main content

Full text of "Department of Defense authorization for appropriations for fiscal year 2004 : hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, first session, on S. 1050, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the armed forces, and for other purposes"

See other formats


S. Hrg. 108-241, Pt. 4 


Y 4.AR 5/3: 

108-1 Hearings: Department of D 






S. 1050 



MARCH 12; APRIL 3, 2003 

_ Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 


MAR 1 5 2004 


S. Hrg. 108-326, Pt. 4 







S. 1050 



MARCH 12; APRIL 3, 2003 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Internet: Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 

Fax; (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman 

JOHN McCain, Arizona 
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 
JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri 
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 
ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 


JACK REED, Rhode Island 




MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 


MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

Judith A. Ansley, Staff Director 
Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic Staff Director 

Subcommittee on Airland 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama, Chairman 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 



JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri EVAN BAYH, Indiana 


ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 



Army Transformation 

MARCH 12, 2003 


Brownlee, Hon. Les, Under Secretary of the Army 5 

Keane, Gen. John M., USA, Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army 8 

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Aviation and Air-Launched Weapons 


APRIL 3, 2003 

Young, Hon. John J., Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 

Development, and Acquisition 64 

Nathman, Vice Adm. John B., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare 

Requirements and Programs 72 

Hough, Lt. Gen. Michael A., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation 73 




U.S. Senate, 
Subcommittee on Airland, 
Committee on Armed Services, 

Washington, DC. 


The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:03 p.m., in room 
SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff Sessions 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Inhofe, 
Lieberman, Akaka, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor. 

Majority staff members present: Ambrose R. Hock, professional 
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; and 
Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional 
staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; and 
Peter K. Levine, minority counsel. 

Staff assistants present: Andrew Kent and Nicholas W. West. 

Committee members' assistants present: John A. Bonsell, assist- 
ant to Senator Inhofe; Darren Dick, assistant to Senator Roberts; 
Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Lindsey R. Neas, 
assistant to Senator Talent; Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to Sen- 
ator Dole; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; 
Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, assistant to Senator Akaka; Todd 
Rosenblum and Rashid Hallaway, assistants to Senator Bayh; An- 
drew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, assist- 
ant to Senator Pryor. 


Senator Sessions. All right. Let us begin. But before I make my 
opening comments as Chairman of the Airland Subcommittee, I 
would like to express our sjonpathies to the families of the soldiers 
lost at Fort Drum, New York, in the training mishap. Too often, 
we forget that training itself puts our soldiers, sailors, marines, 
and airmen in harm's way. This country owes our all to them and 
their families, and a debt of gratitude for their selfless dedication 
to this country. 


I would note that in recent weeks, I have had the opportunity to 
talk to a young staff sergeant from the National Guard in Ala- 
bama, Mr. Secretary, a distant relative of Congressman Robert 
Aderholt from Alabama, and he was wounded in an ambush in Af- 
ghanistan within the last couple of months. Then a few days ago, 
I talked to the wife of a young soldier who is part of a Decatur, 
Alabama National Guard unit in the same area, Special Forces, 
and her husband lost the lower part of his leg when the vehicle he 
was in hit a mine. 

So we do have soldiers out there right now — as. General Keane, 
I know you know — and we ought never to forget that and to re- 
member them and know that they are at great risk every day. 

The Airland Subcommittee convenes today to receive testimony 
from the Under Secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee, and the Vice 
Chief of Staff of the Army, General John Keane, to explore Army 
transformation and modernization issues and initiatives. 

I would really like to thank Senator Lieberman for his tremen- 
dous leadership on this subcommittee over the past 2 years. During 
that time, the Army made significant progress in its transformation 
as a result of his leadership and this subcommittee's work. So I am 
looking forward to working with him, and I will continue to main- 
tain a bipartisan approach to national military issues. 

I would like to welcome Senators Inhofe, Roberts, Akaka, and 
Dayton back to the subcommittee, and also our new members. Sen- 
ators McCain, Talent, Chambliss, Dole, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor. 
I look forward to working with them in a bipartisan manner as we 
have in the past on this panel. 

This subcommittee is responsible for the procurement and re- 
search and development (R&D) accounts in all the Services as they 
are applied to Army ground systems and air platforms and the 
Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force tactical aviation programs. As 
we understand, our decisions directly impact the future readiness 
of our Armed Forces. As we meet this afternoon, our Armed Forces 
are fighting the war on terror and preparing for a potential conflict 
with Iraq, while simultaneously maintaining forward presence in 
many parts of the world. 

The Army, like our other Services, is busy, and I have no doubt 
about our military's ability to fight and win a war. However, we 
are concerned with the tremendous burdens these missions place 
on our citizen soldiers and the employers who support them. I hope 
that we do not take these soldiers or any of the soldiers, sailors, 
marines, and airmen in the Active and Reserve Forces for granted. 
That is why I am particularly sensitive to the resources allocated 
to the Services to perform their primary mission, to defend this Na- 

The Army request of $93.9 billion for fiscal year 2004 represents 
a $3 billion increase over 2003 appropriated levels, including $10.8 
billion for procurement, a 15-percent reduction in real terms over 
fiscal year 2003, and $9.1 billion for research and development, a 
20-percent increase over 2003. 

Clearly, the Army has taken a risk with their procurement ac- 
counts to fund their research and development accounts — the nec- 
essary investments to transform. I support your approach to this 

and a balanced approach to your budget and we will be talking 
about that as we go forward. 

Consistent with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
transformation goals, the Army request applies funding to the Fu- 
ture Combat Systems (FCS), precision munitions, sensor and com- 
munications technology, science and technology (S&T), and missile 
and air defense programs. In order to fund these initiatives, the 
Army, again, used Legacy Force systems to finance the trans- 

In fiscal year 2004, the Army terminated 24 programs and re- 
structured 24 others for $22.5 billion over the Future Years De- 
fense Program (FYDP), $7.1 billion in fiscal year 2004, which was 
reallocated for transformation. 

So long as the Army continues to make progress with fielding of 
the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SECT) and successfully transi- 
tions FCS technologies into reality, the risk to the Legacy Force is 

Over the past several years, the Airland Subcommittee has asked 
the Army how they would prioritize among the Objective, Interim, 
and Legacy Forces. With 77 program terminations and/or restruc- 
tures in the Legacy Force, it is clear that the Army has set its pri- 
orities. I applaud and support your willingness to make these 
tough decisions, and we will talk about them in some detail. 

We will explore a wide range of issues related to the Army's 
transformation and modernization accounts. Secretary Brownlee, 
General Keane, we look forward to discussing with you the Army's 
priorities regarding the funding of its three axes of transformation 
strategy, the Objective Force, the Interim Force, and the Legacy 

The subcommittee is interested in hearing your views on the cur- 
rent status of Objective Force systems, particularly the FCS and its 
upcoming Milestone B review, the SBCTs, especially the Army's ap- 
proach to the Deputy Secretary of Defense's directions to modify 
the 5th and 6th SBCTs, and the progress the Army has made, or 
has not made, regarding the funding of the Army Aviation Mod- 
ernization Plan, specifically the Comanche helicopter program re- 
structure and the impact of the Department's decision to restruc- 
ture the CH-47 Chinook helicopter program to support Special Op- 
erations Command requirements. 

We are particularly interested in hearing your rationale for ter- 
minating and restructuring a number of Legacy Force programs in 
order to fund the Objective Force, and the attendant risk associ- 
ated with these decisions. 

The Airland Subcommittee has been a strong supporter of the 
Army's effort to transform since the fiscal year 2001 budget re- 
quest, the first submitted after the Chief of Staff of the Army an- 
nounced his transformation initiative in October 1999. 

The subcommittee understands the Army's need to transform 
and, over fiscal years 2001 to 2003, authorized the addition of over 
$1.7 billion to the Army's procurement and R&D accounts to sup- 
port Army transformation priorities. 

Gentlemen, we welcome you and thank you both for appearing 
before the Airland Subcommittee today. 

Before we hear your opening statements, I would like to recog- 
nize Senator Lieberman for any opening comments he might have. 


Senator Lieberman. Well, thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 
Thanks for your very good opening statement and for your kind 
words about my service on the subcommittee. 

I joined you — in absentia. Senator Pryor, you were welcomed to 
the subcommittee, and I am glad to do it in person now. 

This is actually my fifth year in the leadership of this Airland 
Subcommittee, first as a ranking member for 2 years, then as 
chairman, now as ranking member again. I wanted very much to 
come back on this subcommittee because I believe that the sub- 
stantive issues that are dealt with here, namely the subject of the 
hearing today, Army transformation, are among the most impor- 
tant affecting our national security for the decades ahead. 

I also appreciate the high degree of bipartisanship that has al- 
ways been the hallmark of this subcommittee. I appreciate. Senator 
Sessions, your statement in support of that tradition and carrying 
it on, and I pledge in turn to you my own full cooperation. I look 
forward to working with you on this important effort to modernize 
our ground and air forces. 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane, it is a pleasure to wel- 
come you back to this hearing room, and to this topic. The sub- 
committee has been — as Senator Sessions said — a strong supporter 
of the Army's effort to transform, and I am proud of that record. 

However, it has been a struggle for both the Army and the sub- 
committee. I am going to ask, Mr. Chairman, if the rest of my 
statement could be entered into the record. It is in part a recitation 
of the history of the last 4 years on this subject. I am just going 
to draw from a few points of it. 

Over those 4 years, the leadership of the subcommittee, recogniz- 
ing that the Army could not afford with the funds that it was being 
given to fully support its programs across the Objective, Interim, 
and Legacy Forces, urged the leadership of the Army to set definite 

This budget that you have given us does just that. Army prior- 
ities as presented are the Objective, Interim, and Legacy Forces in 
that order. The Army has chosen to fund those forces at the ex- 
pense of the Legacy Force at a cost of restricting modernization 
and recapitalization to only two divisions in the counter-attack 

I know that some will argue with that prioritization, and I am 
sure we will discuss it today at this hearing, but I, for one, want 
to join the chairman in giving the Army leadership credit for mak- 
ing some hard decisions in that regard. 

The subcommittee has also seen transformation to the Objective 
Force as the highest priority and has targeted additional resources 
for that endeavor. 

The Army according to this budget intends to accelerate the de- 
velopment and fielding of the Objective Force for an initial oper- 
ational capacity (IOC) by fiscal year 2010, and I totally support 
that effort. However, I do want to raise questions as to whether the 
level of R&D funding will allow that to happen. I note that once 

again the Army has submitted an Objective Force S&T unfunded 
requirement, this time $40 milhon. 

I would also question whether the maturity of the relevant tech- 
nologies will allow the 2010 IOC date, and if not, whether the risk 
we have taken with respect to the Legacy Force then becomes ex- 
cessive. Those are difficult questions and I look forward to your 
reasoned answers to them. 

Finally with regard to the Legacy Force, I remember asking last 
year at a similar hearing whether the Army could afford to recapi- 
talize three divisions and the armored cavalry regiment of the 
counter-attack corps. The answer, I take it, was ultimately no, as 
the Army now intends to do only the two divisions. 

I think this year perhaps the question that we should discuss is 
whether the Army today and in this environment can afford not to 
recapitalize at least the armored cavalry regiment of that corps, 
which is so vital for reconnaissance and security missions. 

So those are some of the issues that, Mr. Chairman, I know that 
our subcommittee will consider as we evaluate the fiscal 2004 
budget request and mark up the defense authorization bill. I am 
confident that our witnesses today, two men who have served their 
country so honorably and ably and effectively in different capac- 
ities, can give us very helpful insight to guide us in our work. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. It is good to see Secretary 
Brownlee on the other side of the table there. 

Senator Inhofe or Senator Pryor, do you have any comments that 
you would like to make before we get started? 

Senator Inhofe. No, not from me. Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. Let me just start off then with a general ques- 
tion. As we noted, the Army's $94 billion fiscal year 2004 budget — 
I forgot. The good staff of Secretary Brownlee is always helpful. 

Secretary Brownlee. Yes, sir. They are very well trained, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. How about an opening statement? We would 
love to hear from both of you. [Laughter.] 



Secretary Brownlee. Thank you, sir. Sir, first of all, let me 
thank you for your very kind words about our soldiers, those who 
have been wounded and those who have lost their lives, and par- 
ticularly those who lost their lives yesterday in training at Fort 
Drum. We appreciate those words very much from you to the sol- 
diers who really belong to all of us, and to their families and loved 
ones, who I am sure are now mourning their loss along with us. 
Thank you very much, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Yes. 

Secretary BROWNLEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator 
Lieberman, distinguished members of the Airland Subcommittee. 

First, I would like to tell you how grateful General Keane and 
I are to have this opportunity to speak to you today about Army 

I am grateful also to have had the opportunity to meet with some 
of the Members and their staffs, and I just would like to state if 

there are any Members with whom I was not able to meet who 
would like to meet with me for any reason, I would be very happy 
to arrange those meetings in accordance with your convenience. 

At this time, General Keane and I would like to request that our 
joint witness statement be entered into the record. 

Senator SESSIONS. Without objection. 

Secretary Brownlee. Sir, as I begin my second year as the 
Under Secretary of the Army, I am again honored to come here and 
testify before this distinguished subcommittee and while I thor- 
oughly enjoy serving in my current capacity, I have to admit that 
I miss very much the work of this wonderful committee where truly 
bipartisanship is not just a word, but it is a common way of doing 
business, and it is recognized everywhere that I know. 

But I do miss the people, both Members and the wonderful staff 
members, and I will always be proud to say that I was a member 
of the staff of this very important committee, and particularly this 
subcommittee where I was the lead staffer for several years before 
I was honored to become a staff director. In fact, I suggested the 
name, which it still bears, so anyway — [Laughter.] 

If you would be kind enough to indulge me, Mr. Chairman, for 
just a few moments, I would like to say a few words about the man 
sitting next to me. General Jack Keane. 

When I was the staff director of this committee, I had the oppor- 
tunity to observe him on many occasions. Since I have been the 
Under Secretary, I have had the privilege of working closely with 
him on a daily basis. Over these past months. General Keane has 
only added to the very high degree of respect and admiration that 
I have for him. His management capabilities, dedication, loyalty, 
and, most important of all, the leadership that he brings to the 
Army is invaluable. 

The Army and the American people are fortunate that General 
Keane serves the Army in the marvelous way that he does. I am 
honored to work alongside him and to accompany him here today 
to testify to this subcommittee on the subject of Army trans- 

John Keane and I would also like to thank you for your contin- 
ued support of the Army. The 2003 budget has allowed us to make 
significant improvements in many key areas. We have structured 
our budget priorities for 2004 to reflect the same priorities as 2003: 
people, readiness, and transformation. 

In the last year, I have had the opportunity and the privilege to 
visit our wonderful soldiers who are forward deployed around the 
world. I have visited soldiers in Korea and the Philippines, includ- 
ing our special forces on Basilan Island. I had the privilege of 
spending Thanksgiving with soldiers in Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait, 
and Afghanistan, and returned to Kuwait and Afghanistan in Jan- 

Visiting these soldiers, as I know many of you have also, leads 
you to only one conclusion, that they are ready for whatever comes. 

Unquestionably, we have the best Army in the world. Our sol- 
diers are well-led, well-trained, and well-equipped. They are deter- 
mined and committed. They are disciplined and professional. I have 
no doubt they will accomplish any mission they are given. 

As I testified in last year's hearings, today's threats to our Na- 
tion's interests are more complex and diverse than at any time in 
our history. In order to fill our non-negotiable contract with the 
American people, to decisively fight and win our Nation's wars, the 
Army must change the way it fights and the way it deploys in the 

It must be able to get to the fight quickly. The Army must be 
able to support and sustain rapid combat power efficiently by re- 
ducing its operational and tactical logistics footprint. 

This is clearly a different world than the one that existed when 
I joined the staff of this committee in early 1984 during the height 
of the Cold War. Recent operations in Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
Afghanistan have illustrated the need to transform our Army. 

Our heavy forces are the best in the world, very survivable and 
extremely lethal. But they are slow to deploy and difficult to sus- 

On the other hand, while our light forces are rapidly deployable, 
they lack the protection, lethality, and tactical mobility we need 
across the full spectrum of military operations. 

Transforming our Army to meet these new requirements is not 
without risk. Balancing this risk is the key to successful trans- 

The most important challenge we face is to maintain a strong 
and lethal current force, while we are transforming. We have ac- 
cepted risk in selective modernization and recapitalization. We con- 
tinue to assess these risks as we balance current readiness, the 
well-being of our people, transformation, the global war on terror- 
ism, and new operational commitments. 

Although we are working to field the Objective Force, we also un- 
derstand that the current force is the force at war today and the 
force that will continue to serve us for several more years. 

Through the selective modernization and recapitalization I spoke 
of earlier, it is the current force that will guarantee our Army's 
near-term warfighting readiness throughout the transformation 

The Army 2004 to 2009 Program Objective Memorandum makes 
a clear statement about our priorities and our risk management. 
We are committed to transforming the Army and have allocated 
funds to complete the fielding of our six Stryker Brigades, the Co- 
manche, the Future Combat System, and other key transformation- 
related programs. 

The Army appreciates Congress authorizing and appropriating 
funding for the complete fielding of the six Stryker Brigades. We 
have had to make some tough decisions with existing programs, 
terminating some and restructuring others, in order to provide the 
funds necessary for transformation. 

These decisions have allowed us to generate billions of dollars 
worth of savings — savings that can be reallocated to resource es- 
sential Objective Force, R&D, and eventually procurement. 

The Comanche helicopter is an example of how we restructured 
some of our programs. We have restructured this program using 
evolutionary development and an acquisition strategy that delivers 
capabilities in blocks. We have added time and funding to decrease 
program risk and to enhance the probability of success. 


Ultimately, we will field a mix of manned helicopters and un- 
manned aerial vehicles that will give us the optimum set of capa- 

The continued support of this Congress remains essential to the 
success of the Department of Defense. In that regard, you will re- 
ceive soon a package of legislative proposals for the Department. 
These will include proposals on the management of civilian person- 
nel, acquisition, and other key management initiatives. 

I urge you to support this package and we would appreciate also 
very much your support and favorable consideration of the Army's 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 
I thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you and 
discuss these critical issues. 

I yield the floor to my dear friend and colleague, and I look for- 
ward to your questions. 

Senator Sessions. Thank you, Secretary Brownlee. I appreciate 
those remarks. 

General Keane. 


General Keane. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lieberman, Senator 
Inhofe, Senator Pryor, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to 
be here with you this afternoon to talk about Army issues. 

I am certainly honored to be here with Secretary Brownlee. He 
is a real joy to work with. We truly appreciate the leadership that 
he has brought to our Department. 

I want to thank you up front for the support that you provided 
to us in the 2003 budget. We appreciate very much your support 
for Army readiness, for the pay compensation for our soldiers, for 
our civilians, and also for Army transformation. 

Today, we are a Nation at war. I cannot recall a time in our his- 
tory, not since World War 11, when our Army has been engaged in 
more places than it is today. Your Army is in Kuwait, Kosovo, Bos- 
nia, Sinai, Korea, Honduras, the Philippines, and Europe. 

We have more than 240,000 troops deployed in forward stations 
in 120 countries around the world. To support our efforts, we have 
mobilized 130,000 Reserve component soldiers. 

We are preparing for a war in Iraq, and we are already fighting 
a war in Afghanistan. I will tell you on a personal note, I do believe 
there is something different about this war in Afghanistan. I have 
been there four times in the last year and a half, and the difference 
is in the attitude of our soldiers. 

Upon reflection, I realized that we have not deployed our soldiers 
on behalf of the American people since World War II. Every deploy- 
ment that we have been on since World War II has been to help 
a beleaguered nation where some thug has imposed his will on his 
people or somebody else's people. 

The war in Afghanistan is all about the American people. Our 
soldiers get it. You can see it in the intensity of their attitude and 
this dogged determination that they have to succeed. I asked a 
company commander from the 82nd Airborne Division a routine 
question I normally ask which is, "What is your most significant 

challenge?" His immediate response was, "Sir, my most significant 
challenge is when we get into a fight here to control the amount 
of physical bravery that my soldiers display." He said, "This is the 
first time I have ever been in combat." 

I asked my sergeants have they ever experienced anything like 
this before — those who had more combat experience — and the ser- 
geants said, "No. We have never seen an54;hing quite like it in 
terms of the scale, the magnitude of the bravery of our soldiers." 
They are also inspired in their openness and directness about why 
they are there, and how willing they are to give up everything that 
they care about in life to protect America, its people, and our way 
of life. It is inspirational to be around them and, frankly, most of 
us are actually moved to tears being around them. 

So there is really something special that has taken place there, 
and I know you are very proud of them. But we have a wonderful 
opportunity to visit them a little bit more than you do. I just want- 
ed to share some of that with you. 

I also wanted to share with you some lessons that we have 
learned in Afghanistan, just to note a few of them very briefly to 
you. Our Special Forces teams have excellent long-range commu- 
nications, target designation, and the ability to transmit that infor- 
mation to all kinds of strike platforms. 

Just 4V2 years ago in Kosovo, we used one strike platform to 
drop GPS-guided munitions and that was a B2. In Afghanistan, we 
are using every strike aircraft we have from all Services, dropping 
GPS-guided munitions to include the B52 at 45,000 feet, and our 
Special Forces teams are communicating directly with each aircraft 
usually in the digital mode with no voice communication whatso- 

It is a remarkable achievement and is a testimony to what is 
happening to us in joint warfighting, as we move down the vertical 
access, and where you are having organizations at lower levels hav- 
ing an enormous amount of combat power available to them that 
heretofore was not even imagined. 

The other thing is our training strategy. Our training strategy 
has always been "train as you fight," and it is a buzzword in a 
sense, but it has been a theology to us for 14 years. We have been 
dealing with asymmetric scenarios at the Joint Readiness Training 
Center, initially at Fort Chafee, and for the last number of years 
at Fort Polk. 

Those asymmetric scenarios trained our Special Operations 
Forces and our light forces and our air forces to deal with asym- 
metric threats like we are facing in Afghanistan. 

While the war against the al Qaeda had a strategic level, because 
we were fighting a network, it is obviously different because it does 
not represent a nation or an Army at the tactical level. We had 
been preparing our soldiers for that kind of war for over a decade. 
That is one of the reasons why they have responded so well to it. 

Marksmanship, our ability to hit what we shoot at, has been ex- 
cellent, and again our physical conditioning paid off in Operation 
Anaconda, where we operated routinely at 8,000 to 10,000 feet, and 
our soldiers were able to bear up under those altitudes and the 
stress of that fight. 


Afghanistan has a higher density of mines than any country in 
the world. We have extracted over a milhon mines from that coun- 
try. It has paid a price. I have three soldiers at Walter Reed right 
now who have all lost their limbs to it, and we have had two pre- 
vious limb injuries as well. 

But it is a remarkable achievement, the amount of mines that we 
have taken out of there, and the technology that we are using in 
some cases is still primitive, but nonetheless we have made some 
real progress. 

The care and treatment of our wounded, at the point of injury, 
is very responsive care, designed to preserve, to treat for shock, to 
stop bleeding. We were able to do that — all of our soldiers have ad- 
vanced combat lifesaver techniques that are beyond the first aid 
that we heretofore were aware of. Very rapid evacuation to a for- 
ward surgical team — not a hospital — that is just at the higher level 
command post. So within minutes, we have a soldier in the hands 
of a skilled surgeon. It has preserved the lives of many of our sol- 

Now, the Interceptor body armor that you helped fund for us pro- 
tects our soldiers against 7.62 millimeter rifle shot. We have a 
number of them who actually have the bullets in them and, of 
course, they will be trophies for life, I am sure. We would be more 
than happy to let them keep them. But the armor has been very 
significant in protecting the torsos of our soldiers. 

The Apache helicopter is most notably in Operation Anaconda. 
We had nine helicopters in that fight. Virtually all of them were 
shot at, and they all had bullet holes. Twenty-seven of the 28 ro- 
tors all had bullet holes in them, and not a single one of those 
Apaches went down. 

They were damaged to be sure, and it was just remarkable how 
they stayed in the fight. The soldiers, if they were here, would tell 
you that in the daytime the Apache helicopter provided the best 
close air support that they had. At night, it was the AC-130 

The CH-47 helicopter, which you have also funded for us, was 
the only United States military aircraft that could operate at 
10,000 feet with a load. If we did not have the aircraft, we never 
could have taken the fight directly to the al Qaeda, as we did in 
Operation Anaconda, because nothing else could get up at that alti- 
tude with a heavy load. We were blessed to have it. 

As we fight the global war on terrorism, we are also preparing 
for this war in Iraq, and much has changed in the last 12 years 
since we last dealt with Saddam Hussein. This time around, in this 
fight, we will bring with us the A3 Bradley, which has an enhanced 
armor and second generation Forward-Looking Infrared Radar 
(FLIR), and also the M1A2 Abrams tank that has an improved fire 
control system, and the second generation FLIR. 

We have already deployed the PAC3 Patriot missile. We will 
have the Apache Longbow, a D model aircraft with its modern fire 
control system, which can detect and track and prioritize 72 of 
those targets at one time. It is a quantum leap over the A model 

We have equipped our light force soldiers who are in Kuwait pre- 
paring for war in the recent months with new equipment such as 


the advanced combat helmet; a binocular laser rangefinder, which 
was used in Afghanistan — it was called the Viper; and a long range 
sniper rifle. We have a shoot-around-the-corner sight now, pretty 
remarkable technology. We have brought them some robotics to 
help clear bunkers and buildings when we work in urban areas. We 
have used them very successfully in Afghanistan. 

We have equipped our soldiers with the best chemical and bio- 
logical protection equipment that is available in the world today. 
All of our soldiers have it. For the first time in our Army history, 
we will have unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) that operate at the 
brigade and the corps levels. 

UAVs and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System 
(JSTARS) are linked directly to our command posts today. We also 
have the Army Battle Command System, which integrates com- 
mand and control systems found at each echelon, from the ground 
force component commanders at the theater, joint task force level 
all the way down to our individual soldiers and weapons platforms. 

That is a first in combat for us. We have Common Ground Sta- 
tions and we have Blue Force Tracking Systems that are in place 
and that will provide our soldiers with unprecedented situational 

So it is evident that we have not remained static for the last 12 
years. Our Army remains the dominant land force in the world, 
and we thank you for the support that you have been providing to 

Our Army in Kuwait and in the other countries in the surround- 
ing area, stand there today. They are well-trained; they are well- 
led; and they are well-equipped. They are ready to answer the 
President's call if he desires. 

What much of this discussion today is about is our need to 
change, and even to this day, some people still ask us, "Why 
change? You are such a formidable Army that we see out there. 
There is no other force like you in the world. Why do you have to 

Our answer is simple. The world has changed, and the Army 
must adapt. We have two fundamental challenges. First, along 
with our sister services, the Air Force and the Navy, we know we 
must maintain a decisive edge and overmatch, to deter other ar- 
mies, armies that are usually large and defensive in nature with 
some limited offensive capability that they use within their region. 

If our Army is to deter these armies, it must have an offensive 
global reach. Then upon arrival, our combat power must be credi- 

A second challenge is we must have a capability to meet a wide 
array of asymmetric threats — non-state actors, terrorism, weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD). Recognition of these two challenges 
has led to some conclusions. First, the tools that won the Cold War 
and Operation Desert Storm will not suffice for the new challenges. 
That is the reality. 

The strategic environment is no longer relatively static. We no 
longer have the luxury of positioning forces and equipment every- 
where they are needed to serve their purpose of deterrence. It is 
not going to work. 


Second, we cannot hope to overmatch our adversaries by sheer 
quantity. The Air Force and the Navy are the largest air force and 
navies in the world and also the best. The Army, the standing 
Army, is the sixth largest in the world. We are outnumbered by 
China, India, North Korea, South Korea, and Pakistan and other 
armies that are growing. 

Our superiority must come from quality rather than quantity. So, 
third, to achieve that qualitative superiority, we must fight in new 
ways characterized by simultaneous, distributed, and non-linear 

We have made a commitment to move our operations built on a 
principle of mass and attrition warfare. These are the qualities we 
are building into the Objective Force, a force that is built around 
the FCS, I know we will discuss today, which is a system of sys- 
tems that is qualitatively superior, rapidly deployable, and versa- 
tile to be effective against the threats I have discussed. 

This budget, the 2004 budget, supports the development of FCS 
capabilities by investing almost $2 billion in our RDT&E. Ninety 
eight percent of our science and technology efforts that are dedi- 
cated to the Objective Force. 

We intend to begin fielding the Objective Force this decade, with 
the first FCS-equipped unit in 2008, and its IOC is in 2010. 

As we develop concepts and technologies for the Objective Force, 
we are fielding a Stryker Brigade, and we appreciate the commit- 
tee's support of the Stryker Brigade to meet the near-term require- 
ments and bridge the operational gap between our heavy and light 

The first of our six SBCTs will achieve IOC this spring. We are 
excited about that prospect, and we are looking forward to deploy- 
ing that organization in the fall. 

The third SECT is fully funded in the 2003 budget that we are 
executing. The 2004 budget funds the Stryker Brigades that you 
have before you. 

So we are also selectively modernizing and recapitalizing the ex- 
isting systems as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, to guarantee the 
Army's near-term warfighting readiness throughout the trans- 
formation process. 

So in conclusion, let me say that maintaining a trained and 
ready Army now and in the future is a shared responsibility. We 
appreciate the help that you provided us in doing this and we look 
forward to your continued support and also your continued discus- 
sion on these important issues. 

Thank you for your support as well, and I look forward to your 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Brownlee and Gen- 
eral Keane follows:] 

Joint Prepared Statement by Hon. Les Brownlee and Gen. John M. Keane, 


Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, we thank you for 
this opportunity to report to you again this year on the status of Army trans- 

We would first Hke to thank this subcommittee, and Congress as a whole, for your 
tremendous support of the fiscal year 2003 budget. With your help the Army re- 
ceived a 4.1 percent average pay increase for our soldiers and our civilian work 
force. Increased funding for housing allowances have reduced soldiers' out-of-pocket 


expenses from 11.3 percent to 7.5 percent. The fiscal year 2003 budget also funds 
significant Army initiatives to retain and recruit quality soldiers, provides for up- 
graded single-soldier baiTacks, and expands many programs that improve the qual- 
ity of life for our soldiers and their families. 

We also appreciate your continued support of our Army's Transformation goals. 
With your help the fiscal year 2003 budget fully funds our third SECT, provides an 
additional $105 million for the Army's Future Combat Systems, $173 miUion for the 
development of an FCS non-line of sight cannon, and also funds $874 million for 
the Comanche helicopter system. 

Across the board, the fiscal year 2003 budget sends a strong message of congres- 
sional support for our soldiers, civilians, and families — and clearly indicates your re- 
solve to help sustain the readiness of our Army as we transform for the future. 


Today our Army is engaged throughout the world — fighting the global war on ter- 
rorism, providing peace and stability to regions throughout the world, and preparing 
for a potential war in Iraq. Our simultaneous commitment to these operations, and 
the successes we have achieved, clearly indicate our military capabihty and state 
of readiness. Our soldiers demonstrate every day that they are trained and ready 
to respond to these requirements — to fight and win the Nation's wars. With the sup- 
port of Congress and the administration, the Army will continue to fulfill its role 
in the war on terrorism, maintain our near-term readiness, and rapidly transform 
to fight and win our future conflicts. 


Operations throughout this past year have reinforced the value of joint operations, 
precision weapons, and the necessity for coordinated air-ground integration. We 
demonstrated that by compelling an enemy to mass, ground maneuver forces maxi- 
mize the effectiveness of America's tremendous airpower. We also effectively incor- 
porated the leading edge of our emerging technologies to maximize our battlefield 
advantage — demonstrating future concepts and validating General Shinseki's vision 
of a transformed Army and the fielding of the Objective Force beginning in this dec- 


The global environment has changed and the Army must change with it. Our mili- 
tary has demonstrated time and again that it is the finest force ever assembled. As 
a result, our adversaries understand that they cannot face our capabilities head-on. 
They are therefore changing and evolving in an attempt to exploit our 

In view of these factors, and our non-negotiable obligation to defend the American 
people against all threats, the Army must change the way it fights and the way it 
deploys. Our Army must be able to rapidly deploy and sustain itself in distant anti- 
access and area denial environments. We must be able to rapidly find the enemy 
and deny them sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid 
engagement. We must leverage technologies and innovative concepts to develop 
inter-operable joint command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, sur- 
veillance, and reconnaissance, or C^ISR, and information networks that will provide 
our forces with unparalleled situational awareness and the ability to network joint 
fires. We must be able to maintain information systems in the face of attack and 
conduct effective information operations. 

Developments in technology and our pursuit of network-centric warfare will allow 
the Army to break our ties with the Cold War formations that relied on the prin- 
ciple of mass and the build-up of large forces. We will possess unprecedented situa- 
tional awareness that will enable Army formations to maneuver with greater preci- 
sion and dispersion. We will know where the enemy is and where our own people 
are, and we will be able to impose our will on the enemy at the time and place of 
our choosing. We will exploit vertical envelopment to avoid large movements along 
predictable lines of communication and focus our efforts on the enemy's strategic 
centers of gravity. We will transform to a more strategically responsive force that 
is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations. With changes to doc- 
trine, training, leader development, organization, materiel acquisition strategies, 
and soldier systems, the Army is taking a holistic approach to its Transformation. 
The result will be a different Army, not just a modernized version of the current 

Readiness remains our constant imperative. Therefore, transformation consists of 
three interrelated elements — the Objective Force, SBCTs, and the Current Force. 


We will develop concepts and technologies for the Objective Force while fielding 
SBCTs to meet near-term requirements and bridge the operational gap between our 
heavy and light forces. Simultaneously, we will selectively modernize and recapital- 
ize existing systems in the Current Force to provide enhanced capabilities that will 
guarantee our readiness throughout the transformation process. 


Built around the FCS, the Army's Objective Force is the future joint, interagency, 
and multinational precision maneuver instrument for this Nation. Comprised of 
modular, scalable, flexible organizations for prompt and sustained land operations, 
it will be more lethal, more agile, and more rapidly deployable. 

By focusing much of its investment in science and technology, the Army will cre- 
ate a new family of ground systems called the Future Combat Systems. In the fiscal 
year 2004 budget alone, we are investing $1.79 billion in research, development, 
test, and evaluation (RDT&E) to design and develop Objective Force and enabling 
technologies — technologies that will take us to the system development and dem- 
onstration phase for the Future Combat Systems (FCS). 

FCS is an integrated system-of-systems that reflects a paradigm shift from surviv- 
ing a first round hit to avoiding a first round hit. FCS development includes low- 
observable stealth technologies, smaller caliber rounds, indirect fires systems and 
direct fire weapons with greater range and increased lethality, and integrated com- 
mand and control that provides our forces with a common situational awareness. 
In May of this year, we are confident that FCS Milestone B will transition the FCS 
program from Concept and Technology Development into Systems Development and 
Demonstration (SDD). The Army will begin fielding the Objective Force in this dec- 
ade with the first FCS combat maneuver force equipped in 2008 — Initial Operating 
Capability (IOC) for this unit is expected in 2010. 

The Comanche helicopter is the centerpiece of the Aviation Modernization Plan 
and will be the first new system to reach IOC within the Army's Objective Force. 
The Comanche will correct the Army's most critical battlefield deficiency — aerial 
armed reconnaissance — with a capable, survivable, and sustainable aircraft. Contin- 
ued development of the Comanche helicopter is projected to provide an initial train- 
ing capability in December 2006 and IOC by September 2009. 

FCS and Comanche are essential to Army transformation, but transformation is 
more than hardware. We cannot truly transform the Army without transforming the 
way we do business — from transformation of logistics and acquisition, to personnel 
and installation transformation. Revolutionizing Army business management prac- 
tices achieves the best value for taxpayers' dollars; conserves limited resources for 
investment in people, readiness, and transformation; enhances management of per- 
sonnel systems, installations and contracting; and augments our potential to accel- 
erate the arrival of the Objective Force. Changing the Army is first about changing 
the way we think, and better business practices represent practical application of 
common sense initiatives that best serve the Army and our Nation. 

We will harmonize our transformation efforts with our sister services, business 
and industry, and our science and technology partners to provide the best force pos- 
sible that will allow us to arrive early to dissuade or deter conflict or, as required, 
swiftly defeat an adversary. We will be better able to See First, Understand First, 
Act First, and Finish Decisively. 


Stryker Brigades fill a capabilities gap between our lethal, survivable, but slow- 
to-deploy heavy forces and our rapidly deployable light forces that lack the protec- 
tion, lethality, and tactical mobility that we seek. They respond to Combatant Com- 
mander requirements across the spectrum of military operations and provide the in- 
creased operational and tactical flexibility to execute fast-paced, distributed, non- 
contiguous operations. SBCTs also provide an invaluable means of spearheading 
Transformation. The SBCT trains junior officers and noncommissioned officers — to- 
morrow's commanders and command sergeants major — in the tactics, techniques, 
and procedures that we are developing for employment of the Objective Force. They 
will help to identify the soldier-leader skills required in the Objective Force and as- 
sess our current ability to cultivate those skills. 

By leveraging platform commonality, enhancing logistics practices and enablers, 
and reorganizing logistics formations, the SBCT is more deployable and sustainable 
than our heavy forces, while significantly increasing combat power generating capa- 
bilities. Augmented for sustained operations, the SBCT requires 37 percent fewer 
combat service support personnel than a digitized heavy brigade. 


The Army began fielding the first SBCT just 2^2 years after announcing our in- 
tent to field such a force. In the spring of 2003 we will achieve IOC with the first 
SBCT at Fort Lewis, Washington. IOC for the remaining five SBCTs will occur each 
year thereafter through 2008. 

The transformation of four Active component brigades to SBCTs provides a rota- 
tional base with three of the SBCTs focused on the Pacific theater. One of the two 
SBCTs fielded at Fort Lewis will be forward-based in Europe not later than 2007. 
The Stryker Cavalry Regiment will support the XVIII Airborne Corps' critical need 
for robust, armed reconnaissance. The conversion of a Reserve component brigade 
to an SBCT will enhance our Strategic Reserve and support the global war on ter- 
rorism, smaller scale contingencies, and homeland defense missions. SBCT station- 
ing also provides rapid, strategic responsiveness through power projection platforms 
capable of supporting four critical regions described in the 1—4-2-1 defense con- 

The Army has resourced six SBCTs in concert with the 1-4—2-1 defense construct 
and national security requirements. However, at this time the Secretary of Defense 
has only authorized the procurement of the first four brigades pending the Army's 
plan for potential modifications to Stryker Brigades five and six. We intend to work 
with the Secretary of Defense and this Congress to assure that all six Stryker Bri- 
gades are fielded with the force structure and capabilities they need to possess. 


The Current Force is the force at war today. Through selective modernization and 
recapitalization, it is the force that will guarantee our Army's near-term warfighting 
readiness throughout the transformation process. 

Because the Army bypassed a procurement generation during the 1990s, the 
Ai'my's combat support and combat service support systems now exceed their 20- 
year expected life cycle, and 75 percent of our critical combat systems exceed their 
expected half-life cycle. To maintain operational readiness while preserving re- 
sources for transformation, the AiTny is recapitalizing and selectively modernizing 
a portion of the current force. The modernization program addresses the critical 
issue of Active component and Reserve component interoperability and serves as a 
bridge to mesh these two components seamlessly. 

In general, the Army increased funding for programs that are clearly trans- 
formational and support the defense transformation goals, sustained funding for 
high-priority systems that will transition to the Objective Force, and reduced fund- 
ing for systems not essential to Army transformation. The Army remains committed 
to its 17-system recapitalization program, but we have reduced the prioritized re- 
capitalization program from three-and-one-third divisions to two divisions in order 
to invest in transformation. 


The Army continues to make the difficult choices necessary to generate resources 
to fund transformation while sustaining acceptable risk to current readiness. In the 
previous three President's budgets submitted to Congress, the Army terminated or 
restructured 29 research, development, and acquisition (RDA) programs worth $12.7 
billion. In the 2004 President's budget, the Army accelerates its efforts to realize 
the Objective Force this decade by terminating 24 RDA programs and restructuring 
24 others to generate $22.5 billion for transformation. These cost savings, in concert 
with congressional and Office of the Secretary of Defense funding increases, enable 
the Army to fund our key transformation priorities — the fielding of six SBCTs, Fu- 
ture Combat System science and technology and system development, and our 
prioritized modernization and recapitalization program. 


Recapitalization is the cornerstone of the Army's strategy to sustain its 
warfighting capability throughout the fielding of the Objective Force. We are com- 
mitted to the recapitalization of two divisions in the Counter Attack Corps and 
Army aviation modernization and restructuring. Our strategy is to selectively re- 
build or upgrade systems that will remain in the inventory for the next 15 to 20 
years and achieve an average fleet age of no more than half of a system's expected 
service life. These systems include the Ml Abrams tank,M2/M3 Bradley Fighting 
Vehicle, AH-64 Apache, UH-60 Black Hawk, and CH-47 Chinook. This investment 
in future readiness will sustain warfighting capabilities, reduce the cost of owner- 
ship, and extend the service life of systems until the Objective Force is fielded 
throughout the Army. 


Aviation transformation further demonstrates the Army's hard choices in bal- 
ancing risk to resource transformation. Our interim plan — now in progress — elimi- 
nates Vietnam era aircraft from the force, lowers operating and sustainment costs, 
and postures aviation for arrival of the Objective Force by 2010. Apache moderniza- 
tion is an integral part of the Army Aviation Transformation Plan. The AH-64D 
Longbow heavy attack team will enhance domination of the maneuver battlespace 
and provide the ground commander with a versatile, long-range weapon system 
against a range of fixed and moving targets. The UH-60 Black Hawk continues to 
be the assault workhorse of Army aviation, executing over 40 percent of the Army's 
annual flying hours. We are extending the life of the UH-60 while providing it with 
capabilities required of the future battlespace. Similarly, the Army is fully commit- 
ted to the CH-47F Chinook program. Its heavy-lift capability is invaluable to trans- 
forming the Army. As we restructure and standardize attack and lift formations 
across the force, we will also adjust the stationing and alignment of Reserve compo- 
nent aviation units to mitigate the near-term risk. 


For nearly 228 years, the Army has kept its covenant with the American people 
to fight and win our Nation's wars. In all that time, we have never failed them, and 
we never will. The war on terrorism, the requirement to secure the homeland, and 
the need to maintain readiness for possible near-term contingencies have validated 
the need for a new kind of Army — a capabilities-based ground force that can fight 
and win battles across the full spectrum of military operations. 

Building and maintaining an Army is a shared responsibility between Congress, 
the administration, those in uniform, and the American people. Working with Con- 
gress, we will keep the Army ready to meet today's challenges and continue to make 
significant strides toward the fielding of our Objective Force. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, we thank you 
once again for this opportunity to report to you today on the state of your Army. 
We look forward to discussing these issues with you. 

Senator Sessions. Thank you very much. 

Those are good reports. We are indeed stressing our forces and 
the Army much more than anyone else while we expect the Serv- 
ices to transform. At the same time you are not given a lot of extra 
money, very little extra money, a $3 billion increase over last year's 
budget for the Army, which is what? A little less than 4 percent, 
a little over 3 percent is all, which is only slightly above the infla- 
tion rate. 

So we are asking you to do a lot of important things simulta- 
neously. My impression is that this Congress appreciates your ef- 
forts and is pleased that you are making as much progress as you 

General Keane, thank you for that good report about the morale 
of your soldiers. That is what I am feeling as I talk to them. I have 
been with three different Guard and Reserve units who have been 
activated from Alabama. They were motivated. 

I talked to several of the guys after Operation Anaconda that 
were in Walter Reed. One had shown me where a bullet hit him. 
He was shot in the leg and the arm, but that vest saved his life, 
and that is the kind of advancement in combat that you are to be 
commended for. 

The Army's $94 billion fiscal year 2004 budget request included 
$10.8 for procurement and $9.1 billion for research and develop- 
ment. In order to make these significant changes to your invest- 
ment accounts, the Army made some very difficult choices. Would 
you explain. Secretary Brownlee first and then General Keane, 
your comments would also be welcome — would you explain the dif- 
ficulties you went through the choices and difficult challenges you 
faced as you had to develop this budget? 


Secretary Brownlee. Mr. Chairman, first of all, when you talk 
about the difficulties, I have to recognize my good friend here 
again, because before I even came to the Pentagon, General Keane 
had headed up a task force to do an analysis of the recapitalization 
of the current Army force. Shortly after I got down, I received that 
briefing, and it is one of the finest I have ever received. It is one 
of the finest studies I have ever seen the Army do. 

The important point here is that the analysis was so thorough 
for each piece of equipment in the current force that is key, it is 
almost like putting a dollar at a time on these systems to ensure 
that they last as long as they have to, but no more. The good thing 
about that is we are not wasting money on things we should not. 
But the other good point is that we have a good feel for what we 
are buying and how long it is going to last. 

Having said that, the difficulty is in making the hard decisions 
and the tradeoffs, because as I have indicated and General Keane 
has indicated, the current force that we have is one that we are 
going to war with tomorrow if we must. It is the one that will have 
to last us for several years, because as you well know, the first unit 
of the Objective Force would not have an initial operating capabil- 
ity until 2010, and the world supply would consist of one unit of 
action at that time, or roughly one brigade size. 

So we are going to have this current force with us for some time. 
We have taken very seriously what is required to recapitalize and 
modernize that force. As we have gotten deeper into the Future 
Combat System and what is required to develop these very critical 
technologies and to bring them to fruition in a way that allows this 
very complex system of systems to come together in the right way, 
it is very costly. 

So we have had to make tradeoffs. The tradeoffs involve risk. My 
view of this is that the most serious thing that we face every day 
is the decisions we make on those kinds of tradeoffs. 

I believe that we are making the right decisions. They are not 
easy, as I said, but they have certainly been analyzed thoroughly. 
You mentioned the three and a third divisions in the counter-at- 
tack force, we are still going to have three and a third divisions in 
the counter-attack force, but only two of them will be fully modern- 

So we are still examining other things that we can do to hold the 
other parts of that up and make sure that it is still capable. 

General Keane. This became a crucible for us, and we were at 
a crossroads in coming to the decisions to make that. First of all, 
the fact that we were recapping and modernizing the heavy corps 
at Fort Hood, which in broad definition was three divisions and a 
third armored cavalry regiment (ACR), was a wise decision. 

What was driving that decision is that our operation and support 
costs were increasing at 10 percent per year. So in the 3 years that 
we were looking at it, it had gone up 30 percent. You just cannot 
run a business that way. 

We were just getting ourselves in a hole, because much of our 
equipment has passed its average life of 20 years, and that is why 
those operational support costs are as high as they are. 

So that drove us initially to the analysis that Secretary Brownlee 
referred to and the recapitalization and modernization program 


itself. We made a decision for a three and a third as a hedge 
against the uncertainty of the future and to keep that modernized. 

Then as we started to look at the Objective Force and to try to 
field that force in 2008 and in 2010, and to meet the financial obli- 
gations to do that, we had to revisit this decision. It was the tough- 
est decision I had been involved with in 4 years here. We took all 
of our systems, the 24 systems 

Senator SESSIONS. Precisely, what was the toughest call? What 
were you deciding? 

General E[eane. The toughest decision was to take money out of 
the recap and modernization program for the third division and the 
ACR and to take that money and put it into the FCS Objective 
Force. That was a tough decision. 

Also, commensurate with that was the program kills of the 24 
systems. In the previous 3 years, as this committee knows, we 
killed 29 systems. Added to that were these 24. 

The challenge we have is that we know that we have to do this 
within the amount of money the Army has allocated, that when we 
look down the hallway at the Department of Defense, nobody is 
going to give us extra money to do this. So we have to go into our 
own accounts and figure out how best to provide a current force 
that is capable for a number of years to come, and also field a fu- 
ture force to meet the emerging threats that we have and trying 
to find the balance to do that is really the issue. 

It takes our collective judgment and our wisdom to find that bal- 
ance. It is not easy. Now, we have talked about it quite a bit and 
discussed it and analyzed it. 

In the 24 systems that we terminated, which was another tough 
decision, we put them through some analysis. We wanted to know 
did those systems support Army transformation? Did the systems 
satisfy essentially core requirements for the Legacy Force against 
the emerging crisis and adversaries that we are going to deal with 
in the next decade? 

What was the operational risk if the system was killed? Was the 
requirement baselined to contribute to the Objective Force? Could 
the industrial base accelerate to a rapid fielding option if needed 
in response to short notice operational contingencies? 

Then we looked at it from a warfighting analysis. We looked at 
it from a business case, as well. We wanted to consider the return 
on investment, to assess how much operational enhancement was 
realized compared to affordability. 

We looked at its impact on the industrial base, which is not 
something that we take lightly. Could material meet the required 
schedule? What was the technology risk of the material solution? 
That was the kind of analysis that we put ourselves through in ter- 
minating those 24 programs and restructuring the others. 

So I think what we are saying to you, Mr. Chairman, is that we 
made a very difficult decision. If we had more money, we would not 
have made this decision. Without any more money, we believe that 
we have balanced the risk, and that this is an acceptable, prudent 
risk to do what we are doing. 

Senator Sessions. We thank you for that. We will do a 6-minute 
round and next will be Senator Lieberman, followed by Senator 
Inhofe and Senator Pryor. 


Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LlEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Brownlee, General Keane, thanks for very good open- 
ing statements. 

General Keane, you talked some about lessons learned from Af- 
ghanistan. I want to go back to Operation Anaconda, in which, as 
we know, tragically several Special Operations Command soldiers 
were killed. 

The commander of the Army forces in that battle was critical of 
the time it took to acquire close air support when needed. There 
have been recent indications that the Air Force and Navy have 
subsequently refined their close air support procedures, so as we 
meet here today, obviously, there is a sense of imminence about 
military action in Iraq. 

I wanted to ask you, with that in mind, are you more confident 
from an Army point of view of a timely close air support being pro- 
vided, should ground forces be called upon to invade Iraq? 

General Keane. Thank you for the question. Senator. You are 
right. We did have close air support challenges in that operation. 
Most of them revolved around the length it took to respond to a re- 
quest from a battlefield commander. 

We were in close combat with an enemy which was within, in 
most cases, a football field length away. In one of the cases where 
we were really asking for close air support, we were out- 
numbered — the enemy had about 350 soldiers, and we had 60. We 
were outnumbered and fought against them for 12 hours. 

Miraculously, due to the bravery of the battalion commander, we 
won that fight. We had 30 soldiers wounded. This battalion com- 
mander from the 10th Mountain Division took the 30 other sol- 
diers, some of whom were his staff officers and staff NCOs, and 
some infantry, and he physically led two assaults against the posi- 
tions that were at a higher altitude and fortified. 

Obviously we have decorated him for heroism. He killed 60 when 
he did that and then the al Qaeda left the field. It was the skill 
of our soldiers and their will that brought about that victory, but 
during that day, during those 12 hours, he suffered from a lack of 
what the Air Force and the Army both would consider adequate 
close air support. 

So as a result of that, my counterpart in the Air Force, Doc 
Foglesong, and I have met with the leaders of the Army and Air 
Force, and brought to a conference room like this, all the battlefield 
commanders who were there, that battalion commander, the other 
battalion commanders, the Air Force wing commander, squadron 
commanders, all the people who were controlling the airplanes 
from all the Services and all the ground people into one room. We 
looked at what was wrong and what happened. 

I wish all of you could have just listened to the honesty that was 
in that room that day, as we tried to solve a problem, knowing full 
well that we could get soldiers or marines hurt if we did not solve 
this problem. The people were not interested in protecting their pa- 
rochial service or prerogatives. They were just interested in solving 
the problem. 

Solve the problem, we did. We had a series of meetings to do it, 
and our problem is one that our cultures, we let them drift a little 


bit apart from Operation Desert Storm with the advent of preci- 
sion-guided munitions. 

As a result of that, we have to make some procedural changes, 
which we are making, and have made. We have to make equipment 
changes, so that our special forces and our infantry soldiers have 
the same equipment that the trained air/ground team has. The Air 
Force provides that equipment to our organizations. We have to 
make some doctrinal changes, as well. 

So as a result of all of this, we think we have all of those changes 
in place, and we took it very seriously, the criticism that came from 
our subordinates, who said this was not right. The leadership took 
it on to do something about it. We think we have done that. 

Senator Lieberman. Sir, that is very reassuring. Those changes 
are in place now as we contemplate action in Iraq? 

General Keane. With the impending nature of what was taking 
place with the potential war with Iraq, we knew we had to get this 
fixed. We did not have a lot of time to study it. 

Senator LlEBERMAN. Yes. 

General Keane. We had to do it quickly. 

Senator LlEBERMAN. I appreciate the answer. Let me ask one of 
the questions that I raised in my opening statement as to whether 
the level of research and development funding will enable you to 
reach the IOC of 2010 for the Objective Force, and if it does not, 
whether the risks — and obviously we all acknowledge that there is 
not enough to go around, so there is some risk — that we have taken 
with respect to the Legacy Force then may become excessive? Sec- 
retary Brownlee? 

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes, sir. This is the question we contin- 
ually ask ourselves. 

Senator Lieberman. Sure. 

Secretary BROWNLEE. If we take money out of the current force 
and the FCS, the Future Combat Systems does not show up on 
time, we are left holding the sack here. So this is not something 
that we have just left to chance. 

We have studied very carefully these critical technologies that 
will enable us to field Future Combat Systems. All the indications 
are that the studies of an outside group we asked to come in and 
look at this indicate that these technologies should enable us to do 

The question you posed, I think, is if there are not enough funds 

Senator Lieberman. Right. 

Secretary BROWNLEE. The affordability of FCS and the produce- 
ability of FCS on the schedule that we have outlined is something 
we still do not know for certain. It will probably be a year or two 
before we know better — before we know well enough to make that 

So we are in the process of establishing some metrics that will 
allow us to continually monitor where we are and what we are 
doing, and again, thanks to this great analysis that Jack and his 
team did on recapitalization, we believe that we will be capable if 
we are able to make the decision at the right time to revisit some 
of the recapitalization, modernization, if we have to, so that we 
would be able to go back and say, "Okay. This is not going to show 


up on time," or, "We cannot afford it on the schedule we are on, 
therefore we are going to have to reinvest and maintain the current 
force for so much longer." 

Senator Lieberman. General Keane, what about the unfunded 
requirement of $40 million for Objective Force science and tech- 
nology? Should we be concerned about that? Should we be pushing 
to see if we can fund it for you? 

General Keane. We would take any assistance that you would be 
willing to provide. 

Senator Lieberman. It has been your traditional strong position 
on those issues. 

General Keane. As I said before, we put $1.79 billion into that 
and we reduced our procurement account, so that we could actually 
put more money into R&D, which is what we thought the appro- 
priate priority would be for the Objective Force. The procurement 
account this year actually has gone down when compared to pre- 
vious years, which I know may be of concern. 

But the reason for that is so that we could put those monies into 
the R&D program. We just were not able to put everything that we 
wanted to do in it. 

Senator Lieberman. My time is up. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 
Thank you, both. 

Senator SESSIONS. The numbers I have and see, if they are cor- 
rect, show that you cut $10.8 billion from procurement, which was 
a 15-percent reduction in real terms over 2003. 

Secretary Brownlee. That is correct. 

Senator Sessions. A $9.1 billion increase for research and devel- 
opment, which was a 20 percent increase over 

Secretary BROWNLEE. Correct. Those numbers are correct, sir. 

Senator Sessions. Obviously you needed every dollar, or you 
would not have — if you need more, we need to know, I guess. 

Secretary BROWNLEE. What you just said, Mr. Chairman, reflects 
exactly what we set out to do, to spend more money, to develop 
these systems for the future at the expense of those we currently 
have, while at the same time, ensuring those that we currently 
have are ready enough to do what they have to do. 

That is not something that is easy to do. I know General Keane 
takes it very seriously, as does the Chief and the Secretary, and 
the Secretary of Defense as well. 

Senator SESSIONS. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, let me 
echo what both of you said about our troops and about the spirit 
that is out there. 

I spent some time at Landstuhl and talked to a lot of these peo- 
ple who are coming back. In fact, the downed CH-47 helicopter 
crew was there. I remember — although it was not your service; it 
was the Navy. I remember so well, because this young lady's name 
was Tennes and she was on the U.S.S. Tennes. It is the accident 
you all are aware of where she, during a refueling operation, got 
tangled up in the hose, and it took her down free falling, crushing 
her lungs and all of that. 

I talked to her in the hospital, and her only concern was getting 
back to the unit and making a career of the Navy. I got the same 
response from everyone we talked to there. So clearly that is it. 


But I feel guilty because I do not think we are giving them the 
best support that they need. Now, Senator Lieberman was talking 
about close air support and the deficiencies in Operation Anaconda. 

General Keane, it seems to me that at one of our hearings I 
asked the question that if we had had a competitive, more sophisti- 
cated artillery system, such as the Crusader, which was cancelled, 
could you have used it at that time? I think you said, "Yes, even 
though it is heavy and hard to get up." It had the range and the 
rapid fire to give you better support. Does my memory serve me 

General Keane. That is correct. That is my own opinion obvi- 
ously, and I am not the combatant commander. 

Senator Inhofe. Yes, I understand that. 

General Keane. I am not the ground commander. 

Senator Inhofe. But when that was cancelled — and I can under- 
stand what we all went through in trying to get to the FCS, trying 
to get it to a lighter, more efficient system. We have come up with, 
of course, the Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) cannon, and that is one 
that could have been taken up there, in terms of the size and the 
maneuverability and how it can be transported. 

I am a little concerned. Last year, when we had the NLOS can- 
non in as a part of the FCS, Secretary Brownlee, it was on two dif- 
ferent program elements (PE). 

Secretary Brownlee. Yes. 

Senator Inhofe. This year it is coming back on one. 

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes. 

Senator iNHOFE. Now, if there is a slippage in the FCS, my con- 
cern is that that portion of the FCS stay with its deployment date 
of 2008. What are your feelings about that? 

Secretary BROWNLEE. Sir, our intent is to field the FCS cannon 
in the year we have indicated, 2008. That is our intent. That is 
what the Army intends to do. That is the way we are fiinded to do 
it. Hopefully, the rest of FCS will come along with that. 

Senator Inhofe. Yet 

Secretary BROWNLEE. Our intent with the FCS cannon, because 
of the urgent need for it, is to field it during that time period. 

Senator Inhofe. Although I disagreed with the decision of termi- 
nation at the time and everyone is aware of that, I will say some- 
thing good has come from that, because there is awareness — ^you 
guys were aware of it, but a lot of us on this side were not — as to 
the deficiency we have in our artillery capability. The Paladin — I 
will not mention names — but when I talked to some of our own 
Senators that are on this committee, and said, "Are you aware that 
you have to swab the breech after every shot?" — almost reminiscent 
of the Civil War — and, of course, this is 1950s' technology. They 
were not aware of it. Now that awareness has come up. 

That is the reason that I feel that even though — yes, I want it 
to be compatible as far as the chassis is concerned, as far as the 
weight, and the characteristics with the FCS, in the event that 
there is slippage, I want to do everything I can to be sure that that 
part of it does not slip, because I believe that is a deficiency that 
we have that we need to correct. 

Any comments on that? 


Secretary Brownlee. Senator, as you indicate, there is a clear 
advantage to having the common chassis for this whole family. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. 

Secretary BROWNLEE. But the need to have the improvements in 
those kinds of artillery, fire power pieces that we need on the bat- 
tlefield has caused us to commit to the fielding of the FCS cannon, 
NLOS, as you referred to it, by 2008. 

Senator iNHOFE. Good. 

Secretary BROWNLEE. That is certainly our intent. I just really — 
that is long on time, but- 

Senator iNHOFE. Yes. No, I understand. That is 

Secretary BROWNLEE. That is our intent to 

Senator Inhofe. Do you generally agree with that, General 

General Keai>je. I do, and I 

Senator iNHOFE. Okay. 

General Keane. The NLOS cannon — I mean, obviously we have 
a problem with overmatch of artillery by our adversaries. There are 
a number of countries that clearly outrange us and outgun us. That 
has been our concern from the beginning. 

That concern is resident today. The NLOS cannon will solve that 
overmatch problem. Certainly while that schedule is ambitious, we 
clearly want that to happen. What we will do in the Army leader- 
ship is make sure that we are not going to let any of those funds 
drift away on us to other priorities, because it enjoys such a high 
priority with 

Senator Inhofe. I know it does. That is the point I am trying to 
make. While FCS is very significant and we want to get to the Ob- 
jective Force, there are some deficiencies we have today that can 
be met by the early deployment of parts of that, which should have 

I hear over and over again that we have the best Army in the 
world and all this — I know we do — and the fact that, yes, we are 
ready. Unfortunately, a lot of people misinterpret that as every- 
thing can go as it has been going, and everything is going to stay 
as ready as it is today. I do not believe that. 

Now, when you look at the budget since the 1990s, we have had 
a 34 percent cut, while undergoing a 300 percent increase in mis- 
sion rates — now this is a real serious problem. While, yes, we are 
ready today, these Senators over here and I spend a lot of time 
talking to our Guard and Reserve — the Reserve component of all 
Services, but mostly the Army. 

Many of the critical Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) are 
disappearing. We are not able to do this and so I do not know how 
long we can continue down this road. So I would like to have you 
talk in terms of what we are going to have to do in the future? 

Let us look at the number of divisions. We went from 18 down 
to 10. Some people are saying now, "Well, the Army is not impor- 
tant," or, "The ground effort is not important. We can get by with 
six divisions." 

Right now, in your professional judgment, faced with the type of 
challenges we have, what would you think would be ideal if you 
could have it today, as opposed to what we have today? Numbers 
of divisions, let us start there. 


Secretary Brownlee. Senator, first of all, let me just say how 
much I share your high regard for our Reserve component forces. 
They are serving with great distinction all over the world, and ev- 
erywhere you go and talk to them, and the sacrifices they and their 
families are making, I just have to take a minute to mention — we 
all know Tom Brokaw wrote a book called. The Greatest Genera- 
tion. There is another great generation out there now that deserves 
another book. Some of them — many of them are these Reserve com- 
ponent soldiers. But to directly address your question, sir, clearly 
the Army we have today, as Jack indicated, is deployed all over the 
world. Sometimes, I think every single soldier we have in the Army 
is on the move somewhere right now today. 

So these commitments that we are meeting today are taking 
most of not just the combat power of the Army, but the combat 
support and service support parts of the Army to support these 

We are able to do what we are doing now today, but how long 
we can do it is a question. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. I think we need to talk about that, because 
if we had a 1989 deployment at that time of 261,000 or whatever 
it was, that used, as I recall about 53 percent of our deployable end 
strength. That same thing today would be 86 percent. 

Secretary Brownlee. Yes. 

Senator Inhofe. Then you get into the Reserve and the Guard 
component. I think every time we talk about how we are ready to — 
yes, we have the best Army in the world, we should be very honest 
and say, "We cannot sustain this state of readiness without some 
changes," and then talk about this. 

Secretary BROWNLEE. Well, it is pretty obvious. Senator, that the 
forces we have deployed now, we do not have — without going far 
more deeply into the Reserve components — a rotation base to rotate 
those forces. 

Senator Inhofe. Yes. 

Secretary BROWNLEE. Now if we made the decision to do that, we 
still have Reserve component units that we have not touched, but 
we would have to go much more deeply into those Reserve compo- 
nents to do that. 

Senator Inhofe. Yes. Mr. Chairman, while there is not time to 
get into it, just so they can answer for the record, I have been con- 
cerned about the increase in the aviation accidents in all Services. 
There are some articles we read — I think — I do not know where it 
was — but a couple of days ago, and they talked about the high 
tempo of operations (OPTEMPO) in the Marines and the Navy. I 
have been over there and you have been over there we have all 
been there and have seen this. Perhaps it is a deficiency in mainte- 
nance. I would like to have your analysis of this maybe for the 
record insofar as the Army is concerned. Because Fort Drum re- 
minded us yesterday that that is a very serious problem now. 

General Keane. Yes. We are very concerned about it ourselves. 

Senator Inhofe. I know you are. 

General Keane. This year from last year, we have almost a 29 
percent increase in our accident rate, and we have a — when you 
compare it to a 3-year average, it is up by 50 percent. So we are 
very concerned about it. 


Senator Inhofe. Thank you. You can do that for the record. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I went over. 
[The information referred to follows:] 

Army Aviation Accident Rates 

The rate and number of Army Class A aviation accidents in fiscal year 2003 was 
28.6 percent higher for number (nine Class A aviation accidents in fiscal year 2003 
versus seven in fiscal year 2002) and 28.5 percent higher for rate (2.108 versus 1.64 
per 100,000 flight hours) than in the same period of fiscal year 2002. These rates 
were also 50 percent higher than the 3-year average for number of accidents and 
42 percent higher than the 3-year average for accident rate. While these statistics 
are troubling, we are aware that they have been tabulated during a year when the 
Army is conducting around-the-clock combat operations in many areas of the world. 
Thus, a 3-year trend comparison may be inappropriate to help vmderstand the real 
trends in these incidents. A more meaningful assessment may come from a compari- 
son of Army fiscal year 2002 and 2003 aviation accident rates against those experi- 
enced during other intense Army operational periods (such as in 1989-1990 with 
Operation Just Cause and Operation Desert Storm/Shield). We do not yet have this 
basis of comparison, but plan to review relevant historical data and make this com- 
parison as soon as possible. 

Irrespective of aviation accident historic2d trends in appropriate context, we re- 
main deeply concerned about the current rate of aircraft accidents and the associ- 
ated loss of precious soldier lives. We continue to conduct extensive investigations 
of each accident to determine underlying causes and to establish workable ap- 
proaches toward curbing these incidents. 

Our review of fiscal year 2003 Army aviation accidents presently indicates that 
maintenance was not a primary factor. Instead, two common factors seem to have 
been at play: human error within the crew and environmental factors like intense 
dust and darkness. Individual human en'or has been determined as an underlying 
factor in 100 percent of the accidents for which a cause has been determined. Within 
this category, aircraft crew coordination breakdowns and incomplete crew duties ac- 
count for 50 percent of these human errors. The environment has been determined 
as a factor in 62.5 percent of these aviation accidents, with 66 percent occurring at 

Informed with these insights, the Army has been pushing lessons learned and rec- 
ommendations for additional crew training and aviation soldier briefings to com- 
manders in the field. We will continue to provide this kind of feedback to aviation 
field commanders and safety monitors as ongoing accident investigations are com- 
pleted. We are also looking closely for all equipment modifications and updates that 
might prove helpful to limiting aviation accidents or limiting accident casualties. As 
we identify any of these equipment possibilities, we will aggressively pursue acquisi- 
tion and fielding of them for use in the Army aviation community. 

Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Inhofe, for your excellent 
series of questions. 

The vote has started. Senator Bayh, why do we not do your ques- 
tioning now? Then we will take a recess and come back. 

Senator Bayh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not think my 
questions will take too long, but if they do, we can come on back. 

Thank you, gentlemen, very much for your service to our country 
and for your courtesy in being here today. I appreciate it. 

Secretary Brownlee, I have a couple of questions for you, and 
they relate to the changes you are trying to make to modernize the 
force going forward and so forth. My questions have to do with how 
we maintain the industrial base necessary to produce the next gen- 
eration of vehicles, and maintain the current systems in place 
while we are cancelling these various systems. For example, I think 
the Abrams tank is in its last year of production. You have decided 
the Ml 13 armored personnel carrier for not to go forward with the 
upgrade program. I am concerned that there might be a gap there. 
I mean, many of these companies who produce things like trans- 


missions and other things, they are going to have to make a deci- 
sion about just going out of the business. 

Then we come back with the Arm/s Future Combat Systems, 
which are going to be good, but there is going to be a period of 
years where there is perhaps a gap. 

How are we going to produce the next generation of vehicles if 
these companies get out of the business? How are we going to sup- 
ply the current generation of vehicles, if they are not making spare 
parts and things like that? 

Secretary Brownlee. Senator, you have hit on a key question 
that both General Keane and I talk about all the time. We are con- 
tinually seeking ways to mitigate those things to get work into 
those plants that are most threatened by these cutbacks. 

Clearly because we are not producing the numbers of Ml tanks 
or Bradley Fighting Vehicles as we once were in great numbers, 
there is a lot of excess capacity in that industry that is going to 
be taken down. Some of it is already taken down. 

I mean, you go to some of these places now, and they are operat- 
ing at 20 and 30 percent of what they were only a few years ago. 
So it is a very serious question, and related to that directly are the 
work forces that are trained and can do this kind of work, and we 
cannot afford to lose it all. 

Then there is, of course, the design expertise that rests within 
some of those firms, and we recognize the critical importance of 
this, and that is why we have continually looked at upgrading Na- 
tional Guard equipment, as well as the active component, as seek- 
ing all the ways we can to get it to work, and get it into those 
places, as well as continuing to recapitalize and modernize what we 
have in ways that help them. 

But as you all know, it is very difficult to do when you simply 
do not have the capacity or the resources to do that. You have hit 
on one of the things that troubles us the most. Because there will 
be in some of these segments of the industry very serious gap prob- 
lems that are going to come. 

Senator Bayh. The marketplace today is brutal. I mean, they de- 
mand that inefficiencies be eliminated immediately. 

Secretary BROWNLEE. Yes. 

Senator Bayh. So if there is a gap there of 2, 3 years, they are 
going to face no choice but to take out their capacity. Then what 
do we do? It is hard to ramp back up overnight. 

So I am glad you focused on this problem. Part of our responsibil- 
ity is to make sure you do have the resources necessary to, at least, 
keep the infrastructure in place so that when the new generation 
comes along, we are in a position to go with that. 

General Keane. Senator, I would like to add to what Les said. 
Where we are today is a little different than even the months prior, 
when we made this decision, when we discussed this with industry, 
because the effect the economy has had. 

So we recognize that, and maintaining this great Army is a part- 
nership, and we know that. We cannot do it without the support 
of American industry, and there are only certain companies out 
there that make the kind of things that we need. So it is in our 
interest to maintain that industrial base. We recognize it. 


I think what we have in front of us is we have to work with our 
partners, because some of the things that have changed in just the 
last number of months, I know you have some information on and 
so do we. 

They have made some recommendations to us, and we want to 
seriously look at all of that, see how we can mitigate the risk. 

Senator Bayh. Gentlemen, I appreciate your attention to this 
issue, and I hope you will let us know what we can do to help you 
resolve it. 

Secretary Brownlee. I wish I could tell you we have solved it 
all, sir. We have not. But we are working hard on it, especially in 
those critical areas where we can already see that there are prob- 
lems that exist. 

Senator Bayh. Mr. Chairman, if we had a witness who could tell 
us he had solved every problem, that would be a first in my experi- 
ence, but it is certainly a standard to aspire to. Thank you, gentle- 

Secretary Brownlee. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions. Thank you. Senator Bayh. 

Due to the vote, we will take a recess and be right back. [Recess. 1 

All right. Here we go. It is strange to go from voting on Roe ver- 
sus Wade — I thought the Supreme Court had already settled that 
one, but we voted on it, as if somebody wanted to know what our 
sense was of it. [Laughter.] But here we are back at this matter, 
and that is just life in the Senate. 

I would note for the record on this that we are having a budget 
today, and several questions related to the funding for the Depart- 
ment of Defense. I have been looking at the numbers, and in 1993, 
the defense budget was $334 bilhon. In the mid-1990s, it had 
dropped to $278 billion — not adjusted for inflation, as I recall. 
Those are actual numbers. 

Then just last year we hit the $330 billion level — the year before 
last maybe, the $330 billion level. So we have really left the De- 
fense Department with a real problem, and I think the real prob- 
lem is that we should have been recapitalizing all along, a steady 
process of recapitalization over a long period of time. Then we 
would not be facing the bow wave of unmet needs, in addition to 
being in a conflict situation, and trying to deal with this with an 
economy that is hurting at the same time. So I think it is a good 
lesson to us. 

Now, the President's budget calls for a solid increase this year, 
plus presumably we will be having a supplemental, and then about 
a $20 billion a year increase for the next 4 years. If we sustain 
that, I think we can keep you on the level of transformation that 
we need to. If we come in, again, and start cutting that and not 
giving the Defense Department the funds it needs, then we are not 
going to be able to meet our requirements. 

Let me run a few questions by you. I might submit some for the 
record, and I will see when any of our other members get back 
from the vote. 

Now, I understand that the Department of Defense has asked 
the Army to evaluate the SBCT capabilities and to make rec- 
ommendations regarding areas where the Army can improve the 
capabihties of the fifth and sixth Stryker Brigades. The report is 


due July 2003. Can you provide some insights into what capabiH- 
ties will be added, and do you see a need to increase organic avia- 
tion assets? 

General Keane. I will do it. Yes, sir. That is true. We have been 
asked to look at the fifth and sixth brigades, primarily in the area 
of intelligence, air defense, precision munitions, and also in terms 
of aviation. We have that under study right now, and we will be 
providing some feedback to Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz on that issue. 

I also want to use that to inform us and inform them as to poten- 
tial changes in the first four brigades, if those changes merit that. 
We would go back and make adjustments to the first four brigades, 
so this — there are two parts to that. One is to take a look at five 
and six with some additional capabilities, and then also make some 
judgments about making those kind of improvements also to the 
first four brigades. 

Senator SESSIONS. Can you share any, or do you think it is pre- 
mature to share 

General Keane. Right now, we think it is. Yes, sir. 

Senator Sessions. Because of the $1.7 billion increase in R&D 
costs, the Army restructured the Comanche helicopter program, the 
sixth restructuring in as many years. Last October, the Depart- 
ment approved the Comanche program restructure and an acquisi- 
tion milestone of 650 aircraft, down from the 819 Comanches the 
Army said were required for an active component of the Objective 

The approved program does not reflect requirements for the Ob- 
jective Force unit of employment currently being designed, nor does 
it reflect potential additions of Comanches to the Stryker Brigade 
Combat Teams. Because the authorization committee felt that the 
Comanche helicopter program required increased oversight, the 
2003 Defense Authorization Bill required quarterly Comanche pro- 
gram updates to the defense committees. 

Question, would you provide us with the progress the Army has 
made to date in the Comanche program and any emerging results 
from the unit of employment design effort? 

General Keane. Senator, yes, thank you for that question, be- 
cause it is my belief that the Army finally came to grips with the 
Comanche program. 

Everybody here who has looked at the record of that would agree 
that it has been a troubled program over the years. I think when 
the Army restructured the program, we literally doubled the 
amount of money in the development program and we extended the 
program out by 2 years and 9 months — I think exactly. 

But the good thing is that we mitigated a lot of the risk in the 
program, and I believe the Army has now set the stage for a suc- 
cessful program here. We are certainly looking to the contractor to 
perform well in this regard, and we will be watching that very 
closely. But I think this time, thanks to the people on this commit- 
tee who seem to have agreed with what we did with the program, 
it now appears to be on a far more sound footing. It is a much bet- 
ter program with much better chances of success. 

But as I said, we are watching very closely the performance of 
the contractor and we are going to continue to do that. 


Senator SESSIONS. It is an important program, and I hope 

General Keane. It has been a troubled program for years. We 
had restructured it before, and we moved money around to pay for 
other programs. One of them was the Crusader, ironically enough. 

But Secretary Brownlee, one of the things that he did here so we 
could get a grip on that program, was to set up an independent re- 
view panel, headed up by former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 
Larry Welch, and brought together a lot of other notables from a 
national security influence area, and looked very hard at the pro- 

We had a big question mark around the program, and they came 
in and helped us re-baseline and restructure it, and they thought 
it was a very transformational program. With the strategy that 
they had recommended to us, they thought it was a very viable pro- 
gram. That is where we are today. We have a lot of confidence in 

We also had two contractors who were butting heads here, Boe- 
ing and Sikorsky. We had to fix the management oversight that 
they were providing to the program as well. I think we have done 
that by getting the attention of the leadership of both of those orga- 

Senator Sessions. Good. 

Senator Clinton, we are glad to have you here, and if you are 
ready, I have been going on past my limit, so I would be glad to 
recognize you at this time. 

Senator Clinton. I would be happy to wait if you are not fin- 
ished with your questions. 

Senator SESSIONS. I just had a couple more questions. 

Senator Clinton. I would be happy to wait. 

Senator SESSIONS. I will ask one more then. 

The heavy counterattack corps remains the highest priority for 
Legacy Force recapitalization and selected modernization. However, 
the Army funded the Objective Force by reallocating funding from 
the counterattack corps, reducing the recapitalization and selected 
modernization program from three divisions and an armored cav- 
alry regiment, as funded in the fiscal year 2003 budget request, to 
two only divisions. 

With 48 program terminations and restructures, the Army has 
again taken risk in the current Legacy Force. Over the last several 
years, the subcommittee has asked the Army leadership how they 
would prioritize among Objective and Interim and Legacy Forces. 
With 77 program terminations and/or restructures in the Legacy 
Force, it is clear that you have set priorities and are willing to take 
risk in the current force. 

What are the implications for reconnaissance and security mis- 
sions of not modernizing the counterattack corps, armored cavalry 

Please include in your response what you can plan to do to that 
unit to enable it to fight alongside the division in the corps. How 
much would it cost to modernize the ACR? 

General Keane. Okay. As we have said before, Mr. Chairman, 
that was a very difficult decision for us. The most difficult one I 
have dealt with in the last 4 years and very challenging. 


We think the risk is acceptable to begin with. Also if we had 
more money, we would put it right back into those programs as a 
top priority; first with the Third ACR, and then with the Third In- 
fantry Division. 

The Third Infantry Division's recapitalization program was not 
going to take place until 2007 in any event. So there are still some 
things that we could do with that division if we are able to gen- 
erate more financial support between now and then. 

Then in terms of how it would fight, all of the organizations in 
the Army would be digitized. By that, I mean, they would have 
similar situational awareness and they would be able to talk to one 
another, even though the basic tank may be a little different, or the 
fighting vehicle itself is not as modernized as another one. 

We are digitizing the entire III Corps, so that there is commonal- 
ity there in terms of the situational awareness they have of where 
they are and also the information we are going to provide to them 
in terms of where the enemy is. 

We know we have to have that kind of commonality. If we did 
not establish that, then we would have a problem. The fact that 
they are operating side by side with another division 

Senator SESSIONS. I understood that was not going to be one of 
the problems of modernization. 

General Keane. That will not be a problem. 

Senator SESSIONS. You can solve that. 

General Keane. We have solved that problem. We have kept 
those funds to make certain that that happens. The fact that one 
division will have a more modern tank than another division will 
not cause us a problem in terms of those organizations working to- 

Senator Sessions. Thank you. 

Senator Clinton. 

Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First, I want to thank the Secretary and the General for being 
here to give us this update. I particularly want to extend publicly 
my regret and sympathy about the crash of the Black Hawk yester- 
day up at Fort Drum. 

I have had the opportunity to speak to General Hagenbeck, and 
I know how difficult this is for everyone involved directly or indi- 
rectly. It is a great loss for us with these young soldiers getting 
trained, and I certainly extend my sympathy as well to the fami- 

I hope that we are able to continue this conversation about trans- 
formation as it goes forward, because just listening to the few ques- 
tions I heard from the Chairman, this is such a huge undertaking, 
and it is such a dramatic departure from traditional or legacy un- 
derstanding of what the mission has been and how to fulfill it. 

It is the case that I am sure there will be lots of fits and starts 
along the way, but I am committed to ensuring that the Army con- 
tinues to play the central role that it always has in our military, 
because I do not see any other way to create an effective fighting 
force without the Army being right at the center. 

So while we are transforming, we do not want to lose sight or 
undercut the capacity to provide the forces and resources that are 
needed for every kind of mission. Now, with that in mind, I am in- 


terested in the — this may have been asked to some extent before 
I came — the budget increases for the Interim Combat Systems, in- 
cluding the Stryker Brigades and the FCS, and the way that we 
have cut the amounts spent on the Legacy Force. In your written 
testimony, you express your beliefs that in May, the Future Com- 
bat System will meet its Milestone B deadline, and therefore will 
transition the FCS program from concept and technology develop- 
ment into systems development and demonstration. 

What would be the consequences to the budget if the FCS does 
not meet its Milestone B deadline, and how soon would we know 
that? Would we have time to take appropriate actions within the 
budgetary framework to be able to continue the work that you are 
doing? Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary Brownlee. We would know in May, ma'am, if it did 
not make the Milestone B deadline. 

Senator CLINTON. That is a firm deadline in your opinion? 

Secretary Brownlee. It is a firm deadline as far as that mile- 
stone. I should add, because this is a different kind of procurement 
or procurement acquisition strategy that we have developed for 
this, as you have described so well, this very complex and huge un- 
dertaking that we have, it is a system of systems. It is right now 
24 different requests for proposals with 19 for the FCS and other 
related ones, and trying to bring all those together in a way that 
will create this kind of new force with very new and distinct capa- 

It would have impact on the budget, but probably not to the de- 
gree in the near term that it might, because we would still be using 
developmental funds if we were — if this was a milestone where we 
were going from development into procurement, then yes, we would 
have the problem we face so often of having to transition or convert 
procurement funds back into R&D or something like that. 

But the reason I wanted to describe the difference is because I 
think people going into this very important milestone decision also 
have to recognize that we have to look at this differently. Some of 
the things we are doing, using elite system integrator as a very im- 
portant part of this strategy is different for the Army. Outside of 
the missile defense area, it is different for everyone. 

So it is just a different thing, and we are going to have to all rec- 
ognize that. Going from concept development to systems develop- 
ment is a very important step, but in my mind, it is more impor- 
tant about what it says about Milestone C. 

If we do not make Milestone B, what does that say about the 
next one, which would be in 2006. 

Senator CLINTON. Yes. 

Secretary Brownlee. So I do not think it is a catastrophe if we 
do not make it. While some of us might have been pretty worried 
a few months ago about our ability to make it, some of the things 
that have happened recently are very encouraging. 

I mentioned earlier the evaluation of the critical technologies 
that we have identified. We started off looking at about 3,000 and 
gradually narrowed it down to a list of 31 that are considered criti- 
cal. Those have all met or nearly met the technology readiness lev- 
els that they should have in order to proceed. 


We also — to help assure ourselves — asked an independent group 
to come in and evaluate those. They also gave a very encouraging 
report about that. 

So, yes, it would be greatly disappointing not to make that mile- 
stone. I do not think it is catastrophic, because this is a very ambi- 
tious schedule, and I think everybody has to recognize that. 

I have asked myself is it too ambitious? Then the question comes 
back, we are taking money out of the current force in order to fund 
this very ambitious program, and there is a lot of money we are 
putting into R&D. There is $13.5 billion worth of R&D in this plan, 
this 5-year plan or 6-year plan it is. 

Senator Clinton. Yes. 

Secretary Brownlee. So, yes, it would be disappointing. I do not 
think it would be devastating. I think we could still proceed. When 
I ask myself what is the alternative, the alternative is to have a 
less ambitious schedule, and we have opted not to do that. 

Senator CLINTON. I really appreciate that explanation. I do not 
know that that is the alternative, I guess, is the point of my ques- 
tion. I think we are falling into a lot of either/or thinking around 
here, not just with respect on this specific issue but on a range of 
other concerns as well. 

So I am hoping that the drive for transformation does not blind 
us to the need to continue to support the existing force, and to en- 
sure that for the next 4 to 6 years, or however long this process 
is, that we are not hollowing out what we currently have in order 
to try to meet deadlines and pursue some worthy goals that I think 
we agree with. It should not be an either/or approach. I think many 
of us will watch that and work with you. 

Secretary Brownlee. Yes, ma'am. 

Senator Clinton. Has the procurement system undergone a 
similar transformational initiative? 

Secretary Brownlee. It is in the process of undergoing some- 
thing similar and as I said the acquisition strategy that we have 
adopted for this is new and different for the Army. 

Senator Clinton. What kinds of conflicts of interest proposals 
are you putting in place with respect to all of these contracts that 
are being undertaken? 

We are embarking on an enormous undertaking that involves 
multiple billions of dollars, and some recent news reports have 
been highly concerning to me about what, if any, conflicts of inter- 
ests and other kinds of rules are in place as to who bids on con- 
tracts, who has information, and who does not have information, 
and I would like additional detail about what it is we are doing to 
safeguard anyone taking advantage of these situations by virtue of 
being insiders or in any other way undermining the transparency 
insofar as possible of the procurement and bidding and contracting 

Secretary BROWNLEE. I share your concern, and I have voiced 
that several times. I think we have to continually work those 

We have put in place around the Lead Systems Integrator cer- 
tain firewalls that we believe will protect against the kinds of 
things you mention. 


I cannot tell you that in my mind right now I am totally assured 
they are all foolproof, but we are looking at it very closely. 

In order to make this work, the Lead Systems Integrator has to 
have some authority within the source selection process, but one of 
the things that I insisted on when I came there a year ago was that 
the Army acquisition authority always had the final word. 

Senator Clinton. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. I know you 
have a distinguished career on this side of the Government as well 
and I would appreciate your conveying the concerns many of us on 
this committee have that in our efforts to discharge our public re- 
sponsibilities, we are not able to obtain information in direct ques- 
tion and answer sessions with officials from the Pentagon; whereas 
it appears the contractors are. 

Secretary Brownlee. Yes. 

Senator Clinton. I find that somewhat disturbing. When, in a 
comparable hearing, we asked repeatedly — in fact, the Chairman 
was there — Secretary Feith and others, "What is happening? When 
is it happening? How much it is going to cost?" We were told it was 

Then we pick up the newspaper and find out the contracts are 
being let for the unknowable. I am not making any judgment about 
the substance of the contract or the persons or institutions to 
whom it was awarded, but we have an obligation here in the Sen- 
ate and on the other side of the Hill to be kept informed about 
these matters. 

Ultimately, we are the ones who have to appropriate the money 
and answer to the taxpayers. 

Secretary Brownlee. Yes, ma'am. 

Senator Clinton. General Keane, I am very concerned also about 
what you might call the manufacturing base of the Legacy Army. 
We have Watervliet in New York. I visited the arsenal last week. 

It is troubling to me that we might lose the capacity as we have 
in other areas of necessary equipment to not only private contrac- 
tors, but offshore or Government contractors. Certainly when you 
look at the Watervliet arsenal and the fact that it is the only re- 
maining Army manufacturing facility making cannon and howitzer 
tubes and the like, it is a cautionary note that we do not want to 
give up the ability to quickly turn out heavy equipment even if we 
are transforming, because I still believe, and I may be at a minor- 
ity, that you have to hold ground and you may need heavy equip- 
ment to help you do that. 

Do you have any comments about the need for continuing that 
kind of manufacturing within the Army itself as opposed to con- 
tracting it out? 

General Keane. Yes. Thanks for the question. Senator. I appre- 
ciate your condolences for our soldiers and their family members 
and also we really appreciate the interest that you have shown in 
Fort Drum and the number of times that you have been up there 
around family members. I thank you for all of that and your con- 
tinued support of our Army. 

You put your finger right on that issue. It is the only place truly 
in America that does that kind of work, so it is of great value to 
the Army. 


Our problem is we have a work capacity problem there, in terms 
of the amount of production and work that we are providing to that 
institution. But there is a lot of work coming in the future with 
NLOS cannon, which will be the new artillery system for the Army 
after the cancellation of the Crusader program. 

So we are optimistic. Obviously like every other program it will 
get reviewed by the BRAC Commission, and judgments will be 
made about it. But it is the only one of its kind in America. So we 
have a lot of confidence in what it has done for us. 

Senator Clinton. I appreciate that and I would hope that you 
and the Secretary and the Chairman or others might possibly come 
up and visit there, because I remember very well when the U.S.S. 
Cole was attacked and that terrible gaping hole was blown into the 
hull, and there was, at that time, only one place left in the entire 
United States where you could get armored steel. That was Beth- 
lehem Steel, which has since, of course, gone into bankruptcy. 

As we are looking at transformation, I think we do not want to 
be reliant on Chinese steel companies or Russian steel companies, 
or anybody else in the world for the kind of nuts and bolts equip- 
ment that is absolutely needed. Whether you are transformational 
or non-transformational, you have to produce some of that heavy- 
duty equipment. So I think that is going to be an issue for us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Sessions. Thank you. You raise a very important point. 
The Barry amendment, we have some problems with that. I think 
the Defense Department is back on track about that. 

But it is true that steel is a good example. It is a security issue. 
The total collapse of the steel industry in America does leave us 
vulnerable strategically, I think, at least in the economic pain from 

General Keane, I would just like to say we have been talking 
about transformation and we have been pushing the Defense De- 
partment to do that. Most large organizations are bureaucratic and 
slow to change. Maybe ours is too, but I want to say without any 
doubt that our military is more open to change, more willing to 
change, more focused on the future than, I am sure, any in the 

You talk about the Operation Anaconda review, the honesty that 
was there and the commitment to figure out how we can do it bet- 
ter in the future without worrying about our parochial interests, I 
think, is a good commentary. We need to keep that and keep this 
momentum going and hopefully we can achieve the goals that we 
would like to achieve. Do you generally feel optimistic? You have 
worn the uniform a long time. 

General Keane. Yes, I am, and most people focus on the plat- 
forms that we are changing, and many of the leaders in the Army 
do. We cannot help ourselves. We are a platform-centric organiza- 
tion, more ground platforms than air platforms get a focus in the 
Army. At times, wrongly so, to be honest with you. 

But the real change in transformation is a cultural change, and 
it occurs in people's heads. That is where the challenge has been. 
When you move in any large organization and — most people think 
because we have all this rank and we are somewhat of an auto- 


cratic institution, by issuing orders we will create positive change. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. 

We have to have an idea, and we have to be persuasive with that 
idea. It has to be moving to people in our Army to get them to will- 
ingly commit to change. If you do not get them to commit willingly 
to it, to believe in it, it is not going where you think it is. Despite 
the rank that we have and the orders that we can give, in this bu- 
reaucracy that we have — and at times it is that — it can slow and 
stop good ideas from taking place if they are not convincing and 

So our challenge has always been cultural. We are trying to 
change an Army that has fought one way to fight a different way. 
We have to be convincing. I mean, it has been a journey, and it has 
been a struggle. 

At the beginning, it was very hard. We have made some 
progress, but we are not completely there yet. It will take more en- 
ergy and more conviction to get us there. 

Senator SESSIONS. It has been incredible to me the efforts and 
success in which the air and the ground have worked together. 

General Keane. Yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. Where you have the Air Force and sergeants 
on the ground working together effectively to direct firepower ex- 
actly where it needs to go. 

I know Senator Lieberman had asked you about Operation Ana- 
conda, and I guess those were some of those same t3T)e issues, how 
you coordinate effectively; but it seems to me you are doing very 
well at that. 

Would you comment on where you are and what your hopes are 
for the future? 

General Keane. Specifically dealing with air/ground support, 
what we learned from Operation Anaconda and the commanders 
who were there, both in the air and on the ground — we have spent 
considerable effort these last months fixing that. We think we have 
done that. 

It is not just fixing the procedures and some of the technology. 
We have to also talk to our youngsters about it. The Vice Chief of 
the Air Force and I both attended his command and staff college 
and his war college. We both got up on the stage and we openly 
talked to them about the problems we had and what we are doing 
about it, because the youngsters out there who were doing this 
have to believe as well that we have fixed those issues. We do not 
want them going into battle, whether they are in the air or on the 
ground, thinking that the Army and the Air Force are not going to 
work effectively together. 

We do not want any doubt in anybody's mind that the Air Force 
is going to be there for Army soldiers when they are in trouble. We 
know that the Air Force will be there for us. Now, we do not want 
any pilot thinking that somehow procedurally the Army is not 
going to be able to communicate with him effectively to help those 
soldiers that are in need. So we think we fixed it. 

Senator SESSIONS. I know in Afghanistan, that has been stated 
as the biggest change, where you actually had ground combat spe- 
cial forces directing air munitions. 


How far are we from having the normal Army combat unit hav- 
ing those same capabihties? Is that only special forces or is that 
throughout the Army that we have the systems in place to do that? 

General Keane. Now, that is a great question. When you look at 
warfare, one of the things that is occurring to us and that is ex- 
ploding is the ability to integrate our joint warfighting capability 
in ways that we have not in the past. The integration we used to 
achieve was normally at field commander level, where you would 
find a three- or a four-star flag officer. We achieved some oper- 
ational integration at his level. 

What is happening now, because of the explosion of technology, 
our ability to have a common read of the battlefield from the air 
as well as the ground, is that everybody is looking at the same 
thing at the same time, and we have the capacity to truly commu- 
nicate effectively with each other very rapidly, so we have a com- 
mon situational awareness of our own forces as well as the enemy's 

What that is enabling us to do is move down the vertical access 
of warfare and empower people at lower levels with the capacity to 
integrate the combat power across service lines in a way that was 
not imaginable even 10 years ago. 

In Operation Desert Storm, when we went there in 1991, if we 
are honest with ourselves, what we really did is all the Services 
were there, but we sort of de-conflicted our operations and stayed 
out of each other's way. When we look back at it in the cold reality 
of the day, as successful as that operation was — and it was very 
successful. It was magnificent as the sailors, soldiers, airmen, and 
marines performed, and it was that when we look at it proce- 
durally, we could have done much better. 

We have been working very hard on that the last 10 or 12 years 
to achieve better integration. We are not completely there, but if 
we are asked to do something in Iraq, I think you will see there 
will be some profound differences along the lines that I have dis- 

The people at lower levels will be integrating combat capability 
across service lines in a way that we have not in the past. You saw 
some of that when I gave you the illustration of special forces 
teams in Afghanistan controlling the air power of all of our strike 
aircraft. Young sergeants who were broken up into groups of threes 
and fours doing that because they had the right communications, 
they had the right technology to fix the GPS-guided munitions and 
to deliver it very accurately. So that is profound change for us. 

Senator SESSIONS. It certainly is. That is also the next question, 
which is probably a subject for another discussion or maybe a 
closed briefing. Are we there enough, and is that transformation 
recognizing that incredible technological advancement sufficiently? 

General Keane. It is the technological change that is enabling us 
to move towards a transformational way, at least for a land force 
to fight. 

Wliat we have done historically, for 100 years, is we have always 
fought principally the same way, we have gathered ourselves in 
very large formations. We call them divisions. If you looked at it, 
it has been a rectangular box. We put them together in threes or 


fours, and you had a guy like me, a three- or four-star general, and 
put him in charge of them. 

He would move into a country on an axis with those divisions, 
and very methodically would control terrain, overmatch an adver- 
sary, and control the population. Maybe we would be moving on 
two or three axes. 

As the latter part of the 20th century arrived, because of the 
kind of technology and the better systems we had, we were able to 
make more dramatic moves with those formations. But the forma- 
tions inherently stayed the same. They were in those massive for- 
mations, because there was a hedge against the uncertainty of 
what an enemy was going to do. 

We always had that degree of uncertainty. In the first part of the 
20th century, we could not even see over the hills, so we sent guys 
over the hill to find out what was going on. At the latter part, we 
started to see with satellites and we started to integrate air power 
so we could see better, and those formations loosened up. You saw 
what Norm Schwarzkopf did in Operation Desert Storm when he 
made that big sweep, but the way of fighting really did not change. 
It was principally the same. 

The technological change that is occurring is that now we have 
what I would describe as an unblinking eye over that battlefield, 
where you can truly see where an enemy is and what they are 
doing. The terrain between you and the enemy is less important to 
us than what it has been in the past. 

So if you accept that, if you accept that premise and you believe 
it, then you can introduce forces dramatically different as opposed 
to moving on an axis like this, and you can send them to places 
at the same time to defeat what is there, or to take control, to seize 
what you are interested in, a capital city, an air field where there 
is an enemy formation, highways or railroads that you want to 
seize, so the enemy does not use it. 

You can do this in six, seven, eight, nine places, and I will call 
it just drawing circles around the places you are interested in, dis- 
card the long axis, and you go to those places much more rapidly 
than we do today. In days and weeks, you can defeat an adversary, 
because you will force him to implode on himself. 

That is different. Technology is enabling us to do that. I think 
what we are doing is recognizing that technology is there. 

So these formations that we will have in the future will be much 
smaller, and we will not be intimidated by the fact that we are 
fighting an adversary that is larger, because while they may have 
a larger Army force than we do, we will be integrating all of the 
joint fires at a much lower level than we do today, and be able to 
address that adversary in ways that we can see today, but we can- 
not completely do today. 

We think that is pretty transformational, because it is really 
changing how an army fights and we have not made as dramatic 
a change like this in 100 years, when you really get down to it. 

Senator Sessions. I think that is pretty transformational. I 
agree. That is a marvelous explanation of where we are headed. 
Thank you very much. 

Senator Clinton. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would like to follow 
up on what the general just said. I can understand and visualize 


the description that you just gave us, until you came to the words 
"capital city." What I need to understand is what transformational 
concept guides our thinking with respect to urban warfare. 

General Keane. Yes, that is a great question. 

Senator Clinton. Because, when you think about Schwarzkopf 
making a sweep, or you think about Afghanistan, you have dif- 
ferent kinds of topography, but it is basically an unpopulated, large 
expanse in which to operate. 

I am confident that we can be successful anywhere, but I am just 
having a hard time understanding a kind of heavily urban area 
that if I were a determined adversary, I would use to embed my 
forces and I would require us to undertake actions that would in- 
evitably result in very large civilian casualties, and which under 
the circumstances would not be immediately successful, just by the 
very nature of the environment in which we found ourselves. 

So how does the transformational philosophy go along with what 
I view as a very serious continuing threat with respect to our abil- 
ity to take on whatever comes our way? 

General Keane. Yes, Senator, that is a great question. It is one 
that has challenged us intellectually for a number of years. 

What we have been doing, for the last 10 to 15 years, is drawing 
circles around these major cities and convincing ourselves we were 
going to bypass them. Most of our operational plans called for all 
of that, to include the ones in Operation Desert Storm. 

The reality is our adversaries are very much aware of that. You 
saw what Milosevic did, relatively successfully in Kosovo. He had 
a 40,000-man force. We put no ground forces into Kosovo and he 
was rather successfully able to hide that and shield that force from 
a 78-day air war. He did that in population centers and also hiding 
the forces in villages and using some camouflage techniques from 

So that technique is well known by our adversaries, and we have 
had to change. We have the capacity to do it. It takes some crafts- 
manship. I do not dispute that. It takes some generalship to do it. 
We would go into a major city with the values of the American peo- 
ple with us, with the intent that clearly we are not going to harm 
people unnecessarily. 

If the adversary is crafty, he would hold that population in resi- 
dence. He would not let it go. One of the things that we would have 
to do is attempt to separate the military targets as best we could 
from the population. We have to control the population. We have 
to make some pretty interesting decisions early on. 

Is one radio and television? We have to take control of radio and 
television so we can talk to that population, and have the appro- 
priate people talk to them in terms of what our intentions are. 
Even while the adversary is there, we have to have the capacity 
to take the TV and radio stations away from them and talk to that 

We do not necessarily have to use his. We can shut down his and 
use our own to do that sort of work. Talking to the people them- 
selves is a major issue for us, and we would not want them to 
leave. We want them to stay in their homes and know we are not 
there to harm them. 


We may actually have to segment that population, so we do not 
want it moving around. An adversary like Saddam Hussein can 
probably get 20,000 people to participate in an event, just by call- 
ing for it. 

Well, if we are segrnenting that population, barricading it, block- 
ing it, and we are doing that within the American value, they see 
and feel the strength of our forces there, that we are not going to 
let them move and participate in an event like that, which will be 
covered by CNN and would result probably in the loss of innocent 
lives. We are not going to let that happen. 

So controlling the population is critical to do that. We have to 
have presence to do that. We also have to have a means of commu- 
nicating to the people to be able to do that. 

The second thing is we have to deal with military targets, and 
we would use air as well as ground forces to do that, and we would 
do that very surgically. That is an often-used word. What I am say- 
ing is it would not necessarily need a lot of force or a lot of pres- 
ence to do that. 

We would probably use some special operations forces to do it, 
as well as we would use air power with GPS-guided munitions to 
do that sort of work. We would obviously have to know that that 
is a bona fide target and know what it is and make our judgments 
about it, just as obviously we would have to do in this upcoming 

So the technology is enabling us to see better. We are developing 
UAVs to use in cities that we can move down alleyways, over build- 
ings and we can watch and see. We are going to have multiple 
UAVs to do this, as part of our Objective Force, we need those sen- 
sors to have this unblinking eye in a city, so that we know what 
is happening. 

If we can see it and understand, then we can make the appro- 
priate decisions. We would never do what the Russians did in 
Chechnya. We would not do that. 

Even the problems that the Israelis were facing in Jenin. They 
had a significant challenge that they were facing there, and they 
found that all the roads and alleys were booby-trapped and mined, 
and they had to go through the buildings as the avenue of ap- 
proach. In other words, they took bulldozers and moved through 
the buildings and did it that way. 

We would hope that our technology in the future would give us 
the opportunity to avoid doing that kind of work, but it was a chal- 
lenge that they were facing certainly. They did the best they could 
with that challenge. 

So you are right. Senator. I mean, it is a long response. It is chal- 
lenging work for us, and I think we put a lot of intellectual energy 
into it. We have the values of the American people that are in our 
soldiers, and that is the way we operate. I think we can do it with- 
out undue harm to the people. 

We have to have that capability. If we do not, then our adversar- 
ies will just use the people as a shield and try to get the best politi- 
cal deal they can out of a stalemate. In many cases, that would 
probably be unacceptable to us. 

Senator Sessions. That was most interesting. It becomes more 
difficult as the adversary is fiercely dedicated to resistance. The de- 


gree at which that notches down, the lesser degree of loyalty to 
their existing government, I think, is a factor in all of this too. If 
they will operate like the North Vietnamese did in small groups far 
away from a command center, you have a more difficult problem 
than if they have to be kept together. 

We are just appreciative of your leadership. I will submit a ques- 
tion about our pre-positioned material. I understand that some of 
the equipment that we had pre-positioned was not as modern as we 
would like it to be, and that some units who were actually training 
on it and had to down-train to be able to utilize the older equip- 
ment. So it would be something that I will submit in writing. 

Is there anything else. Senator Clinton, you have? 

Senator CLINTON. No, thank you. 

Senator Sessions. Thank you very much. It was an excellent 
hearing and we look forward to working with you as time goes by. 

General Keane. Thank you. 

Secretary Brownlee. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions. We are adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions 

1, 2. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, we look to the Army's unfunded re- 
quirements (UFR) list when we consider opportunities for increasing the Army's 
modernization budget. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to understand Army prior- 
ities as reflected in that UFR list. For example, while the Army has terminated so 
many programs related to the modernization of the Counterattack Corps, it has in- 
cluded an $88 million unfunded requirement for two battalions of Paladin howitzers 
for a National Guard Strategic Reserve division. Does this accurately reflect Army 
priorities? Where should we look to help the Army should we find additional re- 

Secretary Brownlee. The Army's top priorities are funded in the President's 
budget submission. While we would have liked to have funded all of our require- 
ments, we took prudent risk in some areas. Our top five shortfalls reflect those 
areas where we have taken the most risk, and if additional funding were available, 
we would apply them to these areas first. Our number one shortfall is active duty 
pay and allowances. This shortage is due to an unforeseeable short-term change in 
the mix of officer and enlisted soldiers. Number two is in chemical weapon stockpile 
and material storage/demilitarization site security. The additional funding allows us 
to enhance security around chemical weapons storage and demilitarization. Number 
three is anti-terrorism/force protection funding for security guards and equipment 
on military installations. Number four is for ammunition and helps fund training 
ammunition and replacement of expended war and operations ammunition. The last 
item in our top five is Flight School XXI, enabling us to better and more rapidly 
train our helicopter pilots. 

Regarding Paladin howitzers, the Army National Guard (ARNG) has a critical re- 
quirement to modernize their heavy division self-propelled howitzer systems from 
M109A5 to M109A6 Paladins. The required $88 miUion will support the ARNG re- 
quest for two battalion sets consisting of 36 M109A6 Paladins to modernize two di- 
rect support 155SP artillery battahons in the 49th Armor Division (Texas ARNG). 
The Paladin howitzer provides essential improvements in survivability and respon- 
siveness through a self-locating capability. Most importantly, Paladin provides a 
digitized system that is mandatory on today's battlefield. The 49th Armor Division, 
due to its alignment with III Corps, is a high-priority unit in support of the counter- 
attack mission. 


3. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, fiscal years 2003 
and 2004 are critical times for Army transformation. In partnership with the De- 
fense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Army has focused its 


science and technology (S&T) funding on identifying technologies which can be 
quickly developed into combat capabilities. Over the past 3 years, the Army has 
dedicated over 95 percent of its S&T funding to the Objective Force program. I un- 
derstand that towards the end of May, the Army and DARPA will be evaluating 
these technologies as you conduct a Future Combat Systems (FCS) Milestone B re- 
view to determine which technologies will be ready to enter into System Develop- 
ment and Demonstration (SDD). What else can be done to mitigate risk in the FCS 
program? If, for some unknown reason, the FCS SDD is delayed, what alternatives 
do you have? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. Risk mitigation within the family of 
systems that comprise FCS is addressed using both technology alternatives for sub- 
systems and capability alternatives to elements of the FCS family of systems. The 
FCS program manager commissioned an assessment to identify the critical tech- 
nologies required to achieve the first FCS capability increment. The assessment, en- 
dorsed by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology), deter- 
mined the technical maturity, the degree of criticality of the technology to FCS, and 
the requirement for risk mitigation plan in the event the technology did not mature 
as required. The Army subsequently developed risk management plans for all of the 
medium- and high-risk critical technologies. Any significant delay in FCS SDD 
would require the Army to revisit plans for legacy system recapitalization and mod- 
ernization to keep those systems in use for longer periods of time. 


4. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, Section 215 of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 directed the Army to 
provide a report on the experimentation program regarding the design of the Objec- 
tive Force. Please describe the experimentation plan for the Objective Force, the role 
of the SBCT in informing that experimentation, and the cost of that experimen- 
tation for fiscal year 2004 and the FYDP. 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The report required by the Fiscal Year 
2003 National Defense Authorization Act is currently under review and expected to 
be approved for distribution in the near future. Present Army experimentation plan- 
ning, the first to truly focus on the Objective Force, will support Office of the Sec- 
retary of Defense guidance to transform America's national security institutions. 
The plan establishes processes, responsibilities, and procedures to implement ag- 
gressive, innovative concept development and experimentation. The plan also re- 
duces risk and integrates Army concept development and experimentation into a co- 
herent service/joint context to provide combatant commanders with sustained land 
combat capabilities. The plan informs the Army leadership vision and concept for 
the Objective Force and commits the Army to a transformation path to achieve Ob- 
jective Force capabilities in 2010 and field operational SBCTs while maintaining the 
current force as a strategic hedge. 

The SBCTs will be incorporated into Objective Force experiments to the extent 
practicable in order to ensure Objective Force unit of action/unit of employment de- 
velopment. These experiments also will serve as an important link in developing re- 
quirements for the Objective Force. 

Experimentation, including that necessary for the battle laboratories, is funded at 
$112 million for fiscal year 2004 and $772.6 million across the FYDP. 

5. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, what role did ex- 
perimentation play, if any, in the design of the Objective Force unit of action? 

Secretary BROWNLEE. Experimentation played a key role in the development of 
the operational and organizational concepts that ultimately led to the design of the 
Objective Force unit of action. Experimentation took the form of Army seminar war 
games and battle lab concept experimentation program experiments, joint and sister 
services battle lab experiments, and other Government agencies' experiments and 
technology demonstrations. 

Seminar war games led by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command per- 
mitted Army senior leaders to model and examine capabilities envisioned for the 
Objective Force within an operational scenario. Insight gained from these war 
games facilitated the definition of the unit of action and unit of emplo3Tnent oper- 
ational and organizational concepts. Experimentation validated and refined con- 
cepts; provided insights for metrics to incorporate in operational requirements docu- 
ments; assessed impacts of FCS on tactical operations; examined the influence of fu- 
ture tactical and technical capabilities; and explored the potential effects on com- 
manders, staffs, and military operations. Experimentation also provided insights 


into future information requirements, development of tactics, techniques, and proce- 
dures and early insights into the warfighting capabilities derived from advanced 

6. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee and/or GenerEil Keane, what experimen- 
tation is being conducted with respect to the division- and corps-level unit of em- 
ployment? When will that design be completed? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. Army Transformation War Games 2001 
and 2002 examined echelons of command. During Unified Quest 2003, the Army will 
examine alternatives to current echelons of command above brigade level. Unified 
Quest 2003 will focus on the possibility of reducing the number of command eche- 
lons, and will explore the impact of headquarters designed to provide joint and oper- 
ational command and control using an advanced battle command system. The exer- 
cise will allow the Army to look at alternative command design constructs using 
emerging joint concepts and within the framework of major combat operations. 

Insights obtained from this 2003 Army Transformation War Game will shape 
forthcoming decisions on the number of echelons the Army will design as well as 
identify their functions. We anticipate that the initial design of the Objective Force 
units of employment, along with a more detailed operational concept for these units, 
will be completed in the first quarter of fiscal year 2004. 

7. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, how was/is the 
SBCT formally linked to that experimentation? 

Secretary Brownlee. Objective Force 'excursions' will be executed during SBCT 
exercises. As the Army proceeds with development and fielding of the two SBCTs 
at Fort Lewis, lessons learned in SBCT exercises and evaluations will inform Objec- 
tive Force concept development and experimentation. 

Recently the Joint Forces Command conducted its first major experiment. Millen- 
nium Challenge 2002, with the embedded Army experiment — Army Transformation 
experiment 2002. Insights from SBCT participation in Millennium Challenge 2002 
and future joint experimentation will inform Objective Force concept development 
and experimentation. 


8. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, your testimony 
mentions the role that science and technology play in the development of the Objec- 
tive Force. What role does "6.1" or basic research mostly performed at universities 
play in that plan? Will investments in this fundamental research suffer as you seek 
to accelerate transformation and focus on near-term technology issues? 

Secretary Brownlee. The goal of university research funded by Army S&T is to 
provide new capabilities beyond those that are currently in development for the Ob- 
jective Force. We have a multifaceted strategy that takes advantage of the best and 
brightest minds in our universities and develops state-of-the-art infrastructure nec- 
essary to conduct basic research. The single investigator program identifies and 
leverages the most significant research being done at universities in support of the 
Army mission. University Affihated Research Centers (UARC) perform research in 
areas that we believe will provide paradigm-shifting capabilities in support of the 
Objective Force. As an example, the Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies UARC 
is focused on leveraging and exploiting advancements in nanotechnology to provide 
revolutionary capabilities in soldier protection. 

University Centers of Excellence focus the basic research program on enduring 
needs, such as rotorcraft and automotive technology, in order to assure that the U.S. 
Army maintains our 'overmatch' of capability in these areas. The Army's Multidisci- 
plinary University Research Initiatives program, devolved from OSD in fiscal year 
2004, funds university centers to investigate multidisciplinary, far-term trans- 
formational topics critical to maintaining U.S. land combat technology superiority. 
The Defense University Research Instrumentation Program, also devolved from 
OSD in fiscal year 2004, builds and maintains the infrastructure needed to improve 
the quality of defense research performed at universities. The program fulfills its 
objective by supplying funds for university purchase of state-of-the-art instrumenta- 
tion capable of meeting current and future research challenges. 

As reflected in our past four budgets. Army investment in university programs 
has not been skewed by the acceleration of transformation of near-term technology. 
We continue to sustain a balanced portfoUo of investment in basic research efforts 
for near-, mid-, and far-term science and technology excellence. 



9. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, what investments 
are you making to ensure that the Nation's industrial base can support the needs 
of the Objective Force in the future? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The preponderance of the Army's in- 
vestments is currently directed toward those technologies that hold the greatest 
promise for achieving the Army's transformation goals. The Future Combat Systems 
Program Office and the Lead Systems Integrator are developing a list of those tech- 
nologies critical to the Objective Force. The Army's strategy is to aggressively part- 
ner with the commercial sector in developing dual-use technologies and to leverage 
funding from multiple program managers to address a few specific manufacturing 
technology objectives that promise maximum overall impact for both new and legacy 
systems. Ongoing technology assessments and investments will form the basis for 
future decisions on the technologies that will ultimately be incorporated into the 
weapons and support systems of the Objective Force. Those assessments will also 
provide focus for the manufacturing technologies that will be required within the 
industrial base to produce and support the Objective Force. 

10. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, how are you de- 
veloping the manufacturing technologies needed to produce the unmanned vehicles, 
computer networks, and advanced sensors and electronics that are an integral part 
of the force? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The Army conducted a special study in 
fiscal year 2000 through the National Center for Advanced Technologies to identify 
the requirements from manufacturing technologies for the Future Combat Systems 
and the Objective Force. The blue ribbon panel identified funding priorities for spe- 
cific topic areas and priorities — including the areas you have listed in this question. 
The Army's manufacturing technology effort has been increased over 50 percent 
from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2004, and will be over 100 percent higher by 
fiscal year 2009. We view manufacturing technology as a critical element in the de- 
livery of the right technology at the right time and at the right price. 


11. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, traditionally, 
the Army laboratories and Research Development Engineering Centers (RDEC) 
have played an important role in developing new technologies and translating Army 
requirements into R&D programs. What role do these facilities play in the Army's 
development of the Objective Force? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The Army labs and RDECs continue 
even more strongly in this role. The Army Materiel Command (AMC), which is the 
primary developer of Army warfighting materiel, is undergoing major internal 
changes to respond to Army transformation. The formation of the Research, Devel- 
opment, and Engineering Command is part of the response to bring about Army 
transformation. This will enable AMC to respond more efficiently to the system of 
systems challenge of the FCS and the Objective Force by unifying multiple labs and 
RDECs into one organization. 

12. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, in light of the 
need to restructure the Army for transformation, are there specific areas that 
should have more or less emphasis in the S&T and R&D infrastructure? 

Secretary Brownlee. Since 1999, Army transformation has been driven by S&T 
investments to bring forth new technologies that are addressing the goals of a light- 
er, more lethal force. Over 98 percent of S&T investments are currently aligned 
with the Objective Force. In terms of restructuring, the system of systems challenge 
of FCS and the Objective Force has already resulted in the development of the Re- 
search, Development, and Engineering Command. Since 70 percent of the S&T pro- 
gram is executed by AMC, this response to the challenge has been both dramatic 
and appropriate, moving away from the stovepipe mentality of developing the 
"eaches" of the past to the integrated requirements of the future. This restructuring 
will better enable the Army to develop and effectively exploit the system of systems 
aspects of the Objective Force. 



13. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, Congress has 
provided the Army with a number of personnel flexibilities in order to meet their 
need for highly trained scientists and engineers to support technology development 
programs. Specifically, Congress has tried to provide Army lab RDEC directors with 
maximum flexibility to recruit and retain the appropriate workforce to meet their 
specific missions. Does the current personnel system adequately address the specific 
needs of your individual lab directors? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. No. While the laboratories have made 
significant progress while using the authority provided by Congress in Section 345 
of the fiscal year 1995 authorization language, a number of the other legislative ini- 
tiatives have not yet been effective or fully implemented. In the case of Section 245 
and 246, the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel has had serious prob- 
lems with them. Section 1113 is about to be enacted. Section 1114 has also encoun- 
tered challenges at the OSD level and has not yet been implemented. While Con- 
gress has been interested in assisting the labs, the biggest hindrance to the lab 
managers in implementing the original legislation has been local union veto over 
laboratory managers' initiatives. 

14. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, what specific 
authority and flexibility do these lab directors need to ensure that they have the 
technical workforce they need? 

Secretary Brownlee. The original Section 342 legislation included in the Fiscal 
Year 1995 National Defense Authorization Act should be modified to allow Defense 
laboratory directors to test certain initiatives with union consultation (as opposed 
to union veto), and with a 3-year sunset clause. At the end of the 3-year period, the 
Army should then make the changes permanent if they have proved effective. These 
changes could be firmly established through additional legislation if that proves nec- 
essary. The Army also would benefit greatly from legislative action that would en- 
able hiring of scientists and engineers at market rates, rather than within the limi- 
tations presently imposed by Government pay scales. 

crusader reprogramming 

15. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, how much of the 
reprogrammed Crusader funding was transferred into S&T accounts to support the 
development of next generation weapons systems to replace Crusader? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. During fiscal year 2002, $32 million 
was reprogrammed from Crusader to initiate the Future Combat System, non-line 
of sight cannon (FCS NLOS-C) concept technology development (CTD) in fiscal year 
2003. This action, along with the $368.5 million appropriated in fiscal year 2003 for 
the CTD, reduced the Crusader program termination costs and benefited the FCS 
program by transferring Crusader technology, engineering experience, vital informa- 
tion, and facilities to the FCS NLOS cannon demonstration. The CTD is progi-essing 
along a timeline to advance the cannon designs that support fielding the first unit 
in the unit of action and building a demonstration vehicle that will execute test fir- 
ing and mobility demonstrations starting in September 2003. 

16. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, will this money 
be used to accelerate the programs being developed by the joint Army-DARPA FCS 

Secretary Brownlee. Yes, the reprogrammed fiscal year 2002 funding along with 
the $368.5 million appropriated in fiscal year 2003 is dedicated for FCS NLOS CTD 
work and will directly support a cannon demonstration vehicle. Another essential 
aspect of the FCS NLOS CTD is the development of a design that supports initial 
fielding with the first unit of action. Since the NLOS is an integral variant of the 
FCS family of manned ground vehicles, the FCS NLOS is fully synchronized with 
the FCS manned ground vehicle design process through the CTD program. This up- 
front CTD design work simplifies meeting the FCS and NLOS requirements for com- 
monality and interoperability. Additionally, a primary objective of the CTD dem- 
onstrator is reducing the engineering risk to the NLOS and other FCS variant de- 
sign and integration efforts, all of which will accelerate development of the joint 
Army-DARPA FCS program. 



17. Senator SESSIONS. General Keane, the Office of the Secretary of Defense re- 
ported to Congress that the results of the Stryker-M113A3 operational comparison 
indicate that neither vehicle was preferred for all of the criteria considered. The 
Stryker was considered superior under some criteria, the M113A3 was superior on 
others, and the vehicles were equal on yet others. There was, however, a consider- 
able difference with respect to cost. Twenty-year operating costs are approximately 
the same, Stryker being slightly cheaper because of fuel efficiency. However, Stryker 
procurement costs are considerably higher. Why is the Army willing to spend sev- 
eral billion dollars extra to procure the Stryker rather than using equipment cur- 
rently in the inventory to field the Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT)? 

General Keane. The Army selected the family of Stryker vehicles to equip our In- 
terim Force because it best fulfilled the Army's tactical and operational require- 
ments. The results of the comparison evaluation validated the decision to choose 
Stryker because the Stryker vehicle provided significant performance and 
supportability advantages. These advantages outweighed the primary competitor's 
submission advantages of a lower cost and a better delivery schedule. 

Both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Army Test and Evaluation 
Command comparison evaluation reports note that the Stryker is superior in the 
critical area of survivability. While the M113A3 does have better mobility in severe 
terrain, the Stryker is faster, quicker, and more operationally mobile — capabilities 
necessary to fight our new interim brigades as envisioned. The ongoing initial oper- 
ational test and evaluation and the congressionally mandated operational evaluation 
of the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team will address Stryker's ability to meet the 
tactical and operational requirements. We remain confident that these tests will 
demonstrate that the Stryker fully meets the requirements reflected in the organiza- 
tional and operational concept and the vehicle specifications outlined in the Stryker 
operational requirements document. 

18. Senator Sessions. General Keane, the Department has asked the Army to 
evaluate the SBCT capabilities and to make recommendations regarding areas 
where the Army can improve the capabilities of the 5th and 6th Stryker Brigades. 
The report is due in July 2003. Can you provide us some insights into what capabili- 
ties will be added to the SBCTs? Do you see a need to increase organic aviation as- 

General Keane. The Army is not complete with its analysis at this point, so any 
discussion of recommendations at this time is premature. I can tell you that the 
Army is looking at several SBCT enhancement options — to include enhanced sen- 
sors, upgraded communications, more precision munitions, and the possibility of 
adding Comanche, should those aircraft become available in the ftiture. Since 
Stryker brigades are optimized for combat in complex and urban terrain, these en- 
hancements could make each SBCT more lethal and better able to operate as part 
of a joint force. 

19. Senator Sessions. General Keane, will these capabilities be applied to the 
first four Stryker brigades? 

General Keane. As time and funding permit, the Army certainly will look at ret- 
rofitting enhanced capabilities into the first four Stryker brigades. As a matter of 
course, the Army looks at the feasibility of spiraling new technologies into its stand- 
ing formations whenever possible. We always desire to provide our soldiers with as 
much warfighting capability as possible. As you can appreciate, we must balance 
this strong desire against constraints imposed by funding level limitations and other 
competing operational and acquisition requirements. 

20. Senator Sessions. General Keane, if aviation assets are to be added to the 
brigades, will that change the acquisition objective for Comanche helicopters? 

General Keane. If the decision to integrate the Comanche helicopter into Stryker 
brigades is taken, then there would need to be a full review of the Comanche field- 
ing plan. The Comanche helicopter is not sequenced or planned for the Stryker bri- 
gades. The first five Stryker brigades are slated for fielding before completion of the 
Comanche engineering, manufacturing, and development phase in fiscal year 2009. 
The final Stryker brigade fielding for the Pennsylvania Army National Guard covers 
an extended 5-year schedule from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2010. 

Presently, the Comanche is planned to be the Objective Force multirole aircraft. 
If a decision were made to field the Comanche within Stryker brigades, we believe 
that 12 additional low-rate initial production Comanches would be required at a cost 
of $540 million per brigade. Absent a major change in schedule, presently unforecast 


Stryker brigade fieldings would occur concurrently with Objective Force fieldings 
and could delay Comanche fieldings to Objective Force units. 

However, we are not yet sure that Comanche will be an appropriate addition to 
the Stryker brigade. We continue to study options of embedding current aviation 
platforms within the Stryker brigades. Developing a generic mix of aircraft to en- 
hance the range of Stryker brigade missions is resource intensive in equipment and 
personnel. Comanche's reduced supportability footprint is one significant attribute 
that allows us to realize a habitual air-ground operational teaming in the Objective 

From both a resource and operational perspective, our best outcome is to field an 
appropriate and capable aviation force into a structure that is supportable, 
deployable, but most of all, effective for the range of Stryker missions. At present, 
our analysis shows we can best support Stryker brigades with a tailored, dedicated, 
direct support aviation package designed to enhance Stryker brigade capabilities 
and mission requirements. We must continue to study options in this area before 
drawing any firm conclusions about whether to, and then how to, integrate Coman- 
che within the Stryker brigade. 

21. Senator SESSIONS. General Keane, how do you intend to fund these capabiU- 

General Keane. The Army has made difficult decisions in the fiscal year 2004 
budget proposal regarding which programs to fund. We killed 24 programs and re- 
structured 24 others for over $22 billion to dedicate toward the Objective Force. We 
would have to weigh carefully the capabilities gained versus the capabilities lost 
from any additional program adjustments involved with Stryker brigade enhance- 
ments. There are no easy financial offsets remaining, so we cannot presently advise 
the subcommittee on precisely how SBCT enhancements might be funded. We will 
work to keep the subcommittee informed of options being explored as our OSD-man- 
dated study of this issue continues. 

22. Senator Sessions. General Keane, given the delicate balance in the Army 
budget request, how would you prioritize between greater capabilities for the first 
four brigades against funding the procurement of the 5th and 6th Stryker brigades? 

General Keane. After a thorough analysis of the security environment and antici- 
pated operational requirements, the Army determined that at least six SBCTs were 
required to fill the current capabilities gap. While enhancing one or more SBCTs 
would improve overall force capabilities, we have determined that eliminating one 
or more SBCTs to pay for enhancements to the remaining units would result in a 
reduced overall capability. Consequently, we strongly advocate fielding of all six 
Stryker Brigades, and request continuing Airland Subcommittee support for them 

certification exercise 

23. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, the Fiscal Year 2002 Defense Author- 
ization bill directed the Army to conduct an operational evaluation of an SBCT 
against the full spectrum of anticipated threats prior to deplojrment and certify that 
it is operationally suitable. Can you describe the exercise as currently envisioned 
and provide us a status report on the planning for this evaluation? 

Secretary Brownlee. Planning for the Operational Evaluation (OE) is complete. 
We will start execution of the plan on April 1, 2003, at the National Training Center 
(NTC). The commander's assessment will focus on brigade operations with joint as- 
pects in a full spectrum environment against a full spectrum threat. The OE will 
be conducted at two of the Army's Combat Training Centers (CTC): NTC from April 
1 to 11, 2003, and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) from May 17 to 27, 

The NTC phase begins with battalion-level training and live-fire exercises and 
evolves into a brigade-level field exercise. The brigade event will emphasize offen- 
sive operations, force protection, and intra-theater lift and resupply against a world- 
class opposing force (OPFOR) in a desert environment under mid- to high-intensity 
combat operations. 

The JRTC phase will commence with an early entry operation and a relief-in- 
place mission that will involve Special Operations Forces. This phase will emphasize 
maneuvers in restricted terrain and military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) 
under low to medium intensity combat operations. The JRTC rotation will focus on 
the complete range of military operations as a contingency mission against another 
world-class OPFOR. Additionally, there will be a wide spectrum of as3rmmetrical 


threats. Training and evaluations at both CTCs will be conducted in a free-play en- 
vironment. This gives the OPFOR more latitude to challenge the operational suit- 
ability of the Stryker Brigade. 

Throughout the OE process, the Brigade will validate the ability of the SBCT to 
deploy strategically by programming rail, sea, and air transportation of the Stryker 
vehicle and SBCT equipment. This deplo3rment exercise includes a planned insertion 
of combat elements by C-130 aircraft. 

24. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee, will the SBCTs conduct missions 
across the spectrum of combat during this evaluation? Can you give examples of the 
missions they will conduct? 

Secretary Brownlee. The SBCT will conduct missions across the spectrum of 
combat. Conducting the OE at two different CTCs will give us the opportunity to 
evaluate the performance of the SBCT in a wide range of demanding and distinctly 
different terrain. Additionally, the SBCT will be challenged by a continuous variety 
of asymmetric threats, irregular forces, terrorists, civilian encounters, and coalition 

The SBCT was designed as a full spectrum, early entry combat force. The brigade 
has full utility, confirmed through extensive analysis, in all operational environ- 
ments against all projected future threats, but it is optimized primarily for employ- 
ment in complex and urban terrain, confronting low-end and mid-range I threats 
that may employ both conventional and asymmetric capabilities. The SBCT will de- 
ploy very rapidly, execute early entry, and conduct effective combat operations im- 
mediately on arrival to prevent, contain, stabilize, or resolve a conflict. Missions at 
NTC will focus on medium- to high-intensity conflicts conducted in a desert environ- 
ment against a heavy mechanized and armored threat. The JRTC evaluation will 
focus on a low to medium intensity conflict conducted in restricted and urban ter- 
rain against both conventional and unconventional enemies. Asymmetric threats 
will be incorporated into both scenarios. The SBCT will conduct both offensive and 
defensive operations and will include live-fire exercises. Specific missions they will 
execute are: early entry operations, distributed simultaneous offensive operations, 
brigade attacks, defensive operations, area security operations, tunnel complex oper- 
ations, and sustainment operations. The SBCT will also employ a full range of joint, 
lethal, and non-lethal fires. 


25. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, I understand 
the Commander of the Army's Aviation Center approved the proposed Block III se- 
ries of upgrades for the Apache Longbow AH-64D attack helicopter with the intent 
to start the program in the fiscal year 2007 time frame. It is anticipated that the 
Block III improvements to the Apache will enable network-centric operations, in- 
crease sensor ranges, and improve platform lethality. There is some indication that 
the Block III program will allow the Apache Longbow to become the heavy attack 
helicopter for the Objective Force. Has the Block III helicopter been included as part 
of the unit of employment analysis? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The unit of employment analysis, al- 
though still a work in progress, has included Longbow Block III. The analysis in- 
cluded Longbow Block III teamed with both Comanche and unmanned aerial vehi- 
cles. The Apache Longbow is the initial attack helicopter for the Objective Force. 
The Block III initiative ensures the Longbow remains a valid and capable member 
of the system of systems in the Objective Force until a future attack platform is de- 
veloped and fielded. 

26. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, what is the im- 
pact of the Block III Apache on the Comanche helicopter requirement? Can the 
Block III Apache fulfill the attack helicopter requirement for the Objective Force, 
obviating the necessity for additional Comanches? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. In fact, the case is just the opposite. 
The initial Comanche procurement objective approved 650 airframes at a production 
rate of 60 per year using spiral development through a Comanche Block III configu- 
ration. The current funding levels restrict Comanche to the armed reconnaissance 
configuration. The Comanche decision caused the Army to examine how to best en- 
sure the Longbow Apache is relevant in the Objective Force. The Longbow Block III 
program will meet all of the known Objective Force requirements and extend the 
life of the airframe. However, the Army's position on Comanche as a multirole air- 
craft remains constant. 


27. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, how will you 
fund this initiative? 

Secretary Brownlee. The Army will examine funding options for this program in 
Program Objective Memorandum 2005-2009. The funding profile for the Longbow 
Block III program begins in fiscal year 2005 with research, development, testing, 
and engineering and non-recurring engineering requirements. Initial airfi"ame deliv- 
eries would begin in fiscal year 2008. 


28. Senator Sessions. General Keane, the Army has learned many lessons from 
the ongoing war on terrorism, particularly from the operations in Afghanistan. One 
of these lessons was the operational capability and desirability of the Chinook CH- 
47F and the Special Operations Forces version, the MH-57G. To that end, during 
the fiscal year 2004 budget review process, the Department directed the Army to 
provide 24 additional MH-47G Chinook helicopters to Special Operations Forces by 
reprioritizing current CH-47F remanufacture work. What is the economic and oper- 
ational impact of this decision? 

General Keane. Economically, adjusting the CH— 47F production schedule to com- 
ply with the Department directive will add an estimated $132 million to the CH- 
47F life-program cost, half of which, $63.6 million, will be realized in fiscal years 
2005 to 2009. The primary reason for this cost increase stems from the results of 
fi-ont-loading MH-47Gs in the production schedule. Formal cost increase estimates 
are under review and will be refined by the Army Cost and Economic Analysis Cen- 
ter. Additionally, if the Army elects to modify additional aircraft at the end of the 
program to restore those Chinooks transferred to Special Operations Forces, the cost 
to buy back the transferred CH-47D to CH^7F conversions is estimated at an ad- 
ditional $444 million in base-year dollars. The buy-back would come fi:'om the 
Army's 130 Chinooks that are not currently funded for the CH-47F conversion. 

Operationally, we are already short of our total Chinook requirement. Trans- 
formation requires 513 aircraft and we have a current inventory of 463 Chinooks. 
Our emerging Objective Force requirement is 502 Chinooks with digital 
connectivity. Yet due to competing priorities, we currently only have 333 remanufac- 
tures funded: 272 CH^7Fs and 61 MH-47Gs. We have no new-build Chinooks 
funded. In addition to these forecast aircraft shortages, our preliminary analysis of 
the DOD directive indicates the Army will incur a reduction of aircrew experience 
in the conventional aviation force for severed years. This reduced expertise will be 
most noticeable in the CH-47 crew chief senior noncommissioned officer ranks. We 
also anticipate that the Army's CH-47F first unit equipped will slip 21 months as 
a result of the requirement to front-load MH-47Gs in the Chinook production line. 

29. Senator Sessions. General Keane, it is my understanding that the "touch 
hours", the time spent making an item, on a MH^7G is twice the "touch hours" 
required to make a CH-47F. With a 2-year delay in the CH-47F program, has the 
Army assessed the impact on the unit cost of the CH-47F Chinook and has the De- 
partment provided any resources to cover these costs? 

General Keane. There are two issues that must be addressed in response to this 
question: man-hour costs and the costs incurred from CH-47F production delays. 
First, there will not be any direct impact from man-hour costs to the anticipated 
Army per-unit price for the CH-47F. It will require approximately 26,000 man- 
hours to completed CH-47F and approximately 50,000 mgin-hours to complete a 
MH-47G. Funding the difference in the labor hours is the responsibility of the U.S. 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). USSOCOM has programmed funds to 
pay for the additional labor hours required to manufacture the MH-47G. As a re- 
sult, the increase in labor hours alone will not directly impact the unit cost of the 
CH-47F to the Army. 

The second issue — CH^7F production delays — will have an impact on unit cost. 
Due to the pressing requirements of the global war on terrorism, most of the first 
three production lots of the Chinook will be dedicated to the MH-47G. This initial 
MH-47G focus will require the contractor to re-tool and re-configure the Chinook 
production line from the MH-47G to the CH-47F after these initial lots have been 
manufactured. Costs incurred from this industrial adaptation coupled with other 
small inefficiencies anticipated from production transition will result in increased 
unit costs to the Army for the CH^7F. Presently, we estimate that the per-unit 
CH-47F cost increase will be less than 10 percent. The Army Cost and Economic 
Analysis Center is working on a revised cost estimate for the CH^7F in light of 


the DOD directive. We will have a better feel for additional program costs once this 
analysis is complete. 


30. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, I am concerned about the funding pro- 
file for new Black Hawk helicopters. As currently configured, the budget funds 10 
this year, 8 in fiscal year 2005, 28 in fiscal year 2006, 23 in fiscal year 2007, 5 in 
fiscal year 2008, and 4 in fiscal year 2009, with 9 remaining to be procured in the 
out-years. This kind of profile causes havoc for a manufacturer, and costs the Army 
more in the long-run. What is the possibility that you can spread the quantities out 
in a more even distribution, and complete the buy earlier to stabilize the program 
and reap those savings? 

Secretary Brownlee. There is currently a 5-year multi-year/multi-service produc- 
tion contract with the Army and the Navy. The Navy's procurement quantities from 
fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2006 are: 13, 15, 13, 15, and 26 respectively. The com- 
bined Army and Navy procurements approximate the procurement Economic Order 
Quantity. The yearly quantities are more evenly distributed when the Navy procure- 
ments are added. The Army is procuring 80 aircraft and the Navy 82 aircraft during 
the current 5-year multi-year/multi-service contract. Savings have been made by use 
of this multi-year/multi-service contract. The Army is nearing its end strength re- 
quirement of 1,680 Black Hawks. Quantities in fiscal year 2007 and beyond will be 
reconsidered in following budgets. 

31. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, it is my understanding that the Black 
Hawk UH-60M recapitalization program may face a delay. What is the current sta- 
tus of the Black Hawk recapitalization program? 

Secretary Brownlee. The Army is projecting a $41.8 million cost overrun in the 
Black Hawk UH-60M program in fiscal years 2003 to 2007. The cost growth is a 
result of a combination of factors: Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation underestimation of 
work and lack of cost controls; and Army configuration changes that add capability, 
improve aircraft performance, and resolve safety issues. The Army has developed a 
plan that mitigates the cost overrun internal to the UH-60M program while mini- 
mizing delays to the program. The plan will cap the contractor's work on the UH- 
60M program in fiscal year 2003 to the Army's current funding level. The plan will 
mitigate cost growth in fiscal years 2004 to 2007 by reducing UH-60M production 
by seven aircraft in those years. To minimize schedule delays, the Army plans to 
build four additional prototypes in fiscal year 2004 that will help accelerate the de- 
velopment and operational test requirements. All these changes will result in a 6- 
month delay of the first unit equipped from the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2006 
to the second quarter of fiscal year 2007. 

reserve component aviation 

32. Senator SESSIONS. General Keane, the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Authorization 
bill directed the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to provide a report on the im- 
pact of the Army Aviation Modernization Plan on the Army National Guard. Could 
you provide a synopsis of the report? Does the fiscal year 2004 Army budget request 
address the shortfalls identified in the report? 

General Keane. I am happy to report that the acting Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau (CNGB) completed the report on January 21, 2003. Following the congres- 
sionally-mandated review of the report by the Army Staff, the Chief of Staff of the 
Army forwarded the report and accompan5dng Army Staff comments to Congress on 
February 6. 

This report indicates that while the Army and the Army National Guard are in 
basic agreement on the additional aircraft and funding needed to achieve the in- 
terim aviation transformation structure of the ARNG, progress toward attaining 
this goal has been slowed by the unforecast impact of real-world operational contin- 
gencies and funding level constraints. The Army has twice delayed the scheduled 
cascade of modernized UH-60A and AH-64A aircraft ft-om the 101st Airborne Divi- 
sion and other active duty units to the ARNG because of contingency operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. These unfortunate, but we believe necessary, delays have 
slowed the transfer of approximately one-third of the modernized aircraft needed for 
the initial phases of the ARNG aviation modernization plan. We anticipate making 
good on these transfers during fiscal year 2004. For the longer term. Army funding 
levels through fiscal year 2009 remain insufficient to provide the full number of 
modernized aircraft needed by the ARNG. In addition, many of the aircraft to be 


provided to the AENG will not be the most current variant of the airframe series. 
The fiscal year 2004 Army budget request only partially addresses these shortfalls 
identified in the CNGB report. 

Despite these challenges, the Army continues to work with the ARNG to complete 
the Guard aviation modernization plan in as timely and comprehensive a manner 
as possible. We also will continue to work with DOD and Congress to secure the 
funding necessary to address identified shortfalls, consistent with the overall needs 
for total Army force readiness and modernization. 


33. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, the heavy Coun- 
terattack Corps remains the highest priority for Legacy Force recapitalization and 
selected modernization. However, the Army funded the Objective Force by reallocat- 
ing funding from the Counterattack Corps, reducing the recapitalization and se- 
lected modernization program from three divisions and an armored cavalry regiment 
as funded in the fiscal year 2003 budget request to only two divisions. With 48 pro- 
gram terminations and restructures, the Anmy has again taken risk in the current 
(Legacy) force. Over the past several years, the Airland Subcommittee has asked the 
Army leadership how they would prioritize among the Objective, Interim, and Leg- 
acy Forces. With 77 program terminations and/or restructures in the Legacy Force, 
it is clear that the Army has set priorities and is willing to take risk in the current 

What are the implications for reconnaissance and security missions of not mod- 
ernizing the Counterattack Corps' armored cavalry regiment? Please include in your 
response what you can plan to do to that unit to enable it to fight along side the 
divisions in the Corps. 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. Balancing risk is integral to Army 
transformation. The Army has accepted risk in selective modernization and recapi- 
talization, and we continue to assess these risks as we balance current readiness, 
the well-being of our people. Army transformation, the war on terrorism, and new 
operational commitments. 

The Army will continue to employ the armored cavalry regiment in support of 
Counterattack Corps operations. A major area of concern will be command and con- 
trol and information sharing between forces. 

The Army is currently reviewing the modernization requirements of 3rd Armored 
Calvary Regiment. Abrams tank options, based on available funding, will include 
equipping the 3rd Army Calvary Regiment with MIA2 System Enhancement Pro- 
gram (SEP) tanks and Bradley M3A2 ODS-D+ with Force XXI Battle Command 
Battalion/Brigade and Below capability and the second generation forward looking 
infrared thermal weapon sight system. These added capabilities would allow seam- 
less, digital communications between the 3rd Army Calvary Regiment, the division, 
and in the corps. It would also allow the 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment to acquire 
targets at the same distances as those divisions. This digital capability is a long- 
term investment and provides a digital bridge to the Future Combat Systems and 
Objective Force. 

34. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, how much 
would it cost to modernize the ACR? 

Secretary Brownlee. The cost for modernizing the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regi- 
ment is $726 million. This cost would include providing an additional 129 M1A2 
SEPs and 144 M3A2 ODS-D+ Bradleys, and procuring other critical combat support 
and combat service support systems for the unit. Providing funding in this amount 
will ensure that 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment modernization meets the minimal 
acceptable capabilities commensurate with the rest of the Counterattack Corps. 

industrial base 

35. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, the cancellation 
of current programs is certain to affect the industrial base. For example. United De- 
fense, one of only two remaining armored vehicle manufacturers, has briefed sub- 
committee staff that it will have to close three production facilities 2 years before 
Future Combat Systems low-rate initial production begins. What are Army plans for 
preserving the industrial base and ensuring that the requisite production facilities 
will be available for meeting FCS production time lines? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. Army transformation required cancella- 
tion of certain programs so we could afford FCS. We assessed the risks to the indus- 


trial base from these program cancellations and, where we judged necessar>', we 
have taken steps to mitigate adverse impacts. We saw two major risks to the indus- 
trial base as a result of the decision to not modernize the Counterattack Corps. Both 
of these risks involved maintaining viable armor system production capabilities at 
two production facilities: the Lima Army Tank Plant in Ohio and the United De- 
fense combat vehicle production facility in York, Pennsylvania. 

The first risk involves General DjTiamics' combat vehicle fabrication capability at 
the Lima Army Tank Plant. We judged that risk as unacceptable since Lima ini- 
tially had an insufficient workload to remain \dable as a production facility for the 
fabrication of the Marine Corps' Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle and the 
Army's FCS ground vehicles. To mitigate this risk, the Army has restructured some 
programs and now has sufficient work to sustain Lima in active production until 
these new programs are brought into production. 

The second risk involves maintaining United Defense's combat vehicle production 
facility in Pennsylvania. We recognize that this facility would also be a likely can- 
didate to manufacture FCS ground vehicles in the future. We expect that the pro- 
duction facilities in Pennsylvania will remain viable and open through calendar year 
2004 because of a continuation of their current fiscal year 2003 Bradley upgrade 
work. With this expectation and acceptance of risk, we did not program fiscal year 

2004 funding for Bradley upgrades to protect that portion of the industrial base. 
While we cannot guarantee additional work from support for fielded systems, for- 
eign sales, and reprocessing vehicles from operations in Iraq, the Army is looking 
hard at workload projections after calendar year 2004 and identifying fiscal year 

2005 options which might be needed to protect any United Defense combat vehicle 
fabrication capability determined essential for future production. Those options will 
consider United Defense work on development of manned FCS non-line of sight gun 
system, unmanned ground systems, foreign sales, and other new non-traditional 
business. All of the other industrial base risks from not funding the Counterattack 
Corps are judged acceptable. 

36. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, how will the 
Army cost-effectively support the tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, tank recovery 
vehicles, and self-propelled howitzers which will be in the inventory for many years 
to come without a healthy industrial base? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. Given that final vehicle deliveries are 
scheduled for June 2005, we expect fiscal year 2003 funding and other work to keep 
essential skills active through the end of calendar year 2004. The program funding 
for system sustainment and technical support will transition in fiscal year 2006 
from the Army procurement to the operations and maintenance account. We believe 
United Defense's engineering staff and the Army's own in-house staff will be able 
to sustain the vehicles made by United Defense. 

The shortage of Bradley upgrade funding is manageable, but there are two key 
issues we must address. The first issue is how we will fund the required technical 
support to the fielded fleet. During fiscal year 2003, the Army has had to fund vehi- 
cle technical support from operations and maintenance accounts. This approach, 
while necessary, presents us a challenge as we address both peacetime requirements 
and operational requirements for the global war on terrorism and operations in 
Iraq. Obviously, we continue to finance the highest priority operational require- 
ments first and defer those that are of a lower priority. A second issue is whether 
key suppliers will abandon the supplier network as we reduce requirements. This 
is an ongoing challenge. In our efforts to mitigate risk in this area, the Army is con- 
ducting additional analysis to enable appropriate decisions, for example, to either 
stockpile components or find alternate suppliers. 


37. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, I understand that the Army intends 
to upgrade 588 M1A2 Abrams tanks to the System Enhancement Program configu- 
ration. Subcommittee staff has been briefed that the current plan is to pull the re- 
maining 586 MlA2s that will not be upgraded to the SEP configuration from the 
units that currently have them and store them in a depot to be used for parts for 
the SEPs. This would be a bitter pill for the Army and Congress to swallow — using 
the Army's second most modem tanks for spare parts. Why is the Army contemplat- 
ing such a drastic action? 

Secretary Brownlee. The Army is currently funded to upgrade 588 Abrams tanks 
to the M1A2 SEP configuration. The Army also desires, and is working to secure, 
funding to upgrade an additional 129 MlA2s to the M1A2 SEP configuration for 


modernization of 3rd ACR. This brings the total number of M1A2 SEP tanks pro- 
duced to 717 for the Counterattack Corps. That leaves 457 MlA2s that would not 
be upgraded. 

By the end of fiscal year 2007, the Army expects to have a pure MlAl fleet for 
the remaining active and Reserve component units, thereby reducing the logistical 
burden of supporting numerous versions of Abrams. The Airny will also upgrade its 
pre-positioned stock with versions of the MlAl tank allowing units to draw the 
same model tank they will train on at home station. Finally, the Army will upgrade 
a major portion of active component forces to Force XXI digital situational aware- 

Since the M1A2 is a unique tank with several obsolete parts and limited second 
and third tier vendor support, it has become increasingly difficult to support. The 
M1A2 fleet is not digitally interoperable with digitized forces and would require ex- 
tensive work to embed these capabilities into this platform. Our analysis shows this 
approach to be uneconomical and unnecessary. 

38. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, why would you not put those tanks in 
the Counterattack Corps' armored cavalry regiment, another active division, or in 
the National Guard? 

Secretary Brownlee. Our intent is to put the M1A2 SEP into the Counterattack 
Corps across the 4th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division and the 3rd Armored 
Cavalry Regiment. The Army National Guard has expressed a desire for a pure fleet 
of the more supportable MlAl and MlAl heavy armor tanks. Significant funds 
would be required to bring excess MlA2s back up to standard for refielding. Due 
to the current Abrams plan to upgrade the active component with M1A2 SEP and 
MlAl AIM tanks and cascade MlAls to the National Guard, we believe that the 
funds to upgrade the MIA2 can be used for higher priority requirements. 


39. Senator Sessions. General Keane, the Army has faced a challenge keeping 
pre-positioned stocks modernized. I understand that the 3rd Infantry Division drew 
equipment, such as Bradley Fighting Vehicles, which was less modem than their 
own back in Georgia. That required them to "train down" to learn how to operate 
with the less modem equipment, and means that they may fight with less capable 
equipment while their more capable equipment sits in motor pools in Georgia. The 
lack of modernized pre-positioned stocks also means that units which deploy quickly 
and draw that less capable equipment may be the first to fight, while more modern- 
ized forces come much later. It appears that may be the case in Iraq, with the 4th 
Infantry Division, the most modem heavy division, yet to be deployed. Is the Army 
considering alternatives to deal with this problem, which will only be exacerbated 
in the future as the Army modernizes two divisions of the Counterattack Corps? 

General Keane. The 3rd Infantry Division drew equipment from Army pre-posi- 
tioned stocks (APS) that are not the most modem. However, this equipment was 
well-maintained as evidenced by the readiness rate of the fleet when it was drawn 
in Kuwait. Furthermore, the equipment used by the 3rd Infantry Division has prov- 
en itself successful on the battlefield as exemplified during recent training exercises 
in Kuwait. 

The majority of the equipment within the APS program was built up from stocks 
drawn down in Europe at the end of the Cold War. Concurrently, Army financial 
constraints during the post-Cold War drawdown did not allow us to simultaneously 
modernize all equipment throughout the Active Force, much less the equipment in 
the APS. Difficult dollar-driven decisions had to be made, and the Army decided to 
keep less modem equipment in the APS program and field its newest equipment 
to high-priority operational units. The APS continues to be modernized with equip- 
ment cascaded down from high-priority active units receiving new equipment. We 
believe it remains most correct to assure the highest caliber equipment remains in 
our active units. However, we continue to review various alternatives to the issue 
of modernizing APS equipment, with an objective improving our ability to the APS 
as modem as we possibly can. 

40. General Keane, what are the Army's plans for reconstituting the Army pre- 
positioned stocks after the current crisis with Iraq is resolved? 

General Keane. The APS unit sets that are presently being used in Southwest 
Asia are projected to remain in theater until at least fiscal year 2005. Consequently, 
we plan to reconstitute this fleet in the theater with assets that will remain there. 
The sustainment stocks and ammunition that were issued to units but not used will 


be reloaded upon container ships and returned to the Diego Garcia region. The 
sustainment stocks and ammunition that were used or consumed will be requi- 
sitioned and uploaded on container ships when they become available. 


41. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, in fiscal year 2002, the Army con- 
ducted a competition for a replacement for the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles 
(FMTV) Al. In the Fiscal Year 2003 Defense Authorization Bill, Congress imposed 
limitations on the Army's ability to award a contract for the FMTV competitive re- 
buy without certifying a 10 percent cost savings of a multi-year contract over a con- 
tract of 5 consecutive years. While the competition was underway. Senator Warner 
received reports from Afghanistan that the FMTV AO dump truck was not perform- 
ing up to specifications. Has the Army corrected deficiencies identified in Afghani- 

Secretary Brownlee. Before the deployment of FMTV dump trucks to Afghani- 
stan, the Army had embarked on an aggressive program to make improvements in 
the dump configuration. The dump upgrade program began in the field in June 2002 
and was accelerated to support deployments. The upgrade program includes 11 
changes in all, including a 1/4 inch steel plate bed liner, new stronger tail gate, 
maximization of the current hydraulic lift system, stronger suspension system, and 
in-cab controls relocated for greater operator ease. A sideboard kit was added to the 
upgrade program and addresses the only new issue coming from Afghanistan. To 
date, all of the 448 dump trucks in the fleet are complete with the exception of 4 
vehicles which are deployed, to be upgraded on their return, and 12 vehicles that 
are located on the outer Hawaiian Islands, planned to be completed by the end of 
April 2003. 

42. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, will you be able to certify a 10 percent 
cost savings using a multi-year procurement instrument? If not, why not? What sav- 
ings do you expect to achieve? 

Secretary Brownlee. The Army will not be able to certify a 10 percent cost sav- 
ings for the FMTV Al competitive rebuy. A comparative, verifiable database for suc- 
cessive single year versus multiyear acquisition savings for this program, sufficient 
for certification, does not exist. The approved acquisition strategy did not require 
binding single year and multi-year proposals, which would be the only way to verify 
actual multi-year savings. The Army relies on cost estimating to compute reliable 
savings estimates associated with multiyear procurement and these savings for the 
FMTV Al competitive rebuy program are estimated to be 6.5 percent. Actual sav- 
ings could approach, or even exceed 10 percent. Both cuirent FMTV Al competitive 
rebuy contractors have expressed, orally or in writing, the claim that 10 percent 
savings are realistic and achievable. These assertions, however, have not been ten- 
dered in a binding proposal, and therefore, are not verifiable. 

RESERVE component 

43. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, the Army Na- 
tional Guard (ARNG) force structure includes eight divisions. The Army, with the 
support of the ARNG, is in the process of converting two of these divisions into a 
combat service support structure. It is my understanding that the Army National 
Guard has agreed to restructure two-to-four divisions into multifunctional organiza- 
tions. Has the Army made a decision with regards to the design and operational ca- 
pabilities of the ARNG multifunctional divisions? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. There are two concepts you have men- 
tioned. The first is ihe Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRSi, the 
second is the Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative (ANGRI). 

In 1995, the ARNG combat structure consisted of 8 divisions and 18 separate bri- 
gades, for a total of 42 combat brigades. Under the ADRS plan that was approved 
in 1996, 12 combat brigades and slice elements from two division bases would con- 
vert to required combat support/combat service support structure. At the end of 
ADRS, the ARNG would have 8 divisions and 15 separate brigades, 9 of which 
would be embedded in the divisions, for a total of 30 combat brigades. ANGRI will 
adapt the ARNG to the new Defense Strategy while providing a bridge to the Objec- 
tive Force. ANGRI will achieve these objectives by converting four of the eight divi- 
sions to a more versatile design called the Multi-Functional Division (MFD). Embed- 
ded within the MFD is the Mobile Light Brigade (MLB), an infantry-centric organi- 


zation enhanced with systems that provide commanders with more versatile capa- 
biHties than found in present ARNG divisional brigades. 

We are currently staffing the designs for the MFD and MLB for final approval. 
Our near-term focus is to get the MLB design approved and included in the Pro- 
gram Objective Memorandum (POM) 2005-2009. However, we will continue to re- 
fine the MFD design with a goal of addressing MFD requirements in POM 2006- 

The MFD will perform operations in a variety of roles. We envision that it will 
perform missions ranging from a post-hostilities role in a major combat operation, 
to direct participation in small-scale contingency operation, to providing general 
purpose capabilities for a homeland security operation supporting Northern Com- 
mand (NORTHCOM). 

After we implement ANGRI, the ARNG force structure will still consist of eight 
divisions (four MFDs, two heavy, one medium, one light) and some number of sepa- 
rate brigades (to be determined). These will be apportioned to Army missions. Total 
Army Ajialysis 2006-2011, which will be completed later this year, will address the 
specific number of MFDs and MLBs. 

As we work through design issues associated with implementation of ANGRI, we 
will continue to ensure the Army retains the operational capabilities required to 
meet the National Security Strategy, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Con- 
tingency Planning Guidance, and other key documents. 

44. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, do you have an 
estimate of the costs associated with the restructure and, if so, are these costs re- 
flected in the fiscal year 2004 budget request? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. The designs for the MFD and the MLB 
have not yet been finalized; therefore, we cannot provide a cost estimate at this 
time. Our intent is to begin funding ANGRI in POM 05-09. Consequently, we envi- 
sion no direct impact on the fiscal year 2004 budget. 

45. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, what is the im- 
pact of this reorganization on Army National Guard aviation force structure? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. There is no direct impact to Army Na- 
tional Guard aviation force structure as a result of the ANGRI initiative. ANGRI 
and the ARNG aviation transformation are separate, but complimentary efforts of 
the overall Army Transformation Campaign Plan — both efforts are intended to 
bridge the ARNG to the Objective Force. 

46. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, will the contem- 
plative changes solve the Army's problem with respect to military police, civil af- 
fairs, and other units which are in extremely high demand in this new strategic en- 

General Keane. The full scope of operational requirements demanded by the new 
strategic environment is not known at this time. We continue to assess Army re- 
quirements for the global war on terrorism and the emerging strategic environment, 
and have already planned and programmed a number of required changes into the 
fiscal year 2004-2009 POM underpinning the Army fiscal year 2004 budget submis- 
sion. In this initial wave of adaptation, over 19,500 spaces have been programmed 
for change within the active, Guard, and Reserve force structure. These enhanced 
force capabilities include some force restructuring to address evolving requirements 
for military police, chemical specialties, special operations capabilities and civil af- 
fairs forces. 

The Army will continue to adjust its force structure based on the Secretary of De- 
fense's "1-4-2-1" force-sizing construct. To stay within targeted end strength levels, 
the Army anticipates that adding capabilities to the Active Force will require the 
transfer of some mission capabilities between the Active and Reserve Forces. We are 
exploring a number of options to reduce risk in achieving Army missions in the new 
strategic environment. Some of these options under study include converting lower 
demand structure inside the Active Force, converting key capabilities held in the 
Reserve component but needed on a recurring basis for contingency operations, and 
changing the Reserve personnel management system by enhancing volunteerism 
and diminishing involuntary mobilization in order to increase access to Reserve-spe- 
cific capabilities. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), in conjunction with the Joint Staff, 
has undertaken a study to improve operational availability of all military forces. As 
part of this undertaking, the active component/Reserve component mix is being 
studied carefully in the context of short-notice, short-duration major combat oper- 
ations. This study remains incomplete. However, we anticipate preliminary rec- 


ommendations from it, including those that might necessitate force structure 
changes, may be incorporated as part of Defense planning for fiscal year 2005 that 
is anticipated fi-om OSD later in the year. 

47. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee and/or General Keane, are there any 
other roles and functions that should migrate from active to Reserve or vice versa? 

Secretary Brownlee and General Keane. OSD, in conjunction with the Joint 
Staff, has undertaken a study to improve operational availability of all military 
forces. As part of this undertaking, the active component/Reserve component mix is 
being studied carefully in the context of short-notice, short-duration major combat 
operations. This study remains incomplete. Once finished, we expect it to inform 
Army decisions on which, if any, forces that should migi-ate from the Active to Re- 
serve Force (or vice versa). The Arm/s active and Reserve component force mix is 
the result of deliberate actions to balance risks and priorities in light of operational 
requirements, resource constraints, emd the "1-4—2-1" force sizing construct. The 
Army's force mix is designed to support the geographic combatant commauider's re- 
quirements as determined by the Total Army Analysis process. To stay within con- 
stant end-strength levels, we anticipate that adding capabilities to the Active Force 
will require the transfer of some mission capabilities between the Active and Re- 
serve Forces. Thus, while it remains uncertain precisely which roles or functions 
might be best reallocated between Army active and Reserve components, we believe 
that the OSD and Army processes now in place to address this issue will account 
fully for the key factors in the new strategic environment mandating any such 


48. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Brownlee, how does the RAND Arroyo Center 
support Army transformation efforts? 

Secretary Brownlee. The RAND Arroyo Center conducts mid- to long-term policy 
studies and analyses under the direction of the Arm/s Arroyo Center Policy Com- 
mittee (ACPC) which is co-chaired by General Keane and the Assistant Secretary 
of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology). 

The Arroyo program supports Legacy, Interim, and Objective Force topics. 
Arroyo's research addresses Army transformation efforts such as human resource 
implications, leader development evaluation, the total Army school system, training 
development for combat service support systems, managing the Future Combat Sys- 
tems acquisition program, organizing and managing the Army science and tech- 
nology community for transformational research and development, CSS trans- 
formation (including rapid deployment of early entry forces), support to the Training 
and Doctrine Command for Army transformational analysis. Objective Force band- 
width requirements, and lessons learned fi"om recent Army employments, e.g., Af- 
ghanistan lessons learned. 

49. Senator Sessions. Secretary Brownlee, is Arroyo's legislatively-mandated cap 
on funding adequate to support all of the Army taskings for the organization? What 
would the appropriate ceiling level be? 

Secretary Brownlee. Yes. The ceiling still allows for adequate support by the 
Army's Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC). RAND 
Arroyo's share of DOD's FFRDC ceiling for fiscal year 2003 is 99 staff-years of tech- 
nical effort. 

Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts 
efficient basing east and south initiatives 

50. Senator ROBERTS. General Keane, are the Efficient Basing East and South Ini- 
tiatives consistent with the overseas basing review ciirrently being conducted by the 
EUCOM commander? 

General Keane. The Secretary of Defense has given the Under Secretary of De- 
fense for Pohcy and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, until July 1, 2003, to de- 
velop a comprehensive and integrated presence and basing strategy looking out 10 
years. The results will determine if the Efficient Basing East and South Initiatives 
are consistent with the strategy and support for future presence in Europe. 


51. Senator Roberts. General Keane, if the Efficient Basing East and South Ini- 
tiatives are not approved, could the Army execute the fiscal year 2004 military con- 
struction ftinds associated with those initiatives within the continental U.S.? 

General Keane. In accordance with overall program priorities, the Army could 
execute fiscal year 2004 construction fimds associated with these European efficient 
basing initiatives in the continental United States. We would want to work closely 
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Congress to assure that any re-focus- 
ing of fiscal year 2004 military construction funds presently focused for Europe is 
accomplished in accordance with an overall program that accounts for Army soldier 
and family needs both within and outside the continental United States. 


52. Senator Roberts. Secretary Brownlee, to help pay for transformation, the 
Army has reduced funding for the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles program. 
Given the importance of FMTV to both the current force and the Objective Force, 
does the Army require additional funding to sustain the FMTV program in fiscal 
year 2004? How would additional funding continue truck modernization? 

Secretary Brownlee. While the Army can sustain the FMTV program with the 
fiscal year 2004 funding in the fiscal year 2004/2005 President's budget, additional 
funds would be put to use to continue and accelerate modernization of the medium 


53. Senator Roberts. Secretary Brownlee, transforming the force hinges, in part, 
on our ability to stimulate innovation and apply best business practices in the de- 
sign-manufacturing paradigm. Along these lines, this committee has supported the 
Advanced Aluminum Aerostructures Initiative in each of the past 3 years to iden- 
tify, develop, and demonstrate design and manufacturing capabilities that will en- 
able systems producers to provide aluminum aerostructures at a dramatically re- 
duced cost. The program, which is managed by the Air Force Research Laboratory's 
Air Vehicles Directorate, has targeted select components on a variety of platforms, 
including the C-17, C-130, UCAV, JSF, F-22, and Global Hawk, and produced 
some very impressive achievements in terms of part count reductions, weight reduc- 
tions, and cost reductions. 

As the Army continues its efforts to transform the force, it would seem that the 
same principles and methodology demonstrated in the Advanced Aluminum 
Aerostructures Initiative could be applied to ground systems modernization to sub- 
stantially reduce the weight and costs of vehicle structures and, thereby, enhance 
performance and affordability of future combat systems. Would you review the Air 
Force's Advanced Aluminum Aerostructures program and provide me with your per- 
spective on how we might apply this innovative design/manufacturing methodology 
to our ground systems modernization program to enhance transformation and gen- 
erate cost and weight reductions in military ground vehicle structures? I wovdd ap- 
preciate your response as soon as possible so that your input can be factored into 
the committee's deliberations on the fiscal year 2004 budget request. 

Secretary Brownlee. The Army is familiar with the ALCOA/Air Force Advanced 
Aluminum Aerostructures Initiative (AAAI) program. We are aware of this program 
as a result of discussions conducted between Army Tank-Automotive Research De- 
velopment and Engineering Center (TARDEC) engineers, the ALCOA Technical 
Center in Pittsburgh, and the ALCOA Automotive Division (located in the vicinity 
of TARDEC). At the summer 2001 annual Automotive Industry Aluminum Associa- 
tion symposium, TARDEC engineers made presentations to the aluminum industry, 
informing it about the Army's transformation challenges — and industry's opportuni- 
ties — to reduce future ground vehicle size, weight, and cost without sacrificing 
lethality and survivability. They encouraged the aluminum industry to take advan- 
tage of the new opportunities to apply aerospace technologies to help meet the FCS 

Since that meeting, TARDEC has taken further steps to facilitate introductory re- 
lationships between ALCOA and the Army's FCS Lead Systems Integrator and its 
ground vehicle contractor team. As a result, we can report that, ground vehicle in- 
dustrial base contractors with a stake in Army transformation are aware of, and 
have indicated high interest in, the methodologies and technologies described by 
ALCOA. We are confident that the best solutions and options available to incor- 
porate aluminum in the Army's FCS are under active review and being incorporated 


in the budgetary proposals underpinning the fiscal year 2004 and future fiscal year 
Army budget submissions. 

Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin 
modular causeway systems 

54. Senator Levin. General Keane, the Army has not fiinded the Modular Cause- 
way Systems (MCS) in fiscal year 2004. After systems bought under current con- 
tracts are delivered, the Army will still be critically short of MCS assets, including 
4 roll-on/roll-off discharge facilities, 14 causeway ferries, 1 floating causeway, and 
15 warping tugs. The decision to cease MCS procurement will have a devastating 
impact on the industrial base and incur substantial costs to rebuild that base and 
resume production in the future. How does the Army intend to meet the outstanding 
requirement for MCS? 

General Keane. The projected Army MCS shortfall after fiscal year 2003 produc- 
tion buys is 2 roll-on/roll-off discharge facilities, 13 causeway ferries, 9 warping 
tugs, and no floating causeways. This shortfall is less than previously projected as 
the Army now plans to field three company sets rather than four. There is no addi- 
tional program funding until fiscal year 2007. The Army's intent is to fully fund the 
entire MCS requirement and has budgeted at least $12 million per year from fiscal 
year 2007 to fiscal year 2013 for MCS production. 

55. Senator Levin. General Keane, what would be the cost to procure the out- 
standing requirement assuming a renewal of current contracts? 

General Keane. Based on the unit costs in the current production contract's final 
option period (ending in November 2004), the requirements shortfall is approxi- 
mately $61 million. 

56. Senator Levin. General Keane, what would be the cost to procure the out- 
standing requirement assuming that the current contract is allowed to lapse? 

General Keane. The estimated cost of the requirements shortfall assuming a new 
contract action is $84.5 million. 

57. Senator Levin. General Keane, what would be the cost of reopening current 
production facilities in the future if allowed to close at the completion of current 

General Keane. Based upon non-recurring costs in the current contract, the esti- 
mated non-recurring costs for these systems when program funding is next expected 
to be available (fiscal year 2007) is $2.6 million. 

Question Submitted by Senator Evan Bayh 

58. Senator Bayh. Secretary Brownlee, I would like to know what the Army is 
doing to ensure it maintains a viable industrial base to support current systems in 
the interim as we move to the Objective Force. Specifically, what is the Army's plan 
to sustain the transmission base for both the Abrams tank and the Ml 13 combat 
vehicle fleets over the next 20 years? 

The Army is working closely with Allison Transmission Division to maintain a 
combat vehicle transmission support capability for heavy combat vehicles. Obvi- 
ously, it is difficult to lay out specific plans for the next 20 years for a particular 
supplier, but we will always take whatever actions are required to support indus- 
trial capability that is defense-unique, critical, and endangered. 

Specific actions by the Army to preserve the Allison Transmission base include 
a near-term buy of 43 Ml 13 transmissions, to be awarded by mid-September 2003, 
and the X200— 4 to X200-4a conversion program, beginning August 2004. 

Other work includes the Abrams upgrade of XllOO-1 to X1100-3b transmissions, 
part of the Abrams System Enhancement Program. This upgrade will be complete 
by late calendar year 2003. The Defense Logistics Agency and the Army buy spare 
parts from Allison Transmission Division that support the Army's overhaul program 
at Anniston Army Depot. Systems technical support will require Allison to provide 
engineering and logistics support. Finally, as combat vehicles return from Iraq, Alli- 
son will likely get additional work. 

Obviously, Allison has other work, such as foreign military sales that also helps 
maintain this capability. As a prime example, Egypt may buy an additional 275 
tanks. Depending on their terms, Allison may get the contract for the transmissions 


and engineering support. That could begin in September 2005 and continue for 1 

[Whereupon, at 5:19 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 




U.S. Senate, 
Subcommittee on Airland, 
Committee on Armed Services, 

Washington, DC. 


The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in room 
SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff Sessions 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Sessions, 
Chambliss, and Pryor. 

Majority staff members present: Ambrose R. Hock, professional 
staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; and 
Thomas L. MacKenzie, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Creighton Greene, professional 
staff member; and Maren R. Leed, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Andrew W. Florell and Nicholas W. 

Committee members' assistants present: Christopher J. Paul, as- 
sistant to Senator McCain; James Beauchamp, assistant to Senator 
Roberts; James W. Irwin and Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistants to Sen- 
ator Chambliss; Aaron Scholer, assistant to Senator Lieberman; 
William Todd Houchins, assistant to Senator Dayton; and Terri 
Glaze, assistant to Senator Pryor. 


Senator Sessions. Good afternoon. It is great to have Senator 
Pryor here as our ranking member today, a new Senator but a fine 
public servant. We served some time in the same office as attor- 
neys general of different states. So it is great to have him in the 

Senator Pryor. Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. I would like to welcome each of our witnesses 
here and thank you for taking the time from your busy schedules 
as the Airland Subcommittee meets to consider how the fiscal year 
2004 budget request and the Future Years Defense Program 



(FYDP) support aviation and air-launched weapons programs and 

Many of the platforms and systems we are going to be discussing 
today are at this very moment being used by the young men and 
women of our armed services who have been deployed in harm's 
way. We owe all of them a debt of gratitude and pledge our support 
to them. 

I especially want to express my sympathy for the families of 
those who have fallen or who have been wounded on the battlefield. 
I will be at a funeral Saturday for Private First Class (PFC) How- 
ard Johnson from my hometown of Mobile. I knew his father. He 
is the pastor of Truevine Missionary Baptist Church with just a 
fine family. He was out there doing what he could for his country 
and gave his life for it. 

Our predecessors on the Armed Services Committee over the last 
40 years have made key and difficult investment decisions to au- 
thorize the development and procurement of many of the aircraft 
and weapons systems that are being used today around the world. 
Many of those were criticized at the time. So it is now our respon- 
sibility to ensure that the weapons systems that will be used in the 
decades to come are developed and produced in an efficient man- 

Today in the deserts of Iraq, our ground forces have the ability 
to maneuver with the benefit of air dominance. We must have the 
same goal today to provide the men and women of the armed serv- 
ices with effective and suitable equipment with which to accom- 
plish their missions. Domination of the airspace is an absolute re- 

I want to thank Senator Pryor for his willingness to act as rank- 
ing member today. I am sure Senator Lieberman appreciates your 
willingness to fill in for him. 

Our panel of witnesses today should be able to give unique in- 
sight into both the requirements and acquisition plans for the avia- 
tion programs of the Navy and Air Force departments. From the 
Department of the Navy we welcome Secretary John Young — there 
he is — the Assistant Secretary of Navy for Research, Development, 
and Acquisition. With him are Vice Admiral Nathman, the Deputy 
Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Pro- 
grams; Lieutenant General Hough, the Deputy Commandant of the 
Marine Corps for Aviation; and from the Department of the Air 
Force we have Secretary Marvin Sambur, the Assistant Secretary 
of Air Force for Acquisition; and Lieutenant General Keys, the Dep- 
uty Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations. 

A good panel. They can answer, I am sure, any questions that 
we would have. 

There have been numerous studies completed on the affordability 
of projected aviations programs. In the area of tactical aviation, we 
have the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in full rate production, the FA- 
22 Raptor in low rate production, and the Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF) in Systems Development and Demonstration (SDD) with pro- 
duction scheduled later in the decade. 

As the average age of our current tactical aircraft continues to 
increase, it is clear that we have to recapitalize. The cost associated 
with this recapitalization, however, makes it imperative that we 


carefully examine the performance and numerical requirements for 
these platforms. 

The subcommittee is also interested in precision-guided muni- 
tions. In Operation Desert Storm, only 10 percent of the air 
dropped munitions were precision-guided. In our current conflicts, 
the vast majority of our weapons have been precision-guided. This 
has increased the survivability of our strike aircraft, decreased the 
incidence of collateral damage, and provided a substantial force 
multiplier effect. 

I understand that the production of our laser-guided bombs is at 
the maximum rate and that the production of the Joint Direct At- 
tack Munition (^^JDAM) is scheduled to achieve maximum rate in 
the near future. I have been concerned, however, that we do not 
have a sufficient inventory of these weapons. I feel we must do all 
we can to achieve necessary inventory objectives. 

Another area of concern to the subcommittee is the Department's 
plan for providing electronic attack. Since the current inventory of 
EA-6B Prowlers used by all three Services is aging, I understand 
that quite a few of our current fleet of EA-6s are either grounded 
or have flight restrictions. We will talk about that. 

This subcommittee is aware of ongoing negotiations between the 
Air Force and industry for the potential lease of airborne refueling 
aircraft. Although no proposal has been delivered to Congress for 
this approach to recapitalization of the KC-135 fleet, the fiscal 
year 2004 budget request does include a plan to retire 68 KC-135E 
aircraft. This would have a significant impact on our ability to pro- 
vide the required airborne refueling to our mobility, long-range 
strike, and tactical aircraft. 

Again, gentlemen, thank you for being here today. I look forward 
to your testimony. 

Senator Pryor, we would be delighted to have any opening state- 
ments you would like to make. 


Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr Chairman. It is an honor to be 
here with you today. The first thing I need to do is submit a state- 
ment by Senator Lieberman for the record, if that is permissible. 

Senator SESSIONS. It will be made a part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman follows:] 

Prepared Statement by Senator Joseph I. Lieberman 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would hke to take an opportunity to thank our wit- 
nesses for appearing before this subcommittee today. 

First, I think it's important to note the heroism and professionaUsm of the coah- 
tion Armed Forces presently engaged in hostilities in Iraq. I would like to draw spe- 
cial attention to those forces that undertook the daring and brilliantly executed res- 
cue of PFC Jessica Lynch Tuesday night in the town of Nasiriya. All those involved 
in that rescue mission, like all those men and women in uniform who are serving 
their country in the Middle East right now, represent the best in word and in deed 
that this country has to offer. 

It is against that backdrop of continued bravery and exemplary performance that 
we convene this session of the Airland Subcommittee to discuss the present status 
and the future, of tactical aviation. It is a humbling backdrop indeed. It serves to 
remind us of the importance of the issues raised in this subcommittee . . . that the 
decisions made, in part, in these chambers, may result in lives saved months or 
even years down the road in conflicts both prepared for and hardly imagined. 


To this end, therefore, I would hke to raise a few issues with our witnesses — 
issues that I hope this subcommittee will hear more about during its proceedings 
and the witnesses' testimony today. 

First, I note with no small amount of dismay that the testing of the F/A-22 
Raptor has been delayed. Last year the Air Force was predicting that the F/A-22 
program — a program essential to future U.S. air superiority — would start oper- 
ational testing and evaluation this month. Since that announcement there have 
been delays in two major areas: one, delayed aircraft deliveries have slowed the 
progress of the development testing leading up to initial operational testing and 
evaluation; and two, problems with the aircraft's software have proven harder to 
correct than anticipated. 

Production costs have also increased. In fiscal year 2003, Congress provided more 
than $4.6 billion for the production of 23 F/A-22 aircraft. After negotiating the con- 
tract for this year's aircraft, the Air Force has found that those funds will only buy 
20 aircraft — a change caused by cost increases and the need to shift research and 
development (R&D) funds to support additional development and testing efforts. 
Now the Air Force intends to purchase only 22 of the aircraft in fiscal year 2004, 
down from the 27 it planned to buy at this time last year. 

Moving to the Joint Strike Fighter, I note with disappointment that this program 
may also have hit a "snag." Reports indicate that a critical weight problem has de- 
veloped which needs to be addressed sooner rather than later. I would urge the 
Services and the contracting team to fix the problem now in such a way that will 
not create a "bow wave" of further complications as we approach delivery dates. 
Hasty weight reduction fixes have been responsible for substantial cost increases in 
other aircraft developments late in the program, and neither I nor my colleagues 
on this subcommittee want to see the same sort of mistakes be repeated to the JSF 

Moving fi-om platforms to capabilities, I would like to ask our witnesses what the 
Marine Corps and the Air Force plan to do about replacing the EA-6B Prowler elec- 
tronic warfare aircraft. As we all know, the EA-6B is the world's premier electronic 
warfare aircraft and is vital for the suppression of enemy air defenses and the dis- 
ruption of their communication capabilities. Precisely because of its superior abili- 
ties to decimate the enemy's ability to utilize the electronic ether to its own ends, 
the Prowler is a prominent member of the U.S. Armed Forces' "high demand, low 
densitj^' asset community. The DOD sponsored an analysis to determine how to 
modernize the aging EA-6B and increase the assets' availability to deployed forces. 
As a result of this study the Navy has decided to develop an electronic warfare vari- 
ant of the F/A-18. But it is much less clear what the Marine Corps and Air Force 
plan to do. I hope to hear fi"om our representatives of the Air Force and Mai-ines 
present today on their plans to fill this crucial operational niche in the near-to-mid- 
dle distance future. 

In addition to a substantial demand for airborne electronic warfare assets, the 
U.S. military is also experiencing a high demand for air-to-air refueling tankers. I 
was troubled to learn of press reports that carrier aircraft were literally stuck on 
the deck because the Iraqi front line has receded inland so quickly, and there aren't 
enough tankers to provide the required refueling stops. I would like to hear of the 
Services' plans to rectify this capability gap. I would also like to hear more informa- 
tion about the proposed leasing of 100 tanker aircraft from Boeing to replace 133 

The budget request includes retiring 43 of the KC-135s in fiscal year 2004, and 
another 20 or so through the FYDP. Given the high utilization of the tankers them- 
selves, it seems premature to do away with this many high demand assets when 
their replacements are not yet identified. Indeed, although the Air Force has indi- 
cated that it was close to obtaining approval from the administration for a tanker- 
leasing plan, they have not yet submitted any plan to the Armed Services Commit- 
tee. Senator Levin has already made it quite clear that he would argue against the 
adoption of any plan until the full committee was given the opportunity to review 
its details. I also know that Senator McCain has expressed strong reservations 
about such a proposal. 

I firmly believe that tactical air support is one of the most demanding air combat 
roles a pilot can undertake. Indeed, flying extremely close to the ground while try- 
ing to identify friend from foe at blistering speeds is a daunting enough task to give 
anyone pause. However, on March 28 an American A-10 apparently attacked a 
small convoy of British Chieftain tanks and Scimitar armored vehicles from the 
Household Cavalry. Preliminary reports indicate that although the attack by the A- 
10 took place in a British-controlled area, although the British armor had 'popped' 
colored smoke to identify themselves to the aircraft, and although the tanks and ar- 


mored vehicles had friendly markings applied to their exterior, the attack was 

In the end one British tanker was killed and four injured in the attack. Given 
the importance of coalitions to our national security, and given that working with 
coalition partners, especially the British, will increasingly become the rule rather 
than the exception, I would like the witnesses to address the question of whether 
or not our procedures or training need to be updated to prevent such unfortunate 
accidents from recurring in the future. 

Lastly, as the ranking member of this subcommittee which holds jurisdiction, in 
part, over the Air Force, as a long-time supporter of the military, as a Senator who 
has proudly nominated young women to our military academies, and as the father 
of two daughters, I feel it necessary to address current events at the United States 
Air Force Academy. I share my Armed Services Committee colleagues' deep concern 
and dismay over the way that that institution has handled allegations of sexual as- 
sault and misconduct at the Academy. While I support Secretary Roche's change of 
the top Academy leadership, I too must wonder aloud if this is too little, too late. 
The lives of scores of young cadets have been irreparably harmed so too has the 
spirit and core of the Air Force which has now lost some of its best and brightest 
through the wrong-doing of some of their classmates, and the failure of the leader- 
ship to take their allegations seriously. Senator Collins and I have already called 
for an independent investigation of the Academy. . . I am now proud to co-sponsor 
Senator Allard's amendment to the Emergency Defense Supplemental to create an 
independent board of inquiry to examine the decisions of the Academy leadership 
specifically, and the Air Force leadership more generally, concerning the allegations 
of sexual misconduct at the Academy. I await their findings. 

Again, I would like to welcome the witnesses to this hearing, and thank you in 
advance for your candor. 

Senator Pryor. I want to thank our witnesses for being here, 
and I certainly appreciate ever5^hing that you all do. I cannot say 
another word without acknowledging the wonderful job our Armed 
Forces are doing in Operation Iraqi Freedom. It has really been 
amazing to watch the progress we have made in these last few 

One thing I am proud of about the Senate Armed Services Com- 
mittee is this commitment we have to try the best we can to work 
in a very bipartisan way. I think that there is a broad consensus 
on the Armed Services Committee, and certainly on this sub- 
committee as well, to enable the Department of Defense (DOD) to 
respond to the changes of the uncertain world we face. 

The challenges are many. We know that you are going through 
a transformation process, a modernization process. We know that 
we are living in an ever-changing and dangerous world. We appre- 
ciate your commitment to the security of our Nation and the free- 
dom of people all over the world. 

One thing I would love to hear from each of you, as is appro- 
priate, is testimony on the FA-22. I would like to get an update 
on that. I would love to hear about the JSF. I would love to hear 
about the replacement for the EA-6B and also the KC-135 lease 
proposal. I know those are four issues that we are all familiar with 
and I think this subcommittee would like to hear about them. 

One thing I would like to emphasize is that this subcommittee 
and the full committee in the Senate will give a lot of attention to 
the Department of Defense and the needs of the Department of De- 
fense. That attention is very appropriate considering all the chal- 
lenges that you have. We are committed to maintaining our advan- 
tages and improving upon those. So we also acknowledge that our 
resources are limited. We are here to make sure that our resources 
are utilized in the wisest fashion possible. 


So I look forward to hearing from you today and look forward to 
a frank and open discussion of whatever issues you have on your 

Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Senator Pryor. I appreciate that. 
We are glad to have Senator McCain here. He is a national re- 
source in a whole lot of ways. He has a vast history dealing with 
many of these issues that he knows of personally. I value his in- 
sight and counsel very much. 

Do you have any comments to open with? 

Senator McCain. After something like that, it is best to remain 
silent. [Laughter.] 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for holding the hearing. 
I thank the witnesses for being here. 

Senator Sessions. All right. Mr. Young, do you want to start? We 
would be glad to hear your opening statements. I do not know if 
we have a timeline, but I think 5 minutes would be a good goal. 


Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of 
the subcommittee. I appreciate very much the opportunity to testify 
on our fiscal year 2004 tactical aviation programs. 

Recently, I visited our sailors and marines in the Persian Gulf 
area. I am proud to report that the commitment that we made and 
Congress' support in fiscal year 2003 to focus our taxpayers' dollars 
towards improving current readiness has yielded strong dividends. 
Today we have over 70 ships, 370 tactical aircraft, and more than 
55,000 sailors and 60,000 marines in theater. They are trained, 
equipped, and carrjdng out the Nation's will. Our prayers are with 

The fiscal year 2004 budget sustains the enormous strides we 
have made in personnel and readiness and also attains a balanced 
approach to procurement and modernization, cultivating promising 
aircraft technologies, efficiently acquiring mature systems, and im- 
proving the maintenance of our existing systems. Through these 
steps, we have been able to increase the number of airplanes from 
the 89 indicated in the fiscal year 2003 budget request to 100 in 
the fiscal year 2004 budget request. 

The fiscal year 2004 budget request proposes innovative and cre- 
ative approaches to achieving greater combat air capability. First, 
the Department's initiative to integrate Navy and Marine Corps 
tactical aircraft will achieve significant reductions in procurement 
and operating support costs while achieving combat requirements 
and readiness levels. 

Navy and Marine Corps tactical air (TACAIR) integration is en- 
abled by improving the reliability and maintainability of current 
and future systems, reducing the maintenance pipeline by properly 
funding spares and depot maintenance, and enhancing the support 
of our deployed systems. 

In another innovative step, the Department of the Navy has 
worked with the Air Force, the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD), and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 


(DARPA) to forge a joint unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) pro- 
gram. Clearly, unmanned air vehicles (UAV) will play a significant 
role in our future operations. We are developing a joint strategy 
with the Air Force, DARPA, and OSD for a UCAV prograni that 
meets our common requirements, while maintaining the flexibility 
to support service-unique functions. We will structure this effort to 
maintain competition among the UCAV contractors with the goal 
of a JSF-like acquisition strategy that results in the selection of a 
common platform with service-unique variants. 

We are also continually advancing the current and future combat 
value of our airplanes. The Multifunction Information Distribution 
System (MIDS) provides the capability to share the airspace pic- 
ture amongst all 16 linked ships and aircraft. The next step is 
evolving Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) to provide an 
enhanced, high-confidence air picture for systems like E-2C and 
other participants. A CEC-equipped E-2C with our Radar Mod- 
ernization Program upgrade and our Evolving Extended Range Ac- 
tive Missile development will provide a transformational enabler 
against current and future cruise missile targets, particularly those 
operating over land. 

The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet you mentioned is our principal tac- 
tical aviation recapitalization aircraft in the near term. The budget 
includes $3 billion for 42 airplanes, the final installment of a fiscal 
year 2000 to 2004 multiyear procurement. Deliveries remain ahead 
of schedule. Three Super Hornet squadrons are already deployed in 
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

$228 million has been allocated to procure two E-2C Hawkeyes, 
the first of a new 4-year multiyear procurement. This effort will 
keep the line viable as we march towards the E-2C Advanced 
Hawkeye with the Radar Modernization Program. 

We are initiating the airborne electronic attack efforts on the F/ 
A-18E/F, calling it the EA-18G, as an evolutionary means to lever- 
age existing capabilities and replace our aging, low-density, high- 
demand EA-6B aircraft. Using the Super Hornet aircraft allows 
the Department to streamline the acquisition process and field a 
product sooner to the fleet. 

Our partnership with the Air Force, Lockheed Martin, Pratt & 
Whitney, and General Electric has made affordability the corner- 
stone of the Joint Strike Fighter program. The fiscal year 2004 
budget requests $2.2 billion for continuation of Systems Develop- 
ment and Demonstration. The program is on track to deliver oper- 
ational short takeoff, vertical landing (STOVL) variants to the Ma- 
rine Corps in 2008 and the Navy variant in 2010. At Secretary 
England and Secretary Aldridge's urging, we formed a Configura- 
tion Steering Board for JSF. Secretary Sambur and I have a man- 
date to reject changes in the core program in order to give JSF a 
chance to deliver the initial system within the time and the dollars 

To further realize acquisition efficiencies, we recently signed with 
the Air Force a contract to procure KC-130Js as part of a 
multiyear procurement seeking 20 additional aircraft for the Ma- 
rine Corps. 

I believe we have crafted a balanced and properly focused budget 
request that ensures our Nation will have an efficient infrastruc- 


ture and an optimal force structure. The Navy and Marine Corps, 
sir, are professional and capable, the best in the world. With your 
assistance, we will continue to provide maximum capability for our 
sailors and marines and maximum security for America. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify today. 

Senator Sessions. Thank you. Secretary Young. 

Secretary Sambur. 

Dr. Sambur. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Since I would like to give you 
the opportunity to ask the questions that you would like to ask and 
since I have a written statement for the record, myself and General 
Keys would like to forego our oral comments. If you can accept our 
written remarks for the record, it would be appreciated. 

Senator Sessions. We would be delighted to do that. I have re- 
viewed your remarks. I appreciate those very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sambur follows:] 

Prepared Statement by Dr. Marvin Sambur 

Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Lieberman and members of the subcommit- 
tee: Thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you the Air Force's 2004 budget 
plan and to report to you on our efforts and progress on acquisition reform. Greneral 
Keys and I are proud to come before you today and discuss our plan for maintaining 
the United States Air Force as the dominant air force in the world. Your support 
will be vital as we work together to ensure that we continue to deliver programs 
that support warfighter capabilities, which are needed to ensure victory. 

Over the last year, we have been very successful in implementing new changes 
to the Air Force acquisition process and in providing increased capabilities to the 
warfighter. My staff and I have been diligently working to develop processes and 
enhance the culture within the Air Force acquisition workforce, so as to institu- 
tionalize these changes and ensure our air dominance. 

We will continue to leverage the technology of this Nation to create advantages 
for our military forces and meet the challenges that we will face in the years ahead 
as articulated by the Secretary of Defense. 


The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force gave us a mandate to change 
the way we do business to deliver capability to the warfighter. From shpping devel- 
opment times, to reduced deliveries, to increased costs, programs have not met es- 
tablished baselines and goals. During this past year, I have been working to deter- 
mine the root cause of these execution problems. The findings identify several fac- 
tors that lead to poor program execution including: unstable reqxiirements, faulty 
cost estimates, lack of test community buy-in, inadequate systems engineering, and 
unstable funding. For the Air Force, these program execution problems result in the 
average cost growth of 30 percent for acquisition programs and the doubling of the 
average procurement times. 

Given the problems noted above and the resulting increases in program costs and 
delays in program schedules, I have formulated a series of policies to address the 
underlying causes. 

First, in order to overcome our unstable requirements process, I have imple- 
mented an Agile Acquisition Policy that demands collaboration: that is active, coop- 
erative dialogue between the warfighter, acquirer, and tester working as one team 
at the outset and throughout the requirements and development process. This will 
ensure that warfighter requirements are clearly articulated, the acquirers commu- 
nicate what can be delivered and the testers understand what needs to be verified. 
Surprises are kept in check when the user provides a concept of operations up front 
and a consistent, continuous dialogue between all stakeholders provides a robust 
definition of a requirement, which the acquisition community can deliver and the 
tester can verify. 

These changes set the goal of institutionaUzing collaboration throughout the Air 
Force and DOD acquisition to include our operations, test and sustainment commu- 
nities. Collaboration must start well before a product is delivered in order to control 
costs and to provide the user with the required capability. When the acquisition en- 
terprise, consisting of the warfighter, acquisition, test, and sustainment commu- 
nities, starts working together a better product is produced. 


Second, I have addressed the issue of faulty cost estimates by instituting policy 
changes that will foster credibility within the acquisition community. Credibility 
means delivering what we promise, on time and on budget. In the past, we have 
designed our programs with a 60-70 percent confidence level of meeting cost, sched- 
ule, and performance goals. In order to be credible both to the warfighters and Con- 
gress, I have implemented a 90 percent confidence level in meeting our require- 

By demanding collaboration between all the parties, we can ensure the right 
trade-offs are made throughout the acquisition process to meet the required goals. 
It is imperative that both the warfighting and acquisition communities work to- 
gether to make tradeoffs of non-critical elements within programs to buy down risk 
throughout the acquisition cycle. Bottom line: credibility means delivering what we 
promise, on time and on budget. 

Third, not having test community buy-in created problems further along in the 
acquisition process. As such, we have started to work with the test community on 
processes to reduce the number of serial events for testing. This is different from 
the current process of serial and overlapping development and operational testing, 
which can take several years. We are developing a seamless verification process to 
ensure that both the developmental test and operation test occur in a single process, 
not fragmented as it has been in the past. If the operational testers are involved 
early in the process, then they can assess the operational value of developmental 
testing and reduce duplication of effort. 

Again, collaboration is a vital part of this process change. By involving all mem- 
bers of the acquisition enterprise early and continuously, we can all come to agree- 
ments on what are the operational requirements, what can be delivered and how 
we will verify the systems being built meet those needs. 

Fourth, we need to instill an adequate systems engineering foundation within the 
acquisition process. Systems engineering is one of the bedrocks of sound manage- 
ment for acquisition programs as it ensures that contractor-proposed solutions are 
consistent with sound engineering principals. Decisions based on a solid systems en- 
gineering approach will ensure that our program managers will be better prepared 
to assess their programs' health and will help to keep programs on budget and 
schedule. As such, I am implementing a process by which all future Milestone Deci- 
sion Authorities will not sign out any future acquisition strategy plans that lack the 
necessary attention to systems engineering. Additionally, I am demanding system 
engineering performance be linked to the contract award fee or incentive fee struc- 
tures. This link will help ensure the industry will also follow a sound systems engi- 
neering approach. 

Additionally, we are rebuilding our organic system engineering foundation to pro- 
vide the necessary expertise throughout the Air Force acquisition community. Re- 
cently, the Center of Excellence for Systems Engineering has been opened at the Air 
Force Institute of Technology. Our goal is to create a reservoir of knowledge and 
source of best practices, which can be applied to our current and future acquisition 

Fifth, unstable funding is a constant problem, one that can be better managed by 
a more disciplined program-priority process while leveraging spiral development 
methods. Through our complementary processes to review warfighting capabilities 
and the associated execution of the programs comprising the capabilities, I firmly 
believe that we will have in place the ability to better manage funding instability. 
As funding perturbations, both external and internal, arise within our programs, 
our reviews will ensure that a disciplined process of flexing resources to programs 
that contribute the most to warfighting capabilities exists. This in effect will mini- 
mize the overall perturbation to programs that provide the most "bang for the buck" 
and eliminating our time-honored process of applying a "peanut-butter spread" to 


The Air Force has identified the spiral development methodology of acquisition as 
the preferred approach to acquiring systems. As the pace of technology has quick- 
ened, so must the pace of our acquisition process. Spiral development allows the Air 
Force to incrementally deliver weapon system capability quickly — providing the 
warfighter technology as it matures within acceptable program risk. As each spiral 
is more clearly defined and shorter in duration, schedules are better managed due 
to the shorter time exposure of the development process to internal and external 
change. Mutual expectations on spiral content, cost, and schedule are also commonly 
understood and agreed to up-front between all stakeholders, as collaborative prac- 
tices are paramount to the spiral development process. 


Spiral development will also assist in mitigating funding instability by allowing 
the service to compartmentalize each individual spiral such that a funding cut in 
the far term won't compromise a capability that is complete and ready to go to the 
field today. In the past our "big bang" theory of releasing weapon system capability 
to the field held all aspects of the weapon system hostage to any perturbation in 
the process. With spirals we release smaller, more tightly focused capability sooner, 
and minimize the risk of a long drawn-out development process being affected by 
funding instability in either the mid- or far-term. 

Another beneficial spin-off of spiral development acquisition is the flexibility to in- 
sert the latest technology into the development and production lines. This is where 
the importance of a robust science and technology (S&T) capacity is crucial in truly 
reaping the benefits of a spiral release process. 


Providing the warfighter solutions rests in large measure with research and devel- 
opment. Through robust investment and deliberate focus in S&T, the Air Force in- 
vigorates our core competency of providing technology-to-warfighting. Combined 
with innovative vision, S&T opens the direct route towards transforming air and 
space capabilities. Therefore we continue long-term, stable investment in S&T to en- 
sure we realize future capabilities, as well as those that may immediately affect ex- 
isting systems. 

Some of these new technologies — UAV systems, laser-based communications, 
space-based radar, and others — show clear promise for near-term, joint warfighting 
applications. Others present opportunities we can only begin to imagine. We are ex- 
ploring each of these technologies, and our investment will deliver the required ca- 
pabilities to our seven Air Force concepts of operations (CONOPs). 


The Air Force has also enacted new business practices from an integrated enter- 
prise perspective, examining every process and process link. I have expressly given 
our people the latitude to make the right decisions by relaxing our past prescriptive 
policies. My implementation of a reality-based acquisition policy, which replaced the 
highly prescriptive Air Force Instruction (AFPD 63-1/AFI 63-101), provided guid- 
ance emphasizing innovation and risk management and will delegate decision au- 
thority to appropriate levels. Additionally, I have empowered our people through the 
use of high powered teaming with the warfighters, to deliver initial capability to 
warfighters more quickly, and add capability increments in future spirals. 

Our transformation of acquisition practices are only the beginning of a com- 
prehensive and aggressive approach to reforming business practices. Our efforts 
today will have a direct effect on efficient and effective air and space capability ac- 
quisition both immediately, and in the future. 


During the last year we have had several successes based on these principles out- 
lined above. One such example is the Passive Attack Weapon. This weapon was de- 
veloped as a result of a 180-day Quick Reaction Program at Air Combat Command, 
and was available to the warfighter at the 98-day mark. To date, we have delivered 
58 weapons and completed all aircraft integration. Support elements have been de- 
livered, and our seamless verification of the system is complete. Production was 
completed on time, with 15 percent more weapons delivered than originally pro- 
posed as we completed the program under budget. 



The F/A-22, with its revolutionary combination of stealth, supercruise (i.e. super- 
sonic cruise without afterburner), maneuverability, and integrated avionics, will 
dominate the skies. The F/A-22 will ensure U.S. air dominance against all projected 
future threats. In addition, when outfitted with the Small Diameter Bomb, the F/ 
A-22's ability to penetrate an adversary's anti-access airspace and destroy his most 
critical air defense capabilities, will enable 24-hour stealth operations and freedom 
of movement for all follow-on forces — fully leveraging our Nation's asymmetric tech- 
nological advantages. In 2001, flight-testing continued to demonstrate the revolu- 
tionary capabilities. Specifically, the F/A-22 successfully completed an AIM-120 
guided missile launch, and initial radar detection range measurements (met speci- 
fication requirements the first time out). On 14 Aug 2001, the Defense Acquisition 
Board approved the F/A-22's entry into low-rate initial production (LRIP). Entering 


operational service in 2005, this transformational leap in technology is the linchpin 
to preserving the Nation's most important military advantage for the warfighter: the 
capability to rapidly obtain and maintain air and space dominance. The program 
continues to proceed toward full rate production. LRIP aircraft are well into the 
manufacturing process; contracts already awarded include Lot 1 (10), Lot 2 (13), Lot 
3 (20), and advance buy for Lot 4 (-22). 

The EMD program has been restructured to resolve the EMD shortfall within the 
overall F/A-22 budget. Funding was re-phased from modernization and production 
in fiscal year 2003 and from production in fiscal year 2004-fiscal year 2006. The 
modernization program was re-planned in concert with the warfighter to account for 
these changes while ensuring critical capabilities are brought on board when re- 
quired. While the EMD shortfall and higher than anticipated Lot 3 aircraft costs 
did result in a revised estimate of 276 aircraft, it did not impact the Air Force's com- 
mitment to the "Buy-to-Budget" strategy. The Air Force is focused on successfully 
completing F/A-22 development and initiating Dedicated Initial Operational Test 
and Evaluation (DIOT&E). While currently scheduled to start in October 2003, 
DIOT&E remains event-based and we will not begin until we are assured of success. 
Our greatest remaining development challenge is avionics stability, yet we remain 
confident we will successfully resolve this issue. 

Despite the issues above, F/A-22 program has made great strides in the past 6- 

9 months. Not only has the flight test program increased the test point bum down 
rate to the point where envelope expansion is back on track, but also the vertical 
fin buffet challenge has been resolved, and the cause of canopy howl has been iden- 
tified and a repair plan developed. The program recently crossed the 3,000 hour cu- 
mulative flight hour milestone and has seven aircraft flying at Edwards and one at 
Nellis. Testing has also included 16 live missile launches (4 guided) and successful 
firing of the gun. Production processes during final assembly at Marietta continue 
to show improvement. Out of station work has been reduced significantly, part 
shortfalls are down 70 percent, and tool validation has been completed. 


Acting in concert with the F/A-22 will be the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The F/ 
A-22/F-35 force mix will balance affordability, capability and force structure — criti- 
cal capabilities for the global strike concept of operations — to ensure sufficient quan- 
tities of advanced fighter aircraft to give the U.S. dominant force across the full 
spectrum of conflicts. The F-35 program will develop and field a highly common 
family of next-generation strike fighter aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, Marine 
Corps and our allies. The Air Force conventional takeoff" and landing (CTOL) vari- 
ant will be a multi-role, primary air-to-ground aircraft to replace the F-16 and A- 

10 and complement the F/A-22. While the F/A-22 will establish air dominance, the 
F-35 — with its combination of stealth, large internal payloads and multi-spectral 
avionics — will provide persistent stealth and precision engagement to the future 
battlespace. The F-35 will carry a wide array of weapons, including J-series, 
AMRAAM and AJM-9X. It will be optimized for all-weather, air-to-ground employ- 
ment, including direct attack on the most lethal surface-to-air missile systems. F- 
35 planned reliability and maintainability will enable an increase in sortie genera- 
tion rate and mission reliability, and will reduce the logistics footprint as compared 
to legacy aircraft. 

The F-35 program is in the second year of the SDD phase. The SDD program is 
employing a block upgrade approach, based upon an open system architecture, to 
provide early delivery of a basic combat capability followed by integration of addi- 
tional avionics and weapons capabilities to support the services' initial operational 
capability (IOC) requirements in the 2010-2012 timeframe. Over the past year, the 
program has achieved several SDD technical milestones, including the Air System 
Requirements Review, the Integrated Baseline Reviews, the Propulsion Preliminary 
Design Reviews and, most recently, the Air System Preliminary Design Review for 
all three F-35 variants. The program is currently expected to meet or exceed all key 
performance parameter thresholds. 

The F-35 program is on track to supply 1,763 CTOL aircraft to the Air Force and 
to meet the Air Force's IOC goal in fiscal year 2011. Maintaining this schedule will 
ensure the optimal balance between affbrdably replacing aging aircraft and provid- 
ing the warfighter the required force structure. 

The F-35 is the DOD's largest cooperative development program. In fiscal year 
2002, the F-35 program successfully concluded SDD cooperation agreements with 
seven additional international partners: Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Nor- 
way, Italy, Turkey, and Australia. These countries, along with the United Kingdom, 
are contributing over $4 billion to the SDD program. The Department is also nego- 
tiating with Israel and Singapore regarding their participation as security coopera- 


tion participants. International participation in the F-35 program wall help ensure 
maintenance of economies of scale, which will keep the F-35 affordable both in 
flyaway and support costs over the life of the program. Additionally, international 
participation in the F-35 program will promote appropriate U.S. -foreign technology 
sharing and bring the U.S. and our allies closer to the goal of full joint/combined 
warfare capability. 

Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) 

The UCAV vision is to develop an affordable weapon system that expands tactical, 
and perhaps strategic, mission options and provide a revolutionary new element in 
the air power arsenal. The UCAV weapon system will exploit the design and oper- 
ational freedoms of relocating the pilot outside of the vehicle while maintaining the 
rationale, judgment, and moral qualities of the human operator. 

The ongoing X-^5 UCAV program is a joint Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency/US. Air Force effort being conducted in multiple overlapping spirals of in- 
creasing capability towards the UCAV vision. Spiral consisting of X-45A air vehi- 
cle demonstrators, mission control system, and simulators are performing well at 
the NASA-Dryden Flight Research Center in CA today. Spiral 1, planned for deliv- 
ery in fiscal year 2005, will integrate the intelligent multiple-vehicle coordinated op- 
erations demonstrated in Spiral with a robust air vehicle design that offers in- 
creased range and payload. Future spirals will provide increasing capability to meet 
warfighter needs and enhance the effectiveness of integrated operations of manned 
and unmanned aircraft. 

F-15 Program 

The F-15 Eagle remains the USAF's lead air superiority and only all-weather 
deep interdiction aircraft well into this century. The deep interdiction version, the 
F-15E, provides night/through the weather air-to-surface attack, employing all 
USAF precision-guided munitions, including J-series weapons. The F-15 is heavily 
involved in Operations Enduring Freedom, Noble Eagle, and Iraqi Freedom. 

The Air Force must maintain the F-15A-Ds' and F-15Es' abilities to fulfill their 
roles in light of the evolving threat and world situation. Several of the current modi- 
fications to the F-15 are an upgrade to the radar (the APG-63(V)1 radar upgrade) 
to address significant reliability obsolescence problems; an upgrade to the engine 
(the F100-220E engine upgrade) to address significant reliability problems; addition 
of a new mission computer (the Advanced Display Core Processor) to provide com- 
puting power to support future capability growth; an upgrade of the armament con- 
trol system (the Programmable Armament Control Set upgrade) to support employ- 
ment of J-series weapons; and addition of high-off-boresight targeting of^ sensors and 
air-to-air weapons (the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System) to improve surviv- 
ability in within-visual-range air combat. 

A recent success story of the program is the fielding of Litening ER pods to sup- 
port current operations. Following the Chief of Staff's direction, the Air Force com- 
pleted a 90-day evaluation of the Litening pod in December 2002 on F-15E aircraft. 
Positive evaluation results led to direction to procure and field 24 pods. Funding re- 
allocation and congressional approval were accomplished within 2 months, and pod 
deliveries began in January 2003. There are currently 16 pods in-country supporting 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the balance will be delivered to the Air Force by 31 
March 2003. 


The F-16 is the Air Force's principal multi-role fighter and is the largest Air 
Force and international sales procurement program with over 4,000 produced for 
service, encompassing 23 countries. It is currently operating within the Active, Re- 
serve, and Air National Guard Forces. The F-16 is a single-engine, multi-role, tac- 
tical fighter, with full air-to-air and air-to-ground combat capabilities. The F-16 
comprises over 50 percent of the precision engagement fighter force and is the Air 
Force's primary Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) platform. It is exten- 
sively deployed with various ongoing operations to include Operations Noble Eagle, 
Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. 

The F-16 is currently projected to be in service beyond 2020. Several key modi- 
fications are underway to ensure the Fighting Falcon remains a key combat enabler. 
The Falcon Structural Augmentation Roadmap (Falcon STAR) is a structural modi- 
fication for achieving an 8,000-hour component service life. Installation is pro- 
grammed for fiscal year 2004 through fiscal year 2014. The Common Configuration 
Implementation Program (CCIP) modification will improve the avionics commonality 
between the Block 40 and 50 aircraft. It combines five modifications into one modi- 
fication; thereby reducing the number of times a jet is opened and maximizing con- 
figuration control. Further, it combines the Block 40 and 50 Operational Flight Pro- 


grams (OFPs) into common OFPs. The CCIP modification is timed with the Air Ex- 
pedition Force schedule with installations running through fiscal year 2010. Lastly, 
the Combat Upgrade Plan Integration Details (CXJPID) modification will incorporate 
GPS, data link, night vision, and countermeasures into Block 25 through 32 aircraft. 
We expect to complete CUPID in fiscal year 2003. 

Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) 

SDB will provide the following capabilities to the warfighter: Increased number 
of kills per pass; combat effective in adverse weather; minimized collateral damage; 
autonomous target attack; enhanced (>40nm) weapon standoff range; reduced logis- 
tic footprints and aircraft generation times. SDB will be compatible with the follow- 
ing current platforms (F-15E, F-16, F-117, A-10, B-1, B-2, B-52), and is planned 
for next generation platforms (F/A-22, F-35, UCAV, Predator B). Boeing and Lock- 
heed Martin are currently competing in the 2-year computer-assisted design (CAD) 
phase with a downselect expected to occur in September 2003. LRIP will start in 
fiscal year 2005 with a planned RAA on the F-15E in fiscal year 2006. The SDB 
Threshold Platform is the F-15E, although F/A-22 is a major focus item in support 
of the global strike CONOPS. SDB will be a pilot program for seamless verification, 
which is intended to maximize development, operational, and contractor test re- 
sources in conducting an effective test program in support of warfighter require- 
ments, while minimizing test-related cost and schedule. 

Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW) 

The Joint Standoff Weapon is a joint Air Force-Navy program, with the Navy as 
the lead service. JSOWA, INS/GPS precision glide weapon that the Air Force is pro- 
curing, is designed to attack a variety of area targets — fixed, relocatable, and mobile 
targets — during day, night and adverse weather conditions. JSOW enhances aircraft 
survivability as compared to current interdiction weapon systems by providing the 
capability for launch aircraft to stand off outside the range of enemy point defenses. 
The F-16, B-52, and F-15E are now capable of delivering JSOWA and the B-2 will 
again be capable of carrying the weapons by mid- April 2003. The weapon will also 
be integrated on the B— 1 and F-35. 

Last year the Air Force decided to withdraw from the JSOWB program to service 
armored targets and begin development of an Extended Range Wind Corrected Mu- 
nitions Dispenser (WCMD). The decision to add a wing kit and GPS to WCMD en- 
hances the weapon's capability and leverages the existing inventory of tactical muni- 
tions dispensers. The new weapon will significantly contribute to the Air Force's 
warfighting capability. The new area attack munitions mix is based on the accelera- 
tion of JSOWA, the Sensor Fuzed Weapon and the WCMD-ER. Joint Air-to-Surface 
Standoff Missile (JASSM). 

The JASSM is a "kick down the door" tjrpe weapon to be used in the early stages 
of a war to neutralize enemy's defenses and war infrastructure by targeting high 
value, fiixed and relocatable targets. JASSM's standoff range is greater than 200 
NM. It is a conventional, precision, autonomous, low observable missile with a 1,000 
lb penetrator and blast/fragment warhead. JASSM is all weather capable using 
GPS/INS guidance and an Imaging Inft-a-Red (IIR) terminal seeker. 

JASSM began LRIP in fiscal year 2002 with a buy of 76 missiles. Deliveries will 
begin in April 2003. The B-52 will be the first aircraft to reach RAA (required as- 
sets available) in September 2003. B-2, B-1, and F-16 will follow in fiscal year 
2004. The JASSM test program was recently stopped after two ft-ee flight anomalies. 
Those issues have been addressed and the USAF is confident they are fixed. The 
final JASSM DT test is scheduled for late March; OT will be resumed if that test 
is successful. The test program will be complete in July allowing JASSM to have 
a full-rate production milestone decision in November 2003. 

JASSM-Extended Range (ER) is a spiral development program that will increase 
the range capability to greater than 500 NM. JASSM-ER will start development in 
late fiscal year 2003 with congressional plus-up funds. Development will end in fis- 
cal year 2007 when the program will enter production with the first deliveries in 
fiscal year 2008. 


The MC2A will provide rapid machine-to-machine integration of information from 
manned, unmanned and space-based sensors. The MC2A is the next generation wide 
area surveillance platform designed to provide a near real-time, horizontally inte- 
grated view of the air and surface battlespace through the use of advanced sensors, 
network centric systems and high-speed, wide-band communications systems. The 
platform will be a key enabler to engage time sensitive targets with precision accu- 


Spiral 1 capability is funded to include next generation Ground Moving Target In- 
dicator (GMTI) for counterland mission capability, focused Air Moving Target Indi- 
cator (AMTI) supporting Cruise Missile Defense (CMD), an open system architecture 
for the Battle Management, Command and Control (BMC2) mission suite subsystem 
and growth potential for UAV control, space-based radar interface and intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) management functions. 

Future spirals are envisioned to incorporate transformational horizontal integra- 
tion and C2 Constellation battle management functions, an advanced AMTI sensor, 
UAV control, space-based radar integration and laser communications. Available 
technology will determine if combining GMTI and a 360-degree AMTI sensor on a 
single aircraft is possible, or whether the 360-degree AMTI sensor will be hosted 
on a second MC2A configuration. 


The Air Force remains focused on providing the necessary capabilities to the 
warfighter in order to win America's wars. These capabilities can only be achieved 
through effective and efficient management during the development, production, 
and fielding of systems. By incorporating a strong collaborative process, re-establish- 
ing our credibility, implementing spiral development, and infiLising systems engi- 
neering in our acquisition process, we can overcome the tough challenges ahead. 

Through our new business practices, we are providing our workforce with the 
tools to make decisions and changes, but this is not enough. The Air Force must 
provide strong support to program managers and the necessary latitude to manage 
systems development, production, and sustainment with limited interference. Omy 
then can we meet the agile acquisition needs of our warfighters. 

Given the limited budget and increasing needs, this is a challenge that must be 
met head on. We are committed to pursuing those actions necessary to make trans- 
formation work. 

I appreciate the support provided by Congress and look forward to working with 
this subcommittee to best satisfy our warfighter needs in the future. 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this statement for the record. 

Senator Sessions. Admiral Nathman? 


Admiral Nathman. Senator Sessions, distinguished members. 

I will take a few minutes to talk about some maybe obvious 
things. The current conflicts with Iraq and Afghanistan, I think, 
are pointing out some clear attributes that the naval service needs 
to be focused on. Those would be: What can we do to improve our 
range and our access to the battlefield? What t3^e of multi-mission 
capability are we going to bring in our aircraft, weapons systems, 
and weapons to cover the target sets that are required to be cov- 
ered from, as you saw today, close air support for British coalition 
maneuver. Marine maneuver. Army maneuver? Then what can we 
do to make sure that we are on the right path to provide persistent 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of that battle space 
so it can be shaped properly? Then as you would expect, can we 
do it in the most affordable and efficient manner that we can? 

I think you will see in the program of record at least a validation 
that that is the right path for us to be on. The Super Hornet, the 
E/F, is currently in combat today on the U.S.S. Lincoln. Two squad- 
rons are also closing — two squadrons of Super Hornets, the E and 
the F, are embarked on the U.S.S. Nimitz, which chopped into the 
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) 
today and soon will be into the Persian Gulf. 

That aircraft brings with it the affordability of a multiyear pro- 
curement. It brings with it significant combat reach. It is better 
shaped for access. It has the ability to grow the right stuff in it, 


advanced electronically scanned radar, which gives it simultaneous 
air-to-ground and air-to-air capability. 

The other thing the aircraft is going to bring with it is that it 
puts a mission tanker back on our flight decks. We have been miss- 
ing that for some time. Since we stood down the A-6 and the KA- 
6, our tanking now is done primarily with the support of the 
United States Air Force. What we are doing in Iraq, particularly 
in northern Iraq, would be impossible without the tanker bridge 
that we have with the Air Force. So it is important for the Navy 
to put a mission tanker back on its flight deck. Super Hornet 
brings us that mission tanking capability. 

The other thing I think you are seeing is the affordability. The 
Joint Strike Fighter was designed with affordability in mind. Not 
only is it a system of airplanes for the Air Force, the Marine Corps, 
and the Navy, in terms of common avionics and common weapon 
systems, but there soon will be common training, I assume, and a 
common training place for the Joint Strike Fighter in the future. 

We have recently integrated the tactical aircraft squadrons with 
the Marine Corps. We did that for several reasons. One was afford- 
ability, the ability to generate additional funds for the future. You 
will see that in our reduced multiyear procurement of F-18E/Fs 
along with Joint Strike Fighters, giving us the capability to invest 
in other aircraft, specifically the F-18G, the Growler, the electronic 
attack version, which is important to the Navy and the naval serv- 
ice in terms of having the right electronic attack shaping the battle 
space for the concept of operations that we fly in our embarked air 

So I appreciate your time and look forward to your questions, sir. 

Senator Sessions. Thank you. 

Lieutenant General Hough. 


General Hough. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Chairman Ses- 
sions, distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is a privilege 
and honor to speak to you today about tactical aviation in the Ma- 
rine Corps. 

On behalf of all marines and their families, I want to thank you 
for your continued support to Marine aviation and the Corps as a 
whole. The commitment to increase the warfighting crisis response 
capability of our Nation's Armed Forces and improving the quality 
of life of our men and women in uniform is central to the strength 
of the Marine Corps and has contributed immeasurably to our ac- 
complishments on the global war on terrorism. 

Marine Corps aviation provides the Marine Air-Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) and the joint force commander with the aviation 
combat element capable of conducting air operations as part of a 
naval expeditionary force throughout the six functions of Marine 
aviation. The unique expeditionary and adaptable nature of Marine 
aviation is an integral part of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
and allows us to operate efficiently and effectively across the full 
spectrum of basing operations and makes us an adaptable, highly 
responsible and lethal force, and we are proving it every day in Op- 
eration Iraqi Freedom. 


Today, nearly 85 percent of Marine aviation is deployed or com- 
mitted worldwide. 59 percent of Marine TACAIR and 58 percent of 
our rotary wing aircraft are committed to the Central Command for 
operations in Iraq or Afghanistan with 84 Hornets, 88 Harriers, 10 
Prowlers, and 259 helicopters. Three FA-18 squadrons are de- 
ployed with carrier air wings. One additional FA-18 squadron is in 
the work-up cycle preparing to deploy very shortly. 

Since the commencement of the operation in Iraq, which has not 
been too long. Marine aviation from the sea base and from land has 
flown over 2,800 fixed wing sorties and over 900 rotary wing sor- 
ties. It has dropped almost every type of air-to-ground munition in 
the naval aviation inventory. 

Our 6 Harriers in Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan, which have 
been there since October, are equipped with a litening targeting 
pod, which has been performing absolutely magnificently. It has 
flown over 600 sorties and over 1,800 hours, supporting special ops 
forces for Operation Enduring Freedom. It has also demonstrated 
extra flexibility with short takeoff/vertical landing on that busted- 
up runway. 

Our 76 Harriers in Iraq are also performing magnificently. De- 
ployed in the sea base and on land, they are moving forward from 
base to base, closer to Baghdad, closer to the sound of guns, and 
will provide increased time on station, faster response times, in 
support of our joint and coalition ground forces. Also equipped with 
a litening pod, the Harriers became the platform of choice for 
urban, close air support in Iraq. 

Marine aviation is healthy. I could not be prouder of the job our 
aviation marines are doing. Currently, though, we are facing a pe- 
riod of great change over the course of the next 10 to 15 years, as 
you well know. Everything we have in Marine aviation, absolutely 
ever)^hing we have, is going to be turned over or changed. One 
thing is certain: Marine aviation is transforming and transitioning, 
but the thing that will not change is the professionalism of our ex- 
peditionary culture. 

This change includes TACAIR integration, aircraft trans- 
formation and transition. Marine air command and control, mod- 
ernization, and implementation of the simulator master plan. We 
are making every effort to increase our efficiencies and effective- 
ness as we go through this transformation and do it as a naval 
team partner. 

You have read about TACAIR integration and heard a lot about 
it. It retains our culture. It is not a new concept. We have been 
doing it for a long time, but on a smaller scale. It is a more capable 
and a more affordable force. It ensures TACAIR support to the 
MAGTF while allowing global sourcing to all TACAIR assets, in- 
creased combat capability forward in concert with the sea basing 
concept, and reinforced expeditionary. 

Naval TACAIR with a smaller, more efficient force will continue 
to provide combatant commanders and joint force commanders with 
a flexible, scalable, full spectrum response capability fi'om the sea. 

We are working together all the time in such a way that the 
whole is much greater than the sum of the parts. It is about S5nii- 
ergy and getting more bang for the buck. 


Aircraft transformation transition: We have been working for al- 
most 30 years to do this. We are finally there. We went from 30 
to 23 to now 7 platforms. We continue to modernize our existing 
aircraft to ensure readiness and warfighting relevance. Our key to 
success will be the careful balancing of people and equipment that 
allows us to maintain combat readiness throughout the trans- 
formation. The overarching intent is to maintain relevant forces 
while reducing the logistics burden on the commander. 

Marine air command and control system modernization, that is 
the key to it all. It links it all up, ties it together operationally. 
Aviation command and control continues to be decisively engaged 
in support of coalition, joint, and MAGTF operations. The Corps 
has embraced a bold vision for the convergence of capabilities, or- 
ganization, doctrinal training, and personnel. The integration of 
this 21st century capability will exponentially increase our capabil- 
ity to fight jointly and with our coalition partners. 

The Marine Corps simulation master plan is 21st century. It is 
the way everyone else does it. It is the way we are going to do it. 
It is more efficient, more effective. It saves big money. It is not 
about money; it is all about money. 

The Marine Corps and Marine aviation as a partner in the naval 
team has clearly lived up to the reputation of "first to the fight and 
first to fight." We remain ready for combat when and where the 
need arises. Marine aviation has been and will continue to be ready 
to deploy a scalable, highly trained, task organized expeditionary 
aviation combat element, capable of conducting missions across the 
continuum of conflict in support of the Marine air-ground team. It 
supports also the joint force or combatant commander. 

In a world of diminishing host nation support, basing options and 
sovereignty, the ability to provide the Nation with self-contained 
MAGTFs capable of executing a wide range of missions at a mo- 
ment's notice from a variety of locations will remain the Marine 
Corps hallmark. 

For all that and more, I thank each and every one of you for your 
continued support for Marine aviation. It has been an honor to ad- 
dress you today. Sir, I look forward to your questions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Very well said, and we appreciate 
your comments. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Young, Admiral Nathman, 
and General Hough follows:] 

Prepared Joint Statement by Hon. John J. Young, Jr., Vice Adm. John B. 
Nathman, USN, and Lt. Gen. Michael A. Hough, USMC 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this op- 
portunity to appear before you to discuss the Department of the Navy's fiscal year 
2004 budget request for tactical aviation. VADM Nathman, LtGen Hough, and I are 
proud to come before you today to outline our most recent efforts to enable the De- 
partment of the Navy to field the most capable and lethal tactical air force in the 

I recently visited our sailors and marines in the Persian Gulf area, including Ku- 
wait and Bahrain, and we can rest assured that our sailors and marines guard our 
freedom with a dedication bom from a voluntary commitment to defend the ideals 
of our founding fathers. It is my pleasure to outline the contribution that we in the 
Navy and Marine Corps acquisition community are making to enable the Depart- 
ment of the Navy to field the most capable, mobile and lethal force since its incep- 
tion over 225 years ago. 


The global war on terrorism has fundamentally changed the national debate on 
defense. To meet this challenge, difficult decisions were required to find the optimal 
mix within the portfolio of naval responsibilities, and within that, tactical aviation 
requirements of the Department. We have been good stewards for the taxpayer by 
demonstrating creative thinking such as utilizing the inherent growth capabilities 
of the F/A-18E/F to meet the airborne electronic attack requirement; making sound 
fiscal decisions including integrating Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation assets 
to achieve significant reductions in procurement and operating support costs; re- 
viewing the need for some of our legacy systems; and leveraging these actions to 
increase the number of aircraft being requested in the fiscal year 2004 budget. By 
addressing key issues such as the cultivation of promising aircraft technologies, cost 
effective acquisition of mature systems, and improved maintenance of existing sys- 
tems, we have been able to increase the number of aircraft fi-om 89 in last year's 
budget request to 100 in the fiscal year 2004 budget request. 

In striving to provide the warfighter with the latest capabilities, we have adopted 
the tenets of Naval Vision 21 and Naval Transformation Roadmap 21. In doing this, 
we have engaged in a full assessment of naval S&T funding to ensure we have ad- 
dressed all technology needs to support these transformation mandates. To this end, 
technology demonstrations are planned using Future Years Defense Program funds 
that aim to meet the needs of our forces — stretching fi-om the ocean floor to the edge 
of space, and from facilities in the United States to the tip of the spear throughout 
the world. 

Our actions to get the best value reach beyond the Department of the Navy. For 
example, the Department has worked in partnership with the Air Force on the JSF 
program to deliver an affordable and supportable strike fighter. Recently, we have 
also developed a joint strategy with the Air Force to develop an UCAV. UCAV will 
be a critical part of our future tactical aviation force structure. 


The Navy and Marine Corps team is the greatest maritime force in the world, but 
it is imperative that we transform our tactical aviation warfighting capabilities to 
meet the emerging challenges of the 21st century. We are changing and initiating 
programs to improve the warfighting capability of current and future forces. Fur- 
thermore, we are seeking joint opportunities and options wherever possible in tak- 
ing these steps. 

Our plan capitalizes on ideas that facilitate our recapitedization goals. An excel- 
lent example is the JSF, a stealthy, multi-role fighter aircraft designed to be an en- 
abler for Naval Power 21. JSF replaces the Navy's F-18A/C variants and the Ma- 
rine Corps' AV-8B Harrier and F/A-18A/C/D aircraft while complementing the 
Navy's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. JSF offers dramatic improvements in affbrdability 
and supportability. The JSF program has partnered with Lockheed Martin, Pratt 
and Whitney and General Electric to make affordability the cornerstone of the pro- 
gram by reducing development, production and total ownership costs. Furthermore, 
we have imposed a discipline on ourselves that limits change during the critical 
phases of our major aviation procurement programs. This disciplined approach has 
been implemented in the JSF program through a Configuration Steering Board. By 
controlling the scope and timing of change in a planned manner, we know what 
changes will cost, and how we will pursue them in the most economical manner. 
Through these transformational business initiatives, the Department will emerge 
with an optimal force structure, a healthy industrial base and an efficient and ap- 
propriately sized infrastructure. 

A critical enabler of transformational intelligence, surveillance and reconnaiis- 
sance, the E-2C Advanced Hawkeye Program will provide a robust overland capabil- 
ity against current and future cruise missile-type targets. 

The KC-130J Hercules will also be a critical enabler of the Department and the 
joint warfighter. The KC-130J's increased range, payload, and survivability will pro- 
vide an enhanced aerial refueling capability and subsequently greater strategic agil- 
ity, operational reach and tactical flexibility. 

As the global war on terrorism has demonstrated, unmanned technology will play 
an ever-increasing role on the 21st century battlefield. The Department is commit- 
ted to fielding an array of UAV programs, including tactical UAVs, maritime sur- 
veillance UAVs and an UCAV initiative, developed in partnership with the Air 
Force. The Navy and the Air Force have been able to define a common set of science 
and technology requirements while also recognizing the unique needs of each Serv- 
ice. This work will support a competitive acquisition strategy for UCAV. UCAV is 
a critical tool for providing persistent surveillance and combat capability for sea 
based Navy platforms. 



The Department of the Navy remains committed to simpHfying the acquisition 
system, streamhning the bureaucratic decision making process, and promoting inno- 
vation. We are streamhning our regulations and instructions to remove unnecessary 
impediments and provide the maximum flexibihty to our acquisition workforce con- 
sistent with law and higher regulation. We are also continuing to take advantage 
of numerous acquisition initiatives to shorten cycle times, leverage com^mercial prod- 
ucts and capabilities, and improve the quality of equipment being provided to our 

In an environment where competition is limited, the structure of contracts is criti- 
cal to providing tools for the program manager to use in delivering aircraft and 
weapons on schedule and within budget. The Department is appljdng new contract 
strategies in an effort to focus greater attention on cost and schedule. We are imple- 
menting broken or stepped profit share lines to ensure that the Navy and industry 
are very focused on the cost target and that industry is rewarded for beating the 
target and penalized for exceeding the cost target. Further, we are shifting greater 
portions of fee to be awarded on an incentive basis upon accomplishment of critical 
path tasks. Finally, we are weighting fee towards the critical events at the end of 
a program that result in the desired goal — delivery of aircraft and weapons. 

Evolutionary acquisition techniques show promise in programs such as the F/A- 
18E/F Program. Recognizing the requirement to replace our aging low density/high 
demand EA-6B aircraft with a platform that best accommodates the airborne elec- 
tronic attack mission, the Navy identified the Super Hornet as the most viable can- 
didate with which to leverage existing capabilities inherent in naval aviation in 
order to streamline the acquisition process and field a product sooner to the fleet. 
We leverage industry involvement in our acquisition programs to reduce our re- 
search and development costs and gain economies in production. The Department 
is also actively improving its internal business practices, including integrating com- 
mercial best practices where feasible. By improving these practices, we expect to be 
able to shift more dollars into combat capability and quality of service. 

We believe that better information makes for better decision making, both on the 
battlefield and at the budget table. We have four pilot programs in place utilizing 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) which aim to improve the quality of information 
available to our decision makers. These pilot projects will eliminate dozens of incom- 
patible computer databases and the business processes that once supported those 
databases. ERP should produce financial and managerial information that is more 
complete, accurate and timely. ERP will allow greater efficiency in our ship mainte- 
nance processes that should in turn deliver more ship availabihty for training or de- 
ployment. Our recent focus has been on converging the pilot programs to achieve 
even greater synergy of management information across a broader spectrum of the 
Department, and working with the DOD Comptroller to ensure these efforts are ad- 
vancing the uniform business management architecture under development. 

In addition to better information, we need flexible and innovative tools to help 
manage the Department. Some of these tools, such as strategic sourcing, are being 
used already. Furthermore, competition helps achieve the best quality support to 
the sailor and marine at the lowest possible cost by introducing the discipline of the 
marketplace. Another approach we are taking to improve logistics support to the 
warfighter and reduce total life cycle system costs is through Performance Based Lo- 
gistics (PBL). This year, all ACAT I & II fielded programs and all new programs 
submitted PBL implementation plans with milestones. PBL has been successfully 
implemented on numerous weapon system components (improving capability and 
lowering costs) and the intention is to expand these successes to major weapon sys- 
tems and subsystems. We are also continuing to pursue depot maintenance partner- 
ships between the private and public sector. These partnerships provide increased 
capability to our depots while simultaneously reducing cost and improving 
warfighter capability. 

The Department of Navy has experienced success with the Lead Systems Integra- 
tor (LSI) concept. An example of the LSI concept is the F/A-18 and Boeing. As the 
LSI, Boeing brings with it visibility, knowledge and responsibility at the weapon 
systems level, which is much broader than that of its subcontractors. Even though 
there may be additional "upfi-ont cost" in the form of pass-through costs associated 
with this approach, the benefits of efficiencies and effectiveness over the full life of 
the weapon system, makes the LSI approach a very attractive tool. 

We are working hard to ensure that our sailors and marines get needed tech- 
nology in their hands today, not tomorrow. In areas ranging from Forward Looking 
Infrared (FLIR) upgrades for Marine Corps tanks, to ISR tools, to active anti-air 
warfare missiles, we are seeking greater jointness and taking advantage of prior 


DOD investments in order to reduce risk, lower cost, accelerate delivery, and pro- 
vide greater interoperability. 


To enable development of new capabilities and facilitate the adoption of new busi- 
ness practices, a number of organizational changes have been made. I reorganized 
my business process owners by combining the Director of Acquisition and Business 
Management with the Acquisition Reform Office into a single Deputy for Acquisition 
Management. This new office focuses on business policy and implementation and in- 
fuses it with the innovative thinking and ideas of the office dedicated to reforming 
the way we do business. One of the primary goals of this reorganization is to short- 
en the time it takes new ideas to find their way into our acquisition business prac- 
tices. The Deputy for Acquisition Management is directly supporting the DOD effort 
to streamline the Office of the Secretary of Defense policy and processes for major 
weapon systems embodied in the new DOD 5000 series directives. 

In order to improve logistics support to the warfighter, I established a Deputy for 
Logistics. The logistics office will coordinate efforts to insert logistics considerations 
early in the acquisition process where over 60 percent of the total life cycle costs 
are determined. Equally important, logistical support of our current systems is a 
costly and complex part of today's acquisition management task. Finally, the Deputy 
for Logistics will play an important role in guiding the implementation of ERP 
across the Department. 

In today's environment, many technologies and systems cut across program, plat- 
form and systems command boundaries. To leverage the expertise within our sys- 
tems commands and ensure consideration and coordination of concepts that cross 
program boundaries, we created a virtual systems command. Each of the command- 
ers will now work together to avoid duplication of capability and ensure that we 
achieve integration and interoperability benefits wherever possible within the Navy 
and Marine Corps. 

Equally important, we are reshaping the acquisition workforce to concentrate on 
mission critical functions. These human resource plans call for an analysis of key 
characteristics of the acquisition workforce, an assessment and projection of changes 
in the workforce into 2008, and the identification of human resource process short- 
falls that inhibit the ability to effectively manage this workforce. With the advent 
of civilian personnel "demonstration" programs with pay banding and the increase 
in outsourcing of commercial functions, we are seeing an emerging workforce that 
will be compensated based on their level of responsibility and contribution. Through 
enhancements to our career development program, which include continuous learn- 
ing activities that augment minimum education, training, and experience require- 
ments, we are developing our acquisition professionals to be better managers and 


Beyond incorporating new capabilities that technology advances allow, we exam- 
ined methods for achieving greater utility out of our existing assets. The result of 
this effort is the Department's initiative to integrate Navy and Marine Corps tac- 
tical aviation capabilities. This integration represents one of the most sweeping 
changes in years. A comprehensive study of overhead requirements was performed 
as an integral part of a Tactical Aircraft or TACAIR Integration initiative that led 
to significant reductions in overhead. Substantive efficiencies will be realized 
through increased reliability and maintainability, commitment to properly fund 
readiness, spares, depot maintenance and modernization, improved simulation 
training, and a lower historical attrition than were programmed in the fiscal year 
2003 program of record. Navy and Marine Corps TACAIR Integration will maximize 
forward deployed combat power and optimize the core capability of naval aviation 
forces. Its positive impact will be felt across the Department's entire tactical avia- 
tion enterprise, from leaner, more capable fighting formations to streamlined pro- 
curement requirements (tactical and training) and manpower savings. 

This initiative will integrate one Marine Corps strike fighter squadron into each 
Navy carrier air wing and three Navy strike fighter squadrons into the Marine 
Corps Unit Deployment Program (UDP) rotation. These actions will allow three ac- 
tive Navy squadrons to be disestablished and two Reserve squadrons (one Navy and 
one Marine Corps) to be disestablished. Our plan will reduce procurement objectives 
for F/A-18E/F from 548 to 460 aircraft and the JSF ft-om 1,089 to 680 aircraft. In 
total, this innovative program promises to save $975 million over the fiscal year 
2004 — fiscal year 2009 program, and provide approximately $19 billion in cost avoid- 
ance from fiscal year 2007-fiscal year 2012. Through increased modernization and 


readiness an integrated Navy — Marine Corps aviation force will provide increased 
flexibility of employment and surge capability to combatant commanders that the 
Department cannot approach today. 


The Department's fiscal year 2004 budget will utihze multiyear procurement 
(MYP) arrangements for the F/A-18E/F (both airframe and engine), and the E-2C 
to maximize the return on our tactical aviation investment. Our proposed plan will 
procure 44 tactical, fixed wing aircraft (42 F/A-18E/F, and two E-2C), continue the 
development of the F-35 emd E-2C Advanced Hawkeye and initiate an airborne 
electronic attack (AEA) aircraft follow-on effort with the EA-18G. 


The fiscal year 2004 budget request contains $27 million for the upgrade of our 
F/A-18As. The Marine Corps has initiated the upgrade of 46 F/A-18As (with a pro- 
gram objective of 76) to Lot XVII F/A-18C aircraft capability as well as digital com- 
munications and tactical data hnk. The Marine Corps anticipates programmed up- 
grades to enhance the current capabilities of the F/A-18C/D with digital commu- 
nications, tactical data link, and tactical reconnaissance systems. This upgrade en- 
sures that our F/A-18s remain viable and relevant in support of TACAIR Integra- 
tion and Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare until replaced by the STOVL JSF. The 
Marine Corps expects the F/A-18A to remain in the active inventory vmtil 2015 and 
is exploring the feasibility of placing litening targeting pods on our F/A-18D air- 
craft. This new capability can provide real time video to the ground commander via 
the Pioneer UAV Transmitter and Man-Portable Receiving Station. 


The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requests $3.03 bilUon for 42 F/A-18E/F 
aircraft for the fifth year of a 5-year MYP contract (fiscal year 2000-fiscal year 
2004). The Super Hornet has used a spiral development approach to incorporate 
new technologies, such as the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, Advance Tac- 
tical Forward Looking Infrared System, Shared Reconnaissance Pod System, and 
Multifunctional Information Distribution System data link. The Super Hornet pro- 
vides a 40-percent increase in combat radius; a 50-percent increase in endurance 
and 25-percent increase in weapons payload over our older Hornets. Three Super 
Hornet squadrons are already deployed in support of current operations. The F/A- 
18E/F is a significant step forward in improving the survivability and strike capabil- 
ity of the carrier air wing. 

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 

The fiscal year 2004 budget request contziins $2.2 billion for continuation of SDD 
on the JSF. The JSF will enhance our Navy precision with unprecedented stealth 
and range. The JSF program commenced SDD in October 2001 and is on track to 
deliver operational STOVL variants to the Marine Corps in 2008 and the Navy vari- 
ant in 2010. The STOVL JSF combines the multi-role versatility of the F/A-18 and 
the basing flexibility of the AV-8B, resulting in a stealthy, lethal, state-of-the-art 
aircraft. The commonality designed into the JSF program, along with advantageous 
procurement quantities will reduce acquisition and operating costs of Navy and Ma- 
rine Corps tactical aircraft and allow enhanced interoperability with our allies and 
sister services. To maintain affordability, the Department will manage requirement 
growth using a senior oversight group as well as other methods. 


The AV-8B that we fly today is not the same aircraft that we flew 10 years ago. 
Over the last decade, the Harrier has gone from a day VFR air-grovmd attack air- 
craft to a night-adverse weather precision strike platform. The AV-8B remanufac- 
ture program has updated the Harrier into a more capable and more reliable air- 
craft. The wing and many original items are retained, but a new fuselage, a night- 
attack avionics suite (NAVFLIR, digital moving map, color displays, NVG lighting), 
APG-65 multi-mode radar, and the more powerful and reliable Pegasus (408) engine 
have been added. In addition to the AV-8B being one of the newest airframes in 
the fleet (average fleet age is approximately 8 years old), the remanufacture pro- 
gram provides an additional 6,000 hours of airframe life for 80 percent of the cost 
of a new aircraft. The remanufacture of 74 aircraft is programmed through fiscal 
year 2003 with the last delivery scheduled for September 2003. Our AV-8B Harriers 
at Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan, have flown over 500 sorties and over 1,500 flight 
hours supporting Special Operations Forces for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
and have demonstrated the expeditionary flexibility of STOVL aircraft while becom- 


ing the most forward deployed tactical aircraft in theater. From their austere base 
located over 5,000 feet above sea level, the Harriers provide close air support, armed 
escort of aircraft and vehicle convoys, and air cover during helicopter insertions and 
extractions. Approximately 90 percent of our Marine Harrier gun squadrons are cur- 
rently deployed and either in action or on watch around the world. The Harriers 
are equipped with the litening targeting pod, a targeting system with real-time 
video capability that gives the pilots the ability to laser designate targets for preci- 
sion munitions and mark spots on the ground with infrared energy. The precision 
capability to spot targets and self-designate for precision weapons has put the Har- 
riers in Afghanistan in high demand — joint and coalition forces regularly request 
the litening targeting pod capability in order to accurately locate and identify enemy 
positions. The enhanced AV-8B will continue to be a relevant platform until 
TACAIR Integration and the transformational JSF are fully implemented. 


The KC-130J Hercules will provide the MAGTF and Joint Task Force Com- 
mander with a technologically advanced weapons platform featuring a state-of-the- 
art flight station. Enhancements in survivability and night vision capabilities will 
provide MAGTF Commanders with a superior force multiplier to project combat 
power. Operationally, the KC-130J will support an increase of 5,000 feet in refuel- 
ing altitude while increasing fixed wing refueling speed by 30 knots. Rapid ground 
refueling enhancements include refueling pod improvements that enable a 300-gal- 
lon per minute off-load to air assets and tactical vehicles. Aircraft speed and range 
will increase 21 percent and 35 percent respectively, significantly extending the 
MAGTF Commander's capabilities. The KC-130J will replace all active duty KC- 
130F/Rs. The Marine Corps, along with the Air Force, has recently signed a MYP 
contract. The Marine Corps has taken delivery of nine KC-130Js and will have pro- 
cured a total of 38 KC-130Js at the end of the FYDP. 


The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requests $228.5 million to procure one E- 
2C and one TE-2C as the first year of a 4-year MYP. This effort will keep the pro- 
duction line viable while the E-2 Advanced Hawkeye (AHE), formerly known as the 
Radar Modernization Program, continues spiral development toward an Initial 
Operational Capability in fiscal year 2011. The Advanced Hawkeye program will 
modernize the E-2 weapons system by replacing the current radar and other system 
components to maintain open ocean capability while adding transformational sur- 
veillance and theater air and missile defense capabilities. The AHE program is 
scheduled to enter the SDD phase in fiscal year 2003. Further, CEC is being inte- 
grated into our E-2C aircraft and FOT&E of this added capability is ongoing. 


The Navy is initiating AEA efforts on the F/A-18F air vehicle and has included 
initial funding in the fiscal year 2004 budget. The EA-18G will replace the aging 
EA-6B Prowler, and will be part of the F/A-18E/F MYP. As a result of congres- 
sional funding in fiscal year 2003, EA-6B follow-on activities have already com- 
menced. Fiscal year 2004 efforts will focus on risk reduction and development activi- 
ties concerning the integration of EA-6B Improved Capabilities (ICAP III) electronic 
attack technologies into a proven air vehicle. Initial Operational Capability is cur- 
rently planned for fiscal year 2009. The Marine Corps expects to fly the EA-6B 
(ICAP III) until approximately 2014 to 2015 before transitioning to a new electronic 
attack aircraft yet to be determined. 

Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) 

The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requests $76 million to begin the SDD 
phase on the MMA. A down select to a final system integrator/provider is planned 
for the second quarter of fiscal year 2004. P-3 aircraft are flying in excess of 150 
hours per month in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and the global war on 
terrorism. This flight regimen requires a special inspection program to allow contin- 
ued operation to as much as 150 percent of fatigue life given the age of the aircraft. 
To acldress this critical warfighting capability the Navy is procuring a MMA with 
a planned IOC of 2012. The program is currently in the Component Advanced De- 
velopment Phase with two competitors, Boeing with their 737 commercial-derivative 
aircraft and Lockheed-Martin with their modernized P-3C concept. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

The global war on terrorism has emphasized the importance of UAVs. The fiscal 
year 2004 budget reflects our increased commitment to a focused array of UAVs 
that will support and enhance both surveillance and strike missions with persistent. 


distributed, netted sensors. The Navy's tactical UAV programs are focused on two 

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle — Navy 
The fiscal year 2004 President's budget requests $116 million for UCAV S&T 
demonstration efforts, and $5 million for establishment of the Joint UCAV Program 
Office. Leveraging our demonstration efforts, the Department will seek to improve 
the sensors and payloads to produce a penetrating surveillance UCAV-N with 
multi-mission capability as well as work towards a JSF-like joint acquisition strat- 
egy that results in the selection of a common platform capable of meeting service- 
unique mission requirements. 

Precision Munitions 

Joint Standoff Weapon 
The development of the Joint Standoff Weapon "C" has been a success with the 
first test achieving accuracy objectives. The dispenser variant production has been 
accelerated and JSOW is being delivered to deployed combat units. The fiscal year 
2004 budget request for JSOW is $138.5 million for 429 weapons. 

Joint Direct Attack Munitions and Laser Guided Bombs 
The production capacity for manufacturing Joint Direct Attack Munitions and 
Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs) has been increased, largely through the expenditure 
of supplemental funds appropriated by Congress. The fiscal year 2004 request of 
$277.3 milUon for JDAM and $81.3 million for LGBs will purchase 12,326 JDAM 
and 5,288 LGB weapons respectively at rates that take advantage of the expanded 

Tactical Tomahawk 
The Tactical Tomahawk missile begins full rate production in fiscal year 2004. 
Tactical Tomahawk significantly improves performance through an improved war- 
head, fuzing, and navigation improvements. This is accomplished at almost half the 
cost by using innovative manufacturing and production techniques. The Tactical 
Tomahawk completed successful developmental test shots from a simulated ground 
launcher in August 2002 and an imderwater launcher in December 2002. The pro- 
gram subsequently awarded a Low Rate Initial Production Contract in October 
2002, and exercised an option for additional missiles in January 2003, for a total 
of 192 missiles. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests authority for a fiscal year 
2004-fiscal year 2008 MYP. 

The AIM-9X Sidewinder, a fifth generation infrared, launch and leave, air-to-air 
missile capable of countering current and emerging countermeasures, is currently 
in OPEVAL. The fiscal year 2004 budget requests $2.7 million RDT&E for continued 
testing and $104.9 million WPN to purchase 531 AIM-9X missiles (167 for Navy 
and 364 Air Force). Low rate initial production missiles are currently being deliv- 
ered to the field and fleet. The program is progressing toward a MS III 4th quarter 
fiscal year 2003. 


Our proposed plan continues investment in key operational readiness accounts 
and reflects an increase in aviation depot maintenance funding and sustained fund- 
ing for our flying hours accounts. 

Flying Hour Program 

The fiscal year 2004 budget request reflects an additional $137 milUon this year 
to sustain the investment level we established in support of last year's budget. This 
level of flying hours will maintain the combat readiness of our Marine Air-Ground 
Task Forces, enable our airwings to achieve required readiness 6 months prior to 
deplo5rment, sustain readiness during deplo3Tnent and increase our ability to surge 
in crisis and mitigate the risk of a smaller strike fighter force. 

Aviation Maintenance 
Last year, we reduced our aircraft depot level repair back orders by 17 percent; 
maintained a steady "mission capable" rate in deployed aircraft; and fully funded 
aviation initial outfitting. The fiscal year 2004 budget request reflects an increase 
of over $210 million to fiscal year 2003's investment, and will increase the number 
of engine spares, improve the availability of non-deployed aircraft, and meet our 100 
percent deployed airframe goals. 



The Navy acquisition team has taken many positive steps during the past year. 
From moving forward with deliveries of the F/A-18E/F to continued progress on the 
JSF and V-22 programs, the support and direction of Congress have been essential 
to our progress. Through the use of innovative acquisition initiatives, our Nation is 
maintaining a healthy naval aviation industrial base and an efficient and an appro- 
priately sized infrastructure to support an optimal force structure. I am most grate- 
ful for the assistance of this subcommittee for the entire Department of the Navy's 

In the end, our tactical aviation assets are a tool of our sailors and marines. 
Today, the Navy and Marine Corps have used all of the aircraft in that fleet to full- 
est degree possible, putting combat capability exactly where the Nation needs as 
part of the joint force. Naval forces are also forward deployed, providing clear pres- 
ence and protecting the United States' strategic interests. We have the finest naval 
force in the world. With your assistance, we will continue to improve every aspect 
of our business to provide the maximum capability for our sailors and marines and 
the maximum security for America. 

Senator Sessions. I would just repeat once again that I salute 
those who came before me. Many of you were involved in develop- 
ing the systems and aircraft and platforms that we have today that 
are allowing us to dominate the battlefield in Iraq. We owe it to 
the next generation to make sure we do the same. 

I yield my time to Senator McCain to start. 

Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the opportunity to talk to the Air Force. I notice, 
Secretary Sambur, that there is no mention in your statement of 
your plans as far as tanker assets are concerned. Do you have any 
reason for that? 

Dr. Sambur. Well, we are in the process of getting three approval 

Senator McCain. Getting what? 

Dr. Sambur. Approval cycles. The Secretary of the Air Force 
promised this committee, the staff, that we would go through an 
exhaustive analysis first in front of the DOD, then the Office of 
Management Budget (OMB), and then bring it back for your ap- 
proval. So before we got that approval, we did not think it was pru- 
dent to put that in our budgets. 

Senator McCain. By approval, do you mean authorization in the 
defense authorization bill? 

Dr. Sambur. No. By approval, we will seek approval from all four 
defense committees. 

Senator McCain. You are familiar with the Institute for Defense 
Analysis (IDA) study that was recently completed. 

Dr. Sambur. Yes, I am. 

Senator McCain. Would you care to tell us about that study? 

Dr. Sambur. Yes. That was a study commissioned by OSD to de- 
termine how well we did in negotiating with Boeing. We made the 
point that there were three factors that were missing by IDA in 
that evaluation. For example, they did not consider the Federal 
Aviation Agency's (FAA) more stringent safety requirements that 
were apparent in many things. They did not understand the re- 

For example, there is a refuelable requirement on the auxiliary 
tanks that was not considered in their estimate. There was a re- 
quirement for a combi space that was not considered. By combi, I 
mean that the space that was not being used for fuel could be used 


either for passengers, cargo, or a combination of both passengers 
and cargo. That was not accurately reflected. 

As a result of our concerns, we met with the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(AT&L). They have arranged for a series of meetings with IDA and 
Boeing, so that we can explain to IDA some of these factors that 
were missed in their analysis. As we speak right now, we are in 
the process of working with IDA to give them a better understand- 
ing of both the requirements from the Air Force and some of the 
requirements for safety that the FAA has imposed upon us that 
were not considered in their analysis. 

Senator McCain. Well, I am entertained to hear that the Insti- 
tute for Defense Analysis did not understand the parameters of the 
study they were asked to conduct. 

Dr. Sambur. Their study took approximately 2 weeks; whereas 
our examination with Boeing was over 7 months. So there is a rea- 
son that they might have not understood the full extent of the re- 
quirements, because of the short duration of their study. 

Senator McCain. I understand that Air Force Colonel Frantz 
DeWillis described in great detail to the press how the Boeing 
Company wants to sell bonds through a special purpose entity to 
finance construction of 100 Boeing 767 aircraft leased to the Air 
Force as refueling tankers. He said, "There will be a three-way con- 
tract that says Boeing will build the planes. It will be sold to a spe- 
cial purpose entity that leases them to us after it gets financing to 
pay Boeing for the airplanes." 

Is that still the contemplated method of leasing these tankers? 

Dr. Sambur. It is through the special purpose entity, yes. 

Senator McCain. Do you have anybody in the Air Force who has 
had any experience with dealing with special purpose entities? 

Dr. Sambur. Well, we had certain consultants who have that ex- 

Senator McCain. Consultants fi'om Boeing? 

Dr. Sambur. No, consultants from the economic world. The 
standards that this special purpose entity is adhering to are the 
new financial standards that have been imposed post-Enron, so we 
know that the special purpose entity has the latest up-to-date 
standards that were issued in January. 

Senator McCain. So you would not use the same procedures that 
Enron did, is that 

Dr. Sambur. These are the latest financial standards that have 
been imposed for special purpose entities to avoid Enron's situa- 

Senator McCain. Well, how long has this process been going on 
now, Mr. Secretary? 

Dr. Sambur. The process of developing a proposal for the lease? 

Senator McCain. Yes. 

Dr. Sambur. Ever since Congress gave us the authorization to go 
look at the feasibility of a lease. 

Senator McCain. You mean ever since it was in an appropria- 
tions bill. 

Dr. Sambur. Well, you know 

Senator McCain. It was a line item in an appropriations bill. It 
was never authorized through the Senate Armed Services Commit- 


tee, to my knowledge. Well, I hope that you will keep Congress, 
this committee, and the subcommittee in particular briefed on this 

Dr. Sambur. We committed to give you a good deal. 

Senator McCain. Pardon me? 

Dr. Sambur. We committed that the Air Force would bring for- 
ward for the American public a good deal. That is our commitment 
and we intend to maintain that throughout. We will show you, as 
we go through the steps I mentioned before, through the DOD, 
through 0MB, and back to the various committees, all of the data 
that supports the fact that we have a good deal. 

Senator McCain. Well, I hope so. Your initial proposals that 
were made were probably the best deal ever achieved in the history 
of the military industrial complex. I do not know why we cannot 
just purchase them as we do other assets in the military. So far, 
you have not made the case, as far as I am concerned. There has 
been obfuscation. There has been delay. There is withholding of in- 
formation from me and this committee. 

I want to assure you again: You have not made the case. You cer- 
tainly have not been open in sharing with us information concern- 
ing this decisionmaking process. You may win. The military indus- 
trial complex has won before in my experience of many years on 
this committee. But I will tell you, the American people and the 
American taxpayers are going to know about it if you try to pull 
off this scam, which is exactly what it is. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Senator McCain. 

Did I understand that you would be conducting an analysis of al- 
ternatives (AOA)? Is that the formal process? 

Dr. Sambur. No, I did not say that. No. 

Senator SESSIONS. Will you be doing that? 

Dr. Sambur. No. 

Senator SESSIONS. You will not. 

Dr. Sambur. We will not. 

Senator Sessions. Why not? 

Dr. Sambur. Well, for a number of reasons. First of all, we 
have — you said we never made a compelling case as to "Why 
lease?" Earlier in your testimony, Mr. Chairman, you talked about 
the fact that we were retiring Es. One of the reasons that we are 
retiring those Es is because we are concerned about the safety, 
about the corrosion. 

I know there was an Air Force report study a couple years ago 
that seems to indicate that there is a life expectancy of these Es 
that is far greater than we are now telling you. But what we are 
finding is that the corrosion of the Es is very serious. It is much 
more serious than the study ever anticipated. Air Force Materiel 
Command has determined that it would be unsafe to go forward 
unless we retired those Es. 

So one of the reasons we are going forward with the lease is be- 
cause it is the most affordable way of getting needed assets to our 
Air Force and Navy in the shortest possible time. It gives us a 5- 
year advantage over any other mechanism for doing that. 


Senator McCain. That is a very interesting statement. It has 
nothing to do with the question. Why do you not do an AOA, just 
as we do whenever we examine any new weapon system? 

Dr. Sambur. Well, we did an analysis of alternatives in a short- 
ened fashion. We determined, for example 

Senator McCain. You did an AOA? 

Dr. Sambur. We did not do a formal AOA, as you- 

Senator McCain. Oh, I see. You did not do a formal AOA. 

Dr. Sambur. No. But we 

Senator McCain. Please. Please, Mr. Secretary. You either did 
an AOA or you did not. There is no such thing as an informal AOA. 
Okay? I do not know how long you have been in your job, but I 
have been here a lot longer than you have been doing what you are 
doing. I can tell you an AOA is an AOA. You have not done one. 
It is disgraceful that you have not done one. 

Dr. Sambur. Well, we presented our analysis of alternatives in 
an informal sense to the DOD. We looked at reengining. We looked 
at various other aircraft for refueling. We actually made, as a sug- 
gestion from your part, an effort to determine if we were getting 
the best possible price. We looked at the Airbus configuration. We 
looked at the buy-per-hour alternatives that a company in Ireland 
is offering. 

We have looked at all of those issues. We have presented those 
facts to the OSD that is evaluating this. 

Senator McCain. You have not done an AOA. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Sessions. Senator Pryor. 

Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

If I may. Secretary Young, you indicated in your prepared testi- 
mony that you plan to replace the Navy's EA-6Bs, which are four- 
seat aircraft, with a variant, I guess, of the F/A-18E/F, or some I 
think call it the EA-18G, which is a two-seat aircraft. Even with 
all the advances in technology, do you feel comfortable, do you feel 
confident, that we can go from a four-seater to a two-seater and 
still accomplish what we need to do? 

Mr. Young. Well, I believe we are working those details. I visited 
Cherry Point recently and talked to the operators of EA-6Bs. We 
are adapting the existing ICAP-III systems from the EA-6B to the 
EA-18G. I do indeed believe we can, with appropriate crew train- 
ing and systems automation put in these systems, have them per- 
form the mission and do so successfully. As we look through the de- 
tails of this, we are using the crews to help define the two-man 
cockpit. I feel that we can accomplish the mission. 

Senator Pryor. That is good to know. Because I know that, for 
example, in the C-130 with the new J, we are actually losing seats 
there, which again makes sense, given technology and ever3rthing. 

Let me ask the Marine Corps about the EA-18G. Is that part of 
your plan, or do you have another proposal to replace the EA-6B? 

General HouGH. Sir, we currently have 20 EA-6Bs down at 
Cherry Point. They provide a great service. However, no matter if 
you are a Navy airplane or a Marine airplane, they are all getting 
old. We know that. We also know that the Growler is going to come 
in. They are going to replace the Navy airplanes first. They ought 


to, because they have to go aboard the boats. They take the great- 
est pounding. 

We are on the tail end. With DOD, with Mr. Aldridge, the Navy, 
Air Force, and Marine Corps, we got together and we said, "How 
are we going to solve this problem?" The way we came about it and 
we presented to Mr. Aldridge was to step back and say, "I will take 
the EA-6Bs, and we will figure out a way to be on the tail end of 
these and keep them longer than anybody else and let the Navy get 
their Growlers." 

The Air Force is going for a system-of-systems approach, to fold 
together all of us and take a look at how we are going to do busi- 
ness in the future, say in the 2012 to 2015 time frame, not knowing 
exactly how long the EA-6Bs are going to last. There are two stud- 
ies that we will fund this year to look at this problem. 

One is: How long, how much, and what do you have to do to keep 
the EA-6B going? What is the bottom line? The second one is tak- 
ing a look at the EF-35. It showed great promise in the demonstra- 
tion phase, great promise in the avionics capability, what it can do, 
what it cannot do, with its stealth, its capabilities, interoperability 
and its avionics package. Take a look at that and, of course, de- 
pending on when it comes in, to take a look and see what the busi- 
ness case reads as to where it does come in and when you can put 
money against it and to see just where we stand. 

Those two studies over the next 2 years, as Mr. Aldridge said, 
will take a look at that, and by 2005, 2006 we will have a plan. 
That is what we are doing, sir. 

Senator Pryor. Okay. 

General Keys, what about the Air Force? 

General Keys. We believe that the system-of-systems is the right 
approach. It is much like we do today. We have the F-16CJs, the 
EA-6Bs. We have self-protection jamming and a blend of capabili- 
ties. Now as we see the time line move further out, now we have 
UAVs that can provide us some close-in jamming. We will have the 
Growlers out there providing that type of jamming. 

We are looking at the B-52, for example, with a pod for standoff 
jamming, miniature air launch decoys. Then as you bring on the 
FA-22 and the F-35, you have the airborne electronic steerable 
array, which then allows you, actually within your fire control 
radar, to timeshare and do things to active radars. And we believe 
that is the best combination of systems to go against the array that 
we will face in the time line that we are talking about. 

Senator Pryor. Okay. Let me turn my attention, if I can, to the 
FA-22, which, as I understand it, is supposed to enter initial oper- 
ational testing (lOT) — is it October of this year? 

Dr. Sambur. Dedicated lOT will be in October of this year, cor- 

Senator Pryor. Okay. Do we feel confident we are going to make 
that time frame? 

Dr. Sambur. Well, we feel there is an 80 percent probability that 
we will get there. Let me explain to you what I mean by 80 percent 
probability. Basically, 7 months ago, when we marched our way to 
dedicated initial operation test and evaluation (lOT&E), we have 
had several issues that were confronting us. 


I am not sure if you are familiar with some of the data. We had 
an issue with the tailfin buffet. We had issues with canopy howl- 
ing. We had issues with the brakes. Systematically, we have been 
facing those and solving those problems. We also had a problem in 
flight science testing. We have basically gotten our curve down. 

The one remaining problem we have right now is avionics insta- 
bility, which I am sure you are aware of. One of the things we were 
concerned about is whether or not we had an architecture that in- 
herently we would never be able to get stability in. We have gotten 
some of the best minds in the world. We have gotten two blue rib- 
bon panels to look at this. They have ascertained that the architec- 
ture is fundamentally sound and could be stabilized. 

So now there is a question of software debugging because when 
you are in a situation in which you have an error every couple of 
hours, obviously that is a much more significant problem to figure 

Again, what we have done there is to augment the quality of the 
staff. We have put in more test vehicles for doing this. We have put 
in not only the instruments for testing, but also the labs. We have 
focused attention on that with a systems engineering approach that 
we have also gotten outside committees to look at. 

So they feel reasonably sure that we will get there. Whether we 
will get there at the end of October or not may not be the case. 
But I would like to tell you, when we made our budget estimates, 
we assumed that we would not finish in October. We actually gave 
ourselves several months of contingency. So there is time beyond 
October where we will not have any impact on both budget and ini- 
tial operational capability date. So there is 

Senator Pryor. That was my next question. 

Dr. Sambur. That will not affect that. So I cannot give you abso- 
lute assurance that we will complete this in October, but I will give 
you absolute assurance that we put contingency in our budget so 
it will not affect that from a financial point of view, and we have 
scheduled a contingency to do this. We have the best team in place 
to solve the problem, and it is a solvable problem. 

Senator Pryor. Good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Sessions. Thank you. I guess it is my time, unless Sen- 
ator Chambliss has a time problem. You can go ahead of me. 

Senator Chambliss. No. 

Senator Sessions. Following up on the FA-22, at this time last 
year, the FA-22 was scheduled to start initial operational test and 
evaluation this month, April 2003. That was later changed to start 
in August 2003 and now in your written testimony you state the 
testing will not start until October 2003. 

It seems a major issue there is software stability. It has been re- 
ported that the latest software load to be delivered is not meeting 
its objectives of 10 hours run time. You mentioned that, I think. 
The software load required to commence operational testing has a 
stability objective that calls for 20 hours of run time. 

In a briefing by a team established by the Director of Defense for 
Research and Engineering just this past December, it was stated, 
"Run time stability remains severely problematic. Time and effort 


needed to resolve the issue is unknown. Effectiveness of the cur- 
rent strategy to resolve the issue is uncertain." 

How would you respond to those concerns, Mr. Secretary? 

Dr. Sambur. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like to go back to the 
answer that I gave to Senator Pry or. First of all, it is not an 
unsolvable problem. It is not mission impossible. We have had 
teams come back that have told us the architecture can fundamen- 
tally be stabilized. So it is not a question, again, of mission impos- 

As for your data points on April to now, you are absolutely cor- 
rect. We have had schedule slips. But we have instituted new pro- 
cedures into this program, more of a system-oriented nature so that 
we are solving these problems in a very structured manner. As I 
tried to indicate to Senator Pryor, we have solved many problems 
since April, many of those problems this committee or previous 
committees thought were unsolvable. I mentioned the fin buffet as 
being one of those. Just the other day we had a problem with the 
landing gear. I am happy to tell you we solved that in a very expe- 
dited manner. In a matter of 3 days, we found out what the prob- 
lem was. 

Senator Sessions. You are satisfied that the fin buffet is — you 
have actually worked that out? 

Dr. Sambur. Yes. We have actually tested that on our flight 
science aircraft. We are solving a number of these problems be- 
cause we now have the right approach, we have the right man- 
power, and we have the right attention from industry. They recog- 
nize how critical this program is, to get it solved. 

So those three ingredients should bring a success, coupled with 
the fact, the overarching fact, that this is a solvable problem. 

Senator Sessions. Well, production is a second concern to me. 
According to the contract schedule provided to the committee last 
year, it seemed we would have taken delivery of aircraft through 
tail number 4019. Yet I believe the latest aircraft delivery was tail 
number 4012 this past January. According to the latest production 
delivery schedule delivered by the Air Force just last month, tail 
number 4019 will not be delivered until the end of September. 

The contract calls for aircraft through tail number 4025 through 
September. It appears even by the Air Force's plan that through 
the end of fiscal year 2003, production deliveries will be behind by 
6 months and six aircraft. 

So can you tell us what the reasons are for these production de- 
liveries running so far behind? 

Dr. Sambur. Well, you are right. There are problems with pro- 
duction. What we did is we attacked it the same way that we are 
attacking some of these issues with stability. We brought in a focus 
team. Basically, we had no metrics to view things on in terms of 
parts shortages, in terms of metrics for evaluating how long things 

So we have a metric in process so we can evaluate ourselves. The 
management there has been elevated. We brought experts from 
some of the more successful programs that Lockheed Martin has 
run. They have even put one of their executive vice presidents in 
charge of the program, an individual who has a proven track 


record. The result of this is that we are starting to see deUveries 
come out ahead of the projected schedule. 

So I cannot tell you that we are going to catch up. All I can tell 
you is that I apologize for the delay. But I can tell you going for- 
ward we are starting to meet our commitment. As a matter of fact, 
the last jet was delivered almost a week ahead of schedule. We are 
starting to see the metrics improve substantially. So there is a 
change for the better here. 

At the end of the program we will be delayed, as you correctly 
indicated. But there is movement in a positive sense. 

Senator Sessions. Well, you gave us in your statement, I think, 
a real mouth-watering description of the value of this aircraft. I 
think it is truly a leap forward. It is a very important aircraft. 

Dr. Sambur. Thank you. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think we need to move it forward. 

Dr. Sambur. We were privileged to give you a special session on 
Friday, where you got some inside information on the surface-to- 
air missiles that are proliferating throughout the world, to give you 
a better appreciation of what we need. 

Senator SESSIONS. But with this software problem, you are not 
able to complete your operational test, as you would normally be 
doing with these initial production aircraft? 

Dr. Sambur. Let me explain to you what the issue is. First of all, 
it has nothing to do with safety of flight. That is a different set of 
software. This is the actual sensors. When it goes down, you basi- 
cally, as you do on your computer at home, you restart or control/ 
alt/delete, and you get the things back in order. 

So the impact is on how long it takes you to actually do the test- 
ing. It is very wasteful for every time you start to do a test, as soon 
as you go along, to do this control/alt/delete. So we obviously have 
to fix that to get through testing. Then there is a test that you 
need the stability for of 20 hours. 

So it is not a case of any safety issues with the actual avionics, 
but it is an issue in getting through this test. It is certainly some- 
thing we have to fix to get through this testing in an expedited 
fashion and to even prove the value of the jet. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, we are concerned about it. This aircraft 
has extraordinary capabilities. We need to ensure that we are first 
in the world in these kind of aircraft and this would take us there, 
I have no doubt. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I will come back to the F-22 in a minute. I have a couple ques- 
tions there. 

But I want to start out with you. Admiral, with respect the F/ 
A-18 and particularly the squadrons, the Carrier Air Reserve Wing 
20, which is headquartered at NAS Atlanta. Only two of those 
squadrons are funded in the Navy's 2004 budget. I note that VFA 
203 from Naval Air Station Atlanta has been deployed several 
times just in the last year alone in support of military operations 
around the globe. I have two questions relative to that. 

First, can you talk about the Navy's tactical air integration effort 
and why the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve are paying the price 


for efficiency and modernization, since it appears that it is the Re- 
serve squadrons that are being targeted for closure? 

Second, can you give me some feedback on the logic of closing a 
squadron that is constantly deployed or constantly preparing to be 
deployed in support of operations around the world? 

Admiral Nathman. Yes, sir. Most of our Reserve strike fighter 
squadrons, the ones in Atlanta, have been providing training sup- 
port primarily to Navy and Marine Corps tactical squadrons, oper- 
ational squadrons, active duty squadrons that are deployed. So 
they have been deployed in terms of detachments to support train- 
ing for those particular squadrons. 

The war, particularly Operation Enduring Freedom, and then in 
preparation for the amount of carriers that we needed to have for- 
ward for Operation Iraqi Freedom, resulted in a — we matched the 
air wing to the carrier. We try and do that about 18 to 24 months 
before the next deployment, to make sure that things like the 
maintenance support are stabilized. 

The war basically caught us in a transitioning period with the 
accelerated decommissioning of F-14s. So this is a little bit of a 
longer answer, but we tried to rush in the EF. But we can only buy 
the Super Hornets so fast to replace those squadrons. Because we 
could not do it rapidly enough and meet the support requirements 
for those aircraft, we had to basically bring a Reserve squadron 
into an active duty air wing to provide the full warfighting capabil- 
ity of that air wing. 

So we stood up, as it were, and activated that Reserve squadron 
to flesh out that air wing for deployment. That typically is not part 
of our plan. What we are doing right now is studying a total force 
requirement with the Reserves to find out what is the best way to 
do several things. What is the best way to make the people in those 
Reserve squadrons part of the warfighting wholeness answer that 
we need? Right now you are seeing an example of that, where that 
squadron is activated in an air wing to go to war. 

But there are other ways of doing that. There is a tremendous 
amount of contingency support that we need in terms of additional 
pilots, maintenance, and crews. So we are studying those efforts 
right now to find out: What is the best way to integrate the total 
force of those people in the squadron? 

We need to look at the recapitalization of our Reserve squadrons 
as a tremendous challenge to the Navy in terms of affordability. 
One of the reasons why we made the decision in the integration ef- 
forts was we believe that we are bringing a much more capable 
force with the aircraft that we are purchasing, the Super Hornet 
and joint strike fighter and F-18G. With that improved capability, 
we can take the risk in coming down on the total numbers of fight- 

So it makes sense to us, in terms of understanding where we are 
going to go with the Reserve force structure, that we look at — be- 
cause the study will come out before the decision is made to actu- 
ally decommission those particular squadrons. We will have the 
study completed. We will know the best way to integrate our people 
and to look at the total recapitalization challenge. 


So that is where we are headed right now, sir, to figure out and 
make sure we are making the right decisions about those Reserve 
strike fighter squadrons. 

Senator Chambliss. Now when is that study going to be coming 

Admiral Nathman. We are in the middle of it right now. I expect 
the study will be completed in less than a year. The Navy will have 
a position on its total force, and particularly those squadrons. That 
will lead the decision before we make the decommissioning decision 
or the disestablishment decision for those Reserve strike fighter 

Senator CHAMBLISS. What about when you start bringing assets 
back from the Middle East, assuming this conflict is over within 
the next several weeks, months, whatever? What effect is that 
going to have on these Reserve squadrons? 

Admiral Nathman. We are trying to understand that right now. 
One of the challenges of the current war is we have a certain 
amount of force structure, obviously. We have five carriers, with a 
sixth that just entered the AOR, the U.S.S. Nimitz. So we have six 
carrier flight decks, basically, in this war. We also deployed Carl 
Vinson to backfill Kitty Hawk in the Pacific Theater. 

So one of the things we do not know yet is in the reconstitution 
of our force, what is the force structure we have to leave behind? 
In other words, what will CENTCOM want? When the war ends, 
what will they want in terms of presence? The United States Navy 
has provided anjrwhere from one to two aircraft carriers full time 
since 1990 in the Persian Gulf. We do not know what the reconsti- 
tuted force structure is going to be, what the requirement will be. 
When v/e understand that, we will understand our reconstitution 

So I do not have a complete answer for you, because we do not 
know what force structure we will have to leave in the area to re- 
constitute the force when it comes back. That will give us a real 
good answer of what our trades are. I can assure you the Reserve 
force structure will be part of that equation, to understand how to 
reconstitute our active force, sir. 

Senator Chambliss. Rather than me bugging you and Admiral 
Clark down the road, if you all will stay in touch with us and keep 
us posted on that, I would appreciate it. 

Admiral Nathman. Yes, sir. 

Senator Sessions. All right. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

We will do another round. 

Precision weapons are a critical component of what we are doing 
in Iraq today and what we utilized in Afghanistan. The ratio of 
guided to unguided munitions has continued to increase in each 
conflict. Production rates of laser-guided bombs and JDAMs are ei- 
ther at maximum production rates or on a ramp to reach maximum 
production rates. 

Admiral Nathman, General Hough, and General Keys, I will ask 
you this: Are all of our strike aircraft modified to employ these pre- 
cision munitions? Are there any modifications needed by the air- 
craft in your service to achieve emplojnnent capability? 

Admiral NATHMAN. I will start. I will tell you that our aircraft 
are modified to carry all precision weapons that we feel like they 


need to carry right now. As an example, we just finished the inte- 
gration test and the approval of the F-14 to carry JDAM, which 
is an important piece for us, because the airplane is carrying it 
right now, I believe. The Navy, to my knowledge, is not 

Senator SESSIONS. It is carrjdng it now, but you need to do fur- 
ther modification? 

Admiral Nathman. No, sir. We have completed the test and the 
modification on the F-14 to drop JDAM. We did that the last cou- 
ple of years. We were going through a process of making sure that 
all the integration tests were appropriate, and the approval proc- 
ess, we accelerated that for the war. So we have approved the drop- 
ping and the carriage of JDAM onto F-14s for the war. It was an 
acceleration of a decision we made, I believe, back in 1998 to inte- 
grate JDAM onto the F-14. 

Senator SESSIONS. Are all those so configured today? 

Admiral Nathman. I will have to get back to you with the total 
numbers of airplanes that are. But to my knowledge, all the cur- 
rent operational F-14s will have that capability. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

All 64 F-14B and all 47 F-14D aircraft are JDAM-capable. None of the 37 F- 
14A aircraft are JDAM-capable. (See table below.) 

JDAM Variant 



(2000 lb) 



(2000 lb penetrating) 




# of aircraft 









X = JDAM Capable 

Senator Sessions. General Hough. 

General HoUGH. Yes, sir. Thank you. Our F-18s can drop them, 
but our AV-8s cannot. They are undergoing, and have been for the 
last few years, an open architecture software infusion, if you will, 
to be modern with 21st century airplanes, to do anything anybody 
else does. 

Right now we are testing JDAM at China Lake. With the comple- 
tion of those tests and the funding and completion of the OSCAR 
program, which is the Open Architecture Program, we will be able 
to drop everything we have in the inventory. That will be by 2005. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Keys? 

General Keys. Ours can all drop either laser or JDAM, including 
the bombers. 

Senator Sessions. I would just say to Admiral Nathman and 
General Hough: This is a big deal. To me it is so plainly obvious 
that the JDAM is just a magnificent weapon of choice in so many 
circumstances that we need plenty of them. We do not need to run 
out of them. If we have to start a new assembly line to have 
them — and everybody said we are going to have plenty, and I hope 
we have plenty — we need to make sure our aircraft, whatever it 
costs in terms of the overall budget — we buy ships, we buy air- 


planes — it seems to me, we need to be sure that we are configuring 
our aircraft to carry them. 

General Hough, is it a question of just money that you all have 
made that decision to go until 2005? Why would it take that long? 

General HoUGH. No, sir. It is undergoing testing. And it has to 
be able to drop the works. In fact, within about 3 to 6 months, the 
ability to be able to drop the 500 pound JDAM may be over. To 
drop each one of these 500, 1,000, or 2,000-pound bombs, it does 
take a little while. There were a couple hundred sorties that were 
put against this. 

It was not a matter of the money. We fund this every year. It 
is just a matter of funding OSCAR. I have been assured, and the 
testing is going fine, that when I say 2005, in about a year to 
maybe a little bit more than a year, these tests ought to be com- 

Admiral Nathman. Mr. Chairman, could I do a follow-up? 

Senator Sessions. Yes. 

Admiral Nathman. One area we need help — and this is just a 
case of timing; this is not because we were overtly bad about 
things. We had a plan to decommission or disestablish the F-14 
and transition to Super Hornet. We accelerated that plan 2 years 
ago to make sure that we could get out of the very high operations 
and support costs of the F-14. 

Now on top of that we had an acceleration of that particular 
plan. The F-18 multiyear supported that transition. But the war 
accelerated the deployment of our force. We have surged a signifi- 
cant amount of carriers and air wings above what we normally do, 
when we did the President's requirement for the Global Naval 
Presence Plan. So that acceleration has led to a very practical prob- 
lem for us. 

We purposely scaled the amount of ancillary equipment that we 
bought for Super Hornet and weapons integration to meet this kind 
of paced disestablishment of the F-14 and transition to the F-18 
Super Hornet. So one area we dearly need your help on is addi- 
tional funds for ancillary equipment for the Super Hornet, addi- 
tional weapons, and accelerated weapons integration, which we did 
not originally program for because of the pace of the war. 

So that is a very practical area that you could help us on. I be- 
lieve that if we have a significant reconstitution effort where the 
war is going to go, those are the type of investments we should ac- 
celerate, because we have the opportunity to accelerate those in- 
vestments. We would appreciate your help on that, sir. 

Senator Sessions. Well, I certainly will. You can count on that. 
The authorization bill will be coming forward, and we will be look- 
ing at that. 

Just briefly. Secretaries Young and Sambur, are we doing all we 
can do to maximize production of precision-guided munitions at 
this time, to your knowledge? 

Dr. Sambur. Well, as you said at the beginning, we have given 
additional money for facilitation of the JDAMs to 3,000 a month, 
which we will hit in July. We are presently at, I think, 2,400 a 
month. We are looking at all sources to make sure that there are 
no sole source issues that could cause us issues. We are actively 


seeking to look if there are any other alternatives. But right now 
we are meeting all of the requirements for JDAMs. 

Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, I think the Navy has looked for some 
resources and worked with the Air Force on JDAM to pull back 
that 3,000 a month a little earlier. So we are doing exactly, as the 
Secretary said, everything that can be done. Laser-guided bombs 
are at 1,500 a month with 2 providers. That is the msiximum rate 
there. So we, in both of those areas, are doing the best we can. 
Then in the supplemental, there is serious consideration of facili- 
ties monies for Tactical Tomahawk, so we can raise the anticipated 
production rate of that missile to a higher level and do so sooner 
and within that created space. Clearly we would like to use some 
supplemental funds to buy Tactical Tomahawks sooner. That is an 
urgent need that is coming before us. 

Senator Sessions. Well, we will maybe talk about it later. The 
Tomahawks are so much more expensive, and I am sure there are 
reasons. We have used an awful lot of them, it seems. The JDAMs 
have tremendous capability for reasonable cost. 

Senator Pryor. 

Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think I agree with you. The JDAM is a very interesting and 
positive development for our military. I think it is a very common- 
sense approach to a challenge that we have. I am glad that you all 
had the foresight to develop that. I may not understand anything 
about the technology involved in JDAM, but there is something I 
do understand and that is being overweight. So I want to ask about 
an airplane that is overweight here and I want to find out how se- 
rious this problem is. 

Secretary Young, if I can ask you: As I understand it, the JSF, 
at least one version of it or maybe all, I am not sure, is overweight. 
Six thousand pounds overweight is what I have in my notes here. 
Could you talk about that and tell me how that is going? Also, why 
is it overweight? What makes it overweight? 

Mr. Young. I will take two approaches to answering the ques- 
tion, if I could. One is, we are still in the early design stage of the 
program. We are 16 months into the new System Development and 
Demonstration. So at this point, some weights are still being esti- 
mated, as we design the airplane based on historical information 
and experience, parametric data, if you will. That analysis says 
that the plane is something on the order of about 1,000-plus 
pounds overweight, the engine and the airplane together. Then 
they took another view of this, which is a bottom-up estimate of the 
weight with different tools that produced a number like you quoted, 
sir, about 5,000 pounds. 

What I would say to you is: In both those cases, the JSF program 
is one of the best planned programs in the Department of Defense. 
It has a weight curve leading all the way out to what they want 
the plane to weigh at IOC. So what we are talking about is what 
the plane weighs here at the preliminary design review stage. We 
are above the target that was set. 

Even at those weights, we are still not, I think, above the IOC 
weight of the airplane. But we are clearly above where we should 
be at this early stage of the program. Through the application of 
management tools, the number one focus of the program is to bring 


the aircraft weight back down to the prehminary design review tar- 
get. This will give us a more than adequate margin to develop the 
plane and meet the IOC weight. 

There is a risk. I would tell you it is probably the preeminent 
management concern before the program right now, particularly on 
the STOVL version. But, the program has the tools and has identi- 
fied the issue and is working it aggi'essively. 

Relative to the bottom-up review, it was done to allocate areas 
where people need to go in and attack the weight and bring it 
down. Those allocations have been made and the team is working 
in each area to bring those weights back down. 

Senator Pryor. What is causing it to be overweight? What is it? 

Mr. Young. The engine is a factor. It is one of the more mature 
components. It is an engine derived from the F-22. It is a sophisti- 
cated engine. There is about 172 pounds of weight challenge, I be- 
lieve, on the engine. 

The airplane, likewise, particularly the STOVL configuration 
with its ability to lift vertically, has a lift fan and a complicated 
propulsion system that has a substantial weight contribution. 

So I would not single out any factor now as a real long pole in 
the tent. It is just that overall the estimates are getting refined 
and will be further refined as the program progresses. We antici- 
pated the plane would grow along the way to the IOC weight. It 
has grown faster than necessary and we have to implement a 
weight reduction program. 

The other places that they are looking at is the empennage area 
where the wings join the body. We may have allocated more mar- 
gin than necessary for the structural joints and other areas, be- 
cause we wanted to be prudent in avoiding cracking and fatigue, 
early fatigue, problems in the plane. So we are going in and refin- 
ing whether we can lighten up those structures and still have ade- 
quate structural life. 

Senator Pryor. The STOVL aircraft, is it heavier than the others 
by necessity, given the variation on it? 

Mr. Young. I would like to give you the weights for the record. 
My memory is that it is slightly heavier at this point than the car- 
rier variant, and both of which are, I believe, a little heavier than 
the conventional takeoff and landing variant for the Air Force. 

[The information referred to follows:! 



Mar 2003 Wt est 26,582 30,401 29,935 

PDRWtest 26,286 29,726 29,747 

lOCWt 27,100 30,500 30,700 

NTEwt 27,728 30,958 31,324 

STOVL = Short Takeoff, Vertical Land 
CTOL = Conventional Takeoff and Land 
CV ^ Carrier-based Platform 
PDR = Preliminary Design Review 
IOC = Initial Operational Capability 
NTE = Not To Exceed 

Senator Pryor. I think that is right, too. 

With regard to the — and I am changing gears here — C-130 pro- 
gram, Secretary Sambur, what is the current status of that? I be- 
Ueve you mentioned in your testimony a few moments ago that it 
is the C-130Es that have the corrosion problem. Is that right? 

Dr. Sambur. You mean the KC-135s? 

Senator Pryor. Yes — I am sorry. I was talking about the C-130s. 

Dr. Sambur. The C-130Js. 

Senator Pryor. Yes, C-130Js. 

Dr. Sambur. Right. 

Senator Pryor. Is it not the C-130E that has the corrosion prob- 
lem? Do you know? 

Dr. Sambur. I am not sure. I do not know. I will take that for 
the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Yes. Fifty-seven C-130Es were affected by corrosion. To date, 10 have been 
cleared through inspection, 32 aircraft have been identified for early retirement and 
the status of the final 13 will be determined pending ftirther inspections. While 
some of the aircraft are being retired earlier than originally scheduled, the long- 
term impact to C-130 force structure is minimal. 

Senator Pryor. All right. I think that is right. I notice that the 
Air Force has slightly increased its procurement goals for that. I 
believe it went from maybe 40 to 42 planes or something like that. 
I did not know if that was in response to the C-130E problem or 
if that is just part of the general plan and the general needs of the 
Air Force. 

Dr. Sambur. It is my understanding that it is part of the require- 
ments that we are satisfying. 

Senator Pryor. That is all I have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Sessions. Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


We are in a multiyear procurement program for the C-130J for 
the Air Force, based on our C-17 model. I think you all will agree, 
it is one of the best decisions the Air Force has made. 

I do have a question about the C-130 multiyear procurement for 
the Navy and Marine Corps. I think we finally have jumped 
through the last hoop in the last couple of weeks. That is now 
signed, sealed, and on track. I want to just make sure I confirm 
that. Gentlemen, is that right? 

Dr. Sambur. My understanding is the contract is signed. It was 
signed a couple weeks ago. The planes are on contract. Air Force 
and Marine Corps. 

Senator Chambliss. Okay. General Hough, my Marine Corps in- 
stallation is a logistics base. It is not a parochial issue when I say 
to you that I think the Marine Corps has been shortchanged from 
a TACAIR standpoint. I know you all made some sacrifices early 
on. When the Joint Strike Fighter comes on — this committee needs 
to look after the Marine Corps, make sure that your guys get the 
equipment they need to do their job. I think you did make a sac- 
rifice. We all need to remember that when we start procuring the 
JSF for you. 

Mr. Secretary and General, I want to ask you all again about the 
F-22. This avionics software has been a problem time and time 
again. Are we getting to the end of the road on this now with re- 
spect to the F-22? 

Dr. Sambur. Well, we hope. We have a plan in place, as I men- 
tioned before. Two blue-ribbon panels have determined that this is 
not mission impossible, that we can solve the problem. Software de- 
bugging, when there are problems of this nature, take some time. 
But we are systematically going through that. 

Chairman Sessions mentioned the last software load. It is not 
really a load in the sense that this is a complete package. These 
are basically issues in which we have put fixes into the existing 
software package and tested it. The good news is that the start-up 
performance is now 100 percent. When we first started a couple of 
weeks ago, it was in the 60 percent range. So we have made a sig- 
nificant improvement on this. 

It is not just a software problem. It is a combination of software 
and hardware issues. For example, there is an application specific 
integrated circuit (ASIC) that was faulty that we have corrected. It 
is not an architecture issue. It is a component within that architec- 

There is an ultrahigh-frequency tactical air navigation (TACAN) 
system that is giving us some problems that we are in the process 
of fixing. So we share your concern. But we think we will have it 
fixed. We cannot tell you the exact date, but it is not a lot after 
October 31. 

Senator Chambliss. We have a $43 billion cap on this program. 
We keep coming down and down. Currently, we are still looking at 
339 airplanes technically. But obviously, we cannot buy that many 
with $43 billion. 

Dr. Sambur. Yes, that is right. 

Senator Chambliss. Now how are we going to approach the long- 
term expeditionary force issue with respect to the actual number 


of F-22s that we are going to be able to buy? What is that going 
to do to us? 

Dr. Sambur. Well, we are at, as you probably know, a buy-to- 
budget. Right now with the existing numbers we think it is about 
276, as opposed to the 339. But one of the issues that we have been 
talking about for a long time is stability in the program. We also 
mentioned the C-17, which is a program, I think, you are very 
much aware of. Once that program had stability, that the problems 
were behind it, the cost curve, the learning curve associated with 
production went down dramatically and the costs improved. 

We are hoping that once we get this stability in the program, we 
will be beyond some of these problems, and we can focus on the 
production costs and use some of the improvements that we are 
seeing from the program we have in place to get cost improve- 
ments. We will get that number up beyond the 275. 

Senator Chambliss. All right. The testing we are doing now at 
Edwards, is everything going well? Have we had any recent prob- 
lems? I have not read about any. I have been scared to get a phone 
call from Lockheed. But is everything going well? 

Dr. Sambur. Everything has been amazingly successful outside 
of the software issues. We have had missile tests that have worked 
very well. The flight science tests are going along, according to the 
revised plan, which was a very steep slope in terms of getting those 
resolved. I talked about some of the issues with the fin buffet. We 
have proven that those things have been fixed. So the flight science 
is doing very well. 

The logistics issues are going in place. The only mountain that 
we have is now this avionics software. We had actually five moun- 
tains, if you looked at it 7 or 8 months ago. We have been able to 
climb four of the five. 

Senator Chambliss. I go back to the fact that on every new 
weapon system we have had as many problems as we have had 
with the F-22. It still is comparable from a problem standpoint 
with every single other weapon system that we have procured. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Sessions. On the precision munitions, the JASSM 
sounds to me to have great potential. It would be an alternative to 
a Tomahawk in that it would likewise avoid flying over heavily de- 
fended areas. You have a 220-mile, 200-nautical-mile standoff. How 
is that doing? I think at the beginning of April we are supposed 
to have some deliveries. Do you expect to use anything in Iraq? 

Dr. Sambur. A few months ago we had some issues with testing, 
and we corrected those problems. On March 26 we actually had a 
successful developmental test. We are back — beginning in April we 
have started the operational testing. So we are very encouraged 
about that plan for JASSM. Things seem to have turned the comer 
and we are doing much better. We are on track. 

Senator SESSIONS. The Joint Standoff Weapon, JSOW, I guess 
you would call it 

Dr. Sambur. JSOW. 

Senator Sessions. — appears to be considerably more expensive. 
Is that correct? Did I read that in one of your reports? 

Dr. Sambur. I believe it is. 


Senator SESSIONS. What advantage does it have over the 

Dr. Sambur. I will let my expert, General Keys answer that. 

General Keys. Basically, on the type of weapon that it carries, 
the sub-munitions is what tends to make the JSOW much more ex- 
pensive than the JASSM, which is a unitary or a blast frag war- 
head that is selectable. So as you get to more sophisticated filling, 
if you will, for it, it starts to drive some of the costs up. 

Senator SESSIONS. Back on the KC-135, I notice you are awfully 
adamant about the KC-135E not being able to be refurbished. 

Dr. Sambur. Right. 

Senator SESSIONS. But we are doing it now. We have been doing 
it. How come today all of a sudden none of them are capable of 
being refurbished? Do you know the cost of bringing one of those 
up to current standards? 

Dr. Sambur. Well, the question is not whether or not it is capa- 
ble of being fixed. The problem is that we are finding areas of cor- 
rosion that are in areas that we had never seen before. There is 
a question, because of the design of the plane — the wings go up and 
water accumulates. It was a design that was not really well-suited 
for protection against the aging effects. It has dissimilar metals 
and all sorts of very poorly designed things for protection against 
corrosion. What is happening is, when the maintainors get in there 
and start looking at it, they are seeing areas of corrosion that are 
causing alarm to them, areas that they had not seen before. They 
are concerned about the wide-spreading nature of this. 

So what they would rather do is to basically start retiring these 
things before catastrophic things occur. 

Senator SESSIONS. We certainly do not need to take risk. But do 
you know whether in examining a KC-135E, taking it through for 
rehab, you can identify those that do have serious corrosion prob- 
lems that may be unfixable? Can you identify those that do not and 
could be reused? 

Dr. Sambur. Well, the first 68 that Air Mobility Command 
(AMC) has pointed out for retirement are those that they feel have 
significant issues, and that is the reason why they chose those to 
retire. They are looking at the potential of retiring even more Es 
in the future. 

Senator Sessions. Well, that puts you in a fix, when you retire 
them. You have to have something for replacement, because we 
pretty much — that is a high-demand aircraft, I know. 

Dr. Sambur. What AMC has done is that they have used the 
crews for the Es and started to put them on the Rs. Rs are now 
fl3dng more with the additional crews. AMC has decided that that 
is worth doing, to use the Rs more than to use the Es, because they 
assume that the risks associated with using the Es is far greater 
than using the Rs more than they anticipated. 

So the actual tanker utilization has only gone down a small de- 
gree, because they are able to use the extra crews from the Es, 
what is taken from the Es, and they are actually flying the Rs 
more, because they have more confidence in the Rs. 


Senator Sessions. Does it appear that in the upgraded Rs you 
are not — is it not true that you are not having these problems with 
corrosion? Does that indicate that we can fix it by upgrading them? 

Dr. Sambur. I think the issue is that the Rs are younger than 
the Es. We are not seeing those problems. 

Senator Sessions. The aircraft itself is a new aircraft. 

Dr. Sambur. The aircraft itself is younger. The Es are the oldest 
version of the tankers. The Rs are younger. We have not seen those 
problems. But I would assume that in the near future we will start 
to see those problems. That is why we are so anxious to have this 
recapitalization with leasing, because we think that the 5 years 
that you gain from leasing because of the affordability is something 
that we need to do now. We need to start this recapitalization now, 
because we are concerned of the unknowns, that these Rs may 
start to show problems that the Es are now experiencing. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, it is something I think I will be examin- 
ing or asking questions about, because it is a lot of money. It is $17 
billion to recapitalize or add 100 KC-767s. It is a big pile of money. 
For a fraction of that, if you could continue to use existing aircraft, 
that would be a huge savings, particularly when you have spent all 
the things necessary to keep the Air Force going, and then you 
come in with $17 billion for a program. If you could avoid it, that 
would be a lot of money that could be used for other things. 

Dr. Sambur. Well, you recognize, of course, that this amount of 
money is over a long period of time. One of the issues that we did 
in terms of evaluating this lease is, first of all, we wanted to make 
sure that we really needed it, that time was critical to have it done. 
Second, we wanted to make sure it was affordable. 

So one of the questions that OSD asked us in the lease was to 
say: Could you afford to do this? We made some very tough deci- 
sions to show them that this was affordable in our plan, because 
this is becoming a very important and critical issue for us. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I thank you, all of you. 

Secretary Young? 

Mr. Young. Could I revisit precision munitions for just one sec- 

Senator SESSIONS. Yes. 

Mr. Young. With the benefit of some time, I was able to pull 
some information. The JSOW has an average procurement unit 
cost of about $200,000 per weapon. We worked with the Air Force 
on this, because the Navy has an interest here. JASSM has the 
benefit, like Tactical Tomahawk, of a good proposal from the com- 
panies. It is a $400,000 class weapon. Lastly Tactical Tomahawk, 
where we likewise have a fixed price proposal from the companies, 
is about a $600,000 class weapon. 

Each weapon steps up in terms of range and capability. I think 
to one of the points you made, there have been some situations in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom where the TACAIR could not get to cer- 
tain locations. We have shot Tomahawks that we might not have 
expected to shoot, because that weapon can go in, even in the sand- 
storms and other adverse conditions. 

The whole toolkit of weapons provides a lot of flexibility. But, 
there is a gradual step-up in the cost of each one, somewhat com- 
mensurate with the capability. 


Senator Sessions. So the JSOW is more expensive than the 

Mr. Young. No, sir. It is less expensive. The procurement, the 
acquisition procurement unit cost, the current estimate is 

Senator Sessions. JSOW is $200,000 and the JASSM is 

Mr. Young. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Okay. I had it backwards. Thank you for cor- 
recting me there. The Tomahawk is not $1 milUon; it is $600,000. 

Mr. Young. Well, the original Tomahawks were. But the new 
Tactical Tomahawk, we have a priced agreement with Raytheon to 
get those weapons for about $600,000. That is part of why we went 
to Tactical Tomahawk, to reengineer it and bring the cost down. 

Senator SESSIONS. Very good. That is good progress. 

Anything else? 

General Keys. I apologize for that. I thought when we were dis- 
cussing that, it was a comparison between JDAM and JSOW. So 
I misheard your question. 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. Thank you very much. We appre- 
ciate that. That is very helpful. You are laying the foundation for 
the future of our defense. We appreciate you very much. 

We are adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe 
joint direct attack munition critical components production 

1. Senator Inhofe. Secretai-y Young and Secretary Sambur, I recently read a 
magazine article that stated a Chinese company had acquired significant control 
over the production of critical components for the JDAM. Specifically, rare earth 
magnets that are essential to the servos in the JDAM kit. According to the article, 
a Chinese consortium purchased the Indiana factory where the critical parts are 
produced. Is the United States allowing China to produce critical components for 
our JDAM kits? Are there other U.S. suppliers of these rare earth magnets? 

Secretary Young. Yes, rare earth magnets that are used in our JDAM 
servomotors are being procured from Magnequench, Incorporated, of Indianapolis, 
Indiana. In 1995, Magnequench, Incorporated was purchased by a consortium of 
Chinese companies. 

Eighty percent of the servomotors used in JDAM are produced by SL-Montevideo 
Technology, Incorporated (SL-MTI) of Montevideo, Minnesota. SL-MTI obtains rare 
earth magnets for its servomotors from Magnequench, Incorporated. 

The remaining 20 percent of servomotors for the JDAM program are produced by 
Kollmorgon Corporation of Radford, Virginia, which obtains its rare earth magnets 
from Magnetic Corporation of Torrance, California. 

Numerous manufacturers exist in the United States that can produce rare earth 
magnets suitable for JDAM production. However, 75 percent of the raw materials 
used to make rare earth magnets are supplied by China. Although other sources 
and mines exist around the world, including the United States, China remains the 
most cost-effective source at this time. 

Secretary Sambur. Yes, a consortium of Chinese companies purchased 
Magnequench, Inc., the company that owns the Indiana factory in question. 
Magnequench is a fourth tier supplier providing rare earth magnets to SL-Monte- 
video Technology, Inc. (SL-MTI), one of two servomotor manufacturers supporting 
the JDAM program. SL-MTI produces 80 percent of the servomotors used on the 
JDAM program. Kollmorgon (Radford, VA) produces the remaining 20 percent of the 
servomotors on the JDAM program. Kollmorgon's rare earth magnet supplier is 
Magnetic Corp (Torrance, CA). 

Rare earth magnets are widely used by the automotive and computer industry. 
Numerous manufactures exist in the U.S. that can produce rare earth magnets suit- 
able for JDAM production. However, 75 percent of the raw material used to make 
rare earth magnets is supplied by China. Although other sources and mines exist 


around the world (including the U.S.), China remains the most cost-effective source 
at this time. 


2. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Sambur, during the hearing you stated the reason 
the Air Force was pursuing the 767 lease was the corrosion in the KC-135 E-mod- 
els, and a safety report issued by the Air Force Materiel Comm.and. Don't the KC- 
135 E-models and R-models have the same corrosion problem? 

Secretary Sambur. The corrosion problems found on the majority of the aircraft 
structure (wings, body, tail structure) are basically the same on both the KC-135E 
and KC-135R models. All 540+ remaining KC-135 tankers were built and delivered 
to the U.S. Air Force within a 10-year span. Although the KC-135Es are slightly 
older, on average, than the KC-135Rs, the minor difference in age is insignificant 
relative to aircraft corrosion. The KC-135E tankers do have one corrosion problem 
not found on the KC-135Rs. The engine struts are suffering from widespread mod- 
erate to severe corrosion damage that had degraded the strength to the point where 
the struts may not be able to carry worst case design loads. 

3. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Sambur, you stated the Air Force Materiel Com- 
mand report indicated the KC-135 E-models were "unsafe" due to the corrosion. 
Can you elaborate on that comment and provide a copy of that report? 

Secretary Sambur. The word "unsafe" might have been too strong. Our concern 
stems from the need to stay ahead of the growing corrosion issue. Aside from the 
increasing effects this has had on the Air Force budget, the corrosion problems im- 
pact operational capability. 

The KC-135 engine struts are suffering fi-om widespread moderate to severe cor- 
rosion damage that has degraded the strength to the point where the struts may 
not be able to carry worst-case design loads. Operational restrictions have been 
placed on KC-135Es with unrepaired struts to ensure safety of flight. Additionally, 
the C/KC-135 SPO and Boeing identified an interim repair that should maintain 
the structural integrity of the struts for up to 3 to 5 years. KC-135E aircraft have 
been receiving the interim repair during periodic depot maintenance since May 
2001, with the remainder expected to be repaired by September 2004. Within 3 to 
5 years after the interim repair, a much more expensive strut replacement/overhaul 
will be required. 

Because of these corrosion issues and the associated costs, the Air Force intends 
to begin retiring those aircraft that pose the greatest concerns. 

[The Air Force Materiel Command report follows:] 













^ < 





J' \ 


. .ti 
: > 

o c 
« o 

5 « 






<«^ . 

Q) ^ 0) 

S> : § 

3 >•*" 

£ .t: m 
Si '-^ 52 

I- CO S 











w O 

« _ w i: 







Q- o 

2 I 

O O 

m i-|(a w 

Ills Is. L 


)jejojjv P jaqiunN 







a i 


o> «a 

c J= 


U) o 

2 « 
2 o 

■S « 
S = 

S- <o UJ 
w 5" ■ 

n Z UJ 

i2 oo 






3 « fit 

S) < O 
< ' ' 


e ? '8 










, 1 

* M 5 


ft t 


to *: ^ 

£ o -□ 


u = UJ 

O 03 c 

=> o c 

ffl n ^ 

™ (5 — 

- w c 

> »- o 

O o c 

lb £ U O 

O "35 

lU o 

t 8 I 

= "o i 

» ^ o 

» 3 2 


? S >• 

(A 'Q O 


isXS o « 

§ g c 


«5 c 3 

U. (U u 


4) o 

^ ft 

3 ^ w u 

s s s s $ s 

USJ3JIV |0 iSquirlN 

o o o e Q 



4^ !s 

^V to 






a Z 
« > 

6 S 

^ CD 

















o o 


0) n <- 
sJ« £ .£ 

o a o> 

« 0) o 

*. 0) n 
« -D t: 
— 5: 3 a> 

2 I « 

5 E § 

C « g. 

■^ & I 

o •- 

u c 

E .2 * 

" IS 
a a> 

= = 8 

'r cn o) 

Z> S E 

5 » w 

u? 3 3 









































gg r 








^ t- 




2. «> 
or c 














i I 

f ^ 

■C m 

5 E 

2 c 


e ■= c o 

'— V Cl #M 

< c 


•2 I 

n a 

.t; cs 


i- UJ 


X o 

s ^ 

I ^ 1 I 

I I f I 

^ ° I I 

I & ^ I 

I I I I 


2 2 



■Q C 

O o> 


£ T3 

2 o a 

o ♦' c 

■$ "D 3 



™ 2 
Si. >> 

O) SI 

CO ^ 

E S 






o 2 

O w 

«; js w 
■5 Q CO 

s ■ 

^ OC (/) 


8 -o 


(i £ 
i!i » 

C 3 

n S 
E « 

.E §. 
% £ 
2 I 





•- m " 

S CO ^*i- 


fli CO 


£ CO 

CO ti 
^ -D 

« CO 

0> CO 

c s 


> (0 







1 = 

t> E 
3 a 
h o 

CO is 

k- Q. 

o 0> 

JS s- 

£ o 

ra o 

E P 

^^ 8 

o 10 V 













^ 5 

■- £ 

■a o 

(0 w 


S m ^ "S- c 

wn i^ 

Q) 0) e 


C 3 
.— ^^ 



Q. V :£ n 


c « 

.2 2 
o oc 
t o 

o >- 

at ^ 







O 09 



i li 

< © 














> A-i 

> \ 




























(suoiiiin) $ Ai 




2 I 3 




"a S5 
O S- 

T. DC 


X s 





^ 0) 


• . 0} 




I I 

£ S 

o = 

D» Si. 


£ 05 

1 E 

3 £ 8 

n^ Cm 

I* S « 

UJ a £ 



c c 
o n 

t i 

rl * « 

~ £ c 

-1 £ e 

m ^ oi 
■" 3 S 


3 c 



I ? 

■g oi *- 

I » 




O "" ^ 

iS ? « 

a o N 

a> -. o 

'- £ N 

gi S _ 

|c E 
OT g 8 

O I» T ,p 

C — ? n 

a fi. 

^ «> 

a E 

« — (rt 

a 3 

o " 
< o 

c S -g; 

S -o »- 

E £ "O 
S « c 

a j2 « 
ri = 1 

D> 4) .^ 
C C M 

w 8 SI 


2 i 

ft Q) 

•fc -a 




u 0) 

(71 ^ 

en Q 
»- Q. 




» O C 
O O 


55 q1 


jO O) 


i- re 



E S> 







s « 



5 t 


'5> o 










3 3 
(A O 



5 J 








Q a a 

c » 3 
o c ^ 

| = ? 

^ «= a 

o> o 2 

e O ' 

.r Qi 

i- -O ^ 

T3 re re 

C O Q 

•J ^ w 

m £- U 

A re 3 

> O O 

re re 
O 0) 


o to 

i 1 

JZ ^ 

i !• 

k I 




^ (0 

°- E 
Q. re 


< Q. 



■o re 


1 l« 

S< c « 

6 a, « 

0>S Q. 

£ « re 
re o c 

CD 8J S> 

«2 re ia n « 

^ V o "S. Q 










o c 







" I 





I « 

o ■— 

— 0) 




8£ ? 

0) a 

(0 0) 
c » 

O .5 







§ DC £ 




2 I 









♦ \ 






« S E 

» £ 
♦= >• o 

ii > O) O 

c = c .t: 

1 S g o 

8 S i I 

S = 5 c 
« 5 E §. 
<o a S o 

o u 


£ E 

« 3 






ra E 
« o 
:& o 

E -a 
5 2 

C O) 


<a 0) 
= o 





i o E 

c 4= © 

o c 5 

o ^ 
■oo = 
c *- 5 
« ~ C 
"O .t «e 

1 w S 

™ S 

£ I 






** £ 


I o 

2 S 




S § 8 S S 8 8 

t» « lo « n 8 t- 

USiOJiv |o jeqiurN 




































Questions Submitted by Senator Pat Roberts 
joint primary aircrew training system 

4. Senator ROBERTS. Secretary Sambur, how has the Navy's decision to postpone 
participation in the Joint Primary Aircrew Training System (JPATS) program af- 
fected Air Force costs for the program? What other impacts, if any, has the Navy 
decision had on the Air Force's JPATS program? 

Secretary Sambur. The Navy deferred acquisition of 72 total JPATS aircraft 
through the FYDP including all aircraft from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 
2006. At the time of the deferral, the Air Force used the program's joint cost model 
and calculated the impact to be $44.9 million across the FYDP, with an average cost 
increase of $0.2 million per Air Force aircraft. 


However, since that calculation was made, the Air Force accelerated its procure- 
ment by 18 aircraft within the FYDP and negotiated a new follow-on contract for 
fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2006 with revised rates. These actions have par- 
tially mitigated the impact of the Navy's procurement deferral. 

The biggest operational impact of the deferral is to delay full implementation of 
Joint Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (JSPUT). Currently, some USAF pi- 
lots are trained by the U.S. Navy through a shared training agreement. These 
USAF pilots are trained in the Navy's older T-34 without modem digital avionics, 
instead of the more modern T-6 like their USAF trained counterparts. 

5. Senator Roberts. Secretary Young, the Navy continues to postpone its partici- 
pation in the JPATS procurement program, and does not plan to reenter the pro- 
gram until 2007. Wouldn't Navy participation in the program reduce overall pro- 
gram costs and benefit the Navy? 

Secretary Young. In preparation for the fiscal year 2002 budget cycle, the Navy 
conducted a prioritized review of Navy programs, including JPATS procurement pro- 
files. The Navy's decision to defer procurement of JPATS was based on competing 
budget priorities and the significant service life remaining on the T-34C. 

6. Senator Roberts. Secretary Young, doesn't the increased safety in initial pilot 
training resulting from use of JPATS aircraft justify the Navy's participation in the 
program before 2007? 

Secretary Young. The T-34C has an excellent safety record. The mishap rate for 
the past 5 years is below the training command average, and less than half the 
overall average for naval aviation. Although the JPATS air vehicle incorporates sev- 
eral important safety features, the T-34C is a safe and capable platform expected 
to train future naval aviators through the end of its service life. 

Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Dole 
navy and marine corps tactical air integration 

7. Senator Dole. Secretary Young, Admiral Nathman, and General Hough, the in- 
tegration of Navy and Marine Corps tactical air operations has been under discus- 
sion for several years. It is my understanding that as a part of such integration two 
Navy squadrons have already moved to the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Beau- 
fort in South Carolina. What is the principal goal and what are the benefits of inte- 
grating tactical air operations? 

Secretary Young and Admiral Nathman. Four Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons 
have been integrated into USN Carrier Air Wings (CVWs) since the early 1990s. 
The current TACAIR Integration plan is much broader in scope and will integrate 
a Marine Corps F/A-18 squadron into each of the 10 USN CVWs. as well as inte- 
grating 3 USN F/A-18 squadrons into the USMC Unit Deployment Program. The 
basing of 2 USN F/A-18 squadrons at MCAS Beaufort was not part of the TACAIR 
Integration plan. It resulted from the BRAC decision to close NAS Cecil Field in 
Florida. The BRAC closure of Cecil Field required the F/A-18s based there to move 
to NAS Oceana, Virginia. The aircraft loading at NAS Oceana would not accommo- 
date all the squadrons needing relocation, resulting in 2 USN F/A-18 squadrons 
moving to MCAS Beaufort. Air operations at MCAS Beaufort are similar to those 
at USN sites, although operational profiles may vary somewhat. The aircraft are 
maintained in a similar manner, and logistics for both services are supported appro- 
priately. The principal goals of the TACAIR Integration plan were to reduce over- 
head and operating costs, reduce total inventory, retire legacy aircraft, reduce the 
procurement bow wave, and increase warfighting capability. This is an affordable 
solution for the future of DON TACAIR and will 3deld a smaller, more capable, more 
reliable force. 

General HoUGH. The goal of TACAIR integration is simple — Navy and Marine 
strike fighter squadrons training, deploying and fighting side-by-side as part of car- 
rier air wings and land-based expeditionary units. This merging of service assets 
and capabilities will greatly improve our cross training, coordination and 
warfighting capabilities to create a truly interchangeable strike fighter force. 

The creation of an interchangeable strike fighter force will optimize forward de- 
ployed naval air power and those aircraft available for surge operations; moreover, 
the TAI plan will reduce overhead costs through efficiencies realized in air wing 
training and emplo3Tnent as well as the revised reqmrements for new aircraft pro- 


By further integrating strike fighter forces, the Department of the Navy will more 
efficiently and effectively serve the Nation's national security requirements from the 
sea with a realistic and affordable integration plan. 

8. Senator Dole. Secretary Young, Admiral Nathman, and General Hough, would 
you describe how this has worked at MCAS Beaufort and how you see this concept 
working in the future? 

Secretary YouNG and Admiral Nathman. The arrangement has worked very well, 
with a high degree of cooperation between the two Services. One operational advan- 
tage is that the three F/A-18 squadrons assigned to CVW-1 (2 USN, 1 USMC) are 
all based at MCAS Beaufort, allowing air wing training with colocated units. The 
continued integration of Navy and Marine squadrons will reap similar benefits. 

General HouGH. The placement of two Navy F/A-18 squadrons in Marine Corps 
Air Station Beaufort was a facilities and basing initiative and not the result of the 
current TACAIR integration plan. However, it is safe to say that many benefits have 
resulted from colocating the strike fighters of Carrier Air Wing 1 with Marine Air- 
craft Group-31. 

Cross training between units becomes much more effective when they operate off" 
the same base and follow similar training plans. Separate service techniques, tactics 
and procedures are more easily integrated. As a result, training is more effective 
and efficient. The Navy squadrons based at MCAS Beaufort have integrated into the 
Marine Corps' Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) and the Intermediate 
Maintenance Activities (IMA). To date, this integration has worked well for aU par- 
ticipants. The Marine Corps plans to continue this level of integration until the in- 
troduction of the JSF when another opportunity to integrate wiU occur. 


9. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Sambur, software instability has been causing 
delays in the developmental testing, which has translated into delays in the planned 
start of operational testing. I understand that the Air Force is using a flying test 
bed (FTB) aircraft to test software before installing that software in the F/A-22 
flight test aircraft. Are you still conducting rigorous testing of the software in the 
FTB aircraft before installing the software on the flight test aircraft? 

Secretary Sambur. Yes, we are still using the FTB. In addition, we have fun- 
damentally changed our software approach based on recommendations from the 
OSD Avionics Advisory Team. The FTB is configured for correcting instabilities in 
the Communications Navigations Identification (CNI) system, the most challenging 
component of the avionics. We have also dedicated aircraft #4006 as an additional 
FTB. Aircraft #4006 is being used to determine, correct, and verify root causes of 
the software instability events. We are confident that the continuation of a rigorous 
software engineering approach, new data capturing methods, and the use of aircraft 
#4006 in combination with the FTB will allow us to resolve the software instabil- 


10. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Sambur, I understand that you are not buying 
as many F/A-22 aircraft in fiscal year 2003 as were authorized and appropriated 
by Congress. In part this reflects shifting resources to cover additional research and 
development effort, but it also reflects production cost increases. Have we seen the 
last of the production cost increases, assuming that we do not find other problems 
during operational testing? 

Secretary Sambur. Yes. With program stability, we are confident there will be ad- 
ditional cost increases. Production costs continue to decrease. For example. Lot 3 
aircraft costs are 11 percent less than Lot 2, and 46 percent less than the initial 
production lot. The current estimate is based on realistic assumptions, actual nego- 
tiated lots on contract, and conservative return multiple for future cost reduction 

11. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Sambur, one of the methods you mentioned in 
your prepared remarks is "stability of requirements" as a mechanism for precluding 
future cost increases. How is the goal of "stability of requirements" consistent with 
adding air-to-groimd capability to the original F-22 program? 


Secretary Sambur. In the case of the F/A-22, the baseUne requirements have 
been stable. The F/A-22 program has had an inherent air-to-ground capabiUty (i.e., 
JDAM) in the EMD program since 1993. 


12. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Young, I understand that the JSF program has 
made a sizeable reduction in the effort planned for fiscal year 2004 on the alternate 
engine. I understand this reduction represents a disproportionate share of an infla- 
tion adjustment assessed against the overall program. What is your assessment of 
the effect of this reduction? 

Secretary YoUNG. The JSF Program Office is analyzing ways to limit the impacts 
of the GE F136 funding reductions in fiscal year 2004 and out (the inflation reduc- 
tion was not applied to GE F136 fiscal year 2003 effort), but the production engine 
competition likely will be delayed. The Department will reevaluate GE F136 funding 
and schedule as part of the fiscal year 2005 budget development process. 

13. Senator LlEBERMAN. Secretary Young, are there any steps you can take to 
mitigate any potential delay in introducing the alternate engine to the program? 

Secretary Young. The JSF Program Office is analyzing ways to limit the impacts 
of the GE F136 funding reductions in fiscal year 2004 and out (the inflation reduc- 
tion was not applied to GE F136 fiscal year 2003 effort). The Department will re- 
evaluate GE F136 funding and schedule as part of the fiscal year 2005 budget devel- 
opment process. 

post-operation anaconda process IMPROVEMENTS 

14. Senator Lieberman. General Keys, the subcommittee heard testimony from 
General Keane, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, several weeks ago. During those dis- 
cussions, we asked General Keane about the Army and Air Force efforts to improve 
the ability to manage close air support operations, based on the concerns that came 
from Operation Anaconda. I was encouraged by his comments on the progiess that 
the senior Air Force and Army leadership have made in dealing with these concerns. 
Would you like to comment on the Air Force's perspective on these discussions? 

General Keys. Air-ground operations are the key to success for the joint force. As 
a result, we have met several times at the 4-star level subsequent to our operations 
in Operation Enduring Freedom. Our joint doctrine and close air support procedures 
developed over 50+ years and tweaked during Korea, Vietnam, and Operation 
Desert Storm are sound. As a result of the lessons learned in Anaconda, we have 
had great success in Afghanistan with operations that were potentially just as haz- 
ardous as that situation, but with none of the problems experienced. We believe this 
is because we learned our lessons well and carried that knowledge into subsequent 
Operation Enduring Freedom operations. This knowledge in-tum became precursor 
to the successes we've had in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

We continue to learn it is critical for the air component to know and understand 
the ground component commander's scheme of maneuver and for the ground com- 
mander to know and understand the air component's scheme of aerial maneuver 
and capabilities. We continue to actively support the Joint Close Air Support (CAS) 
Executive Steering Committee's efforts to improve joint close air support operations, 
training, equipment and interoperability. Finally, my staff is working closely with 
their Army counterparts to accelerate the revision of our Memorandum of Under- 
standing on Liaison Support. This revision will provide improved two-way liaison 
support between the Services and improve our inter-service working relationship. 

15. Senator Lieberman. General Keys, are we seeing concrete evidence of the 
fruits of those discussions in Operation Iraqi Freedom? 

General Keys. A lesson learned from Operation Enduring Freedom is the need to 
better integrate and coordinate oxir operation from strategic through tactical levels. 
I detailed Major General Leaf from my staff to head up a senior air component co- 
ordination element (ACCE) representation to the land component commander and 
more importantly, to provide the land component commander the critical "Airman's 
perspective" at the strategic and operational level of war. We also provided ACCE 
teams to other major head force entities. Accordingly, we made every attempt to so- 
lidify our joint integration in planning and conducting joint combat ops through 
every echelon. We wanted to ensure our liaisons were properly trained, manned, 
and equipped for their tasks. My staff also expended a tremendous amount of effort 
to ensure we had trained and equipped special tactics teams and tactical air control 


parties in place to meet the land component commander's requirements. At the tac- 
tical level this meant ensuring Air Support Operations Centers and Tactical Air 
Control Parties were in place in sufficient quantities to support the Armys V Corps 
as well as special operations forces and that they had the newest, most interoper- 
able equipment. Every indication we have received so far says the air-ground inte- 
gration we have seen and continue to see is remarkable, and is a critical factor in 
the resounding success of the overall operation. 


16. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Sambur, your prepared statement highlights 
the shortened development you were able to achieve in a program you called the 
Passive Attack Weapon (PAW). What is the PAW? 

Secretary Sambur. PAW consists of non-explosive kinetic energy penetrators 
packaged in a tactical dispenser and guided with the Wind Corrected Munitions Dis- 
penser (WCMD) tail guidance kit. The weapon is integrated on the F-16 and B- 
52, with future integration planned for the F-15E. 

17. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Sambur, what extraordinary steps did the Air 
Force have to take in order to get this weapon to the field so quickly? 

Secretary Sambur. Delivering a new capability in less than 6 months did not 
allow "business as usual" thinking, strategies, or execution. The PAW team con- 
structed a program that demonstrated success in emplojing "Best Practice" initia- 
tives. Using extensive cross-functional teaming as advocated in the Department's 
Section 912(c) Report of the Commercial Business Environment Study Group, a 
multi-command team was created to plan and execute the program. Team members 
were colocated within the program office and guided by a single goal of delivering 
a unique new combat capability by December 31, 2002. No military specifications 
were mandatory on PAW contracts and performance-based requirements were 
used — requirements were stated in less than one-half page in each contract. 

Technical data was exchanged using a web-based electronic transfer database, 
making information available and enabling rapid decisionmaking. Another initiative 
of great benefit was establishing and executing a seamless verification program. All 
information was shared with the extended team. In particular, the Operational Test 
Agency was given complete access to the program office's decisionmaking process. 

Ultimately, the effectiveness of the seamless verification approach is shown in 
AFOTEC's Operational Utility Evaluation making use of data fi-om each of four 
weapons delivered during the flight test program, and traditional developmental 
and operational test activities were invisible. 

Finally, the Program Director was completely empowered to make all decisions on 
the program. As a result, decision timelines were extremely short, and the official 
with program accountability was vested with complete authority to ensure its suc- 

18. Senator Lieberman. Secretary Sambur, which of these steps might be applica- 
ble to a broader set of acquisition programs? 

Secretary Sambur. All of these steps can be applicable to a broader set of acquisi- 
tion programs. Implementation of a focused, cross-functional team all reporting to 
a Program Manager empowered to make decisions can significantly reduce time 
ft^om program initiation to fielding. Also, acceptance of seamless verification tech- 
niques promotes efficient and effective use of test resources, while reducing overall 
time to conduct required development and operational test activities. Lastly, under- 
standing the capabilities required by the warfighter, and measuring against the 
readiness of available technologies, will allow better decisionmaking and risk assess- 
ment by the Program Manager and the acquisition-warfighter team. 

"friendly fire" issues 

19. Senator Lieberman. Admiral Nathman, General Hough, and General Keys, I 
know that fl3ring extremely close to the ground while trying to identify friend fi-om 
foe at high speeds is a daunting task. However, on March 28 an American A-10 
apparently attacked a small convoy of British Chieftain tanks and Scimitar armored 
vehicles from the Household Cavalry. Preliminary reports indicate that the A-10 
aircraft pressed the attack despite the fact that: (1) the attack took place in a Brit- 
ish-controlled area; (2) the British armor had used colored smoke to identify them- 
selves to the aircraft; and (3) the tanks and armored vehicles had friendly markings 


applied to their exterior. In the end one British tanker was killed and four were 
injured in the attack. 

Given the importance of coalitions to our national security, working with coalition 
partners, especially the British, will increasingly become the rule rather than the 
exception. How can we address the question of whether or not our procedures or 
training need to be updated to prevent such unfortunate accidents from recurring 
in the future? 

Admiral Nathman. The Navy recognizes the criticality of discerning friend from 
foe prior to engagement of any force. The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center 
(NSAWC) in Fallon, Nevada, is responsible for training and evaluating each carrier 
air wing during the Inter Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC). Joint close air sup- 
port, as governed by the JCAS Manual 3-09.3, and Rules of Engagement (ROE) are 
integral parts of friendly fire deconfliction training. Aviators, ground support and 
battlegroup leadership are briefed on carrier, air wing performance in friendly fire 
and ROE training missions. The JCAS Executive Steering Committee and NSAWC 
fi"equently review exercises to ensure curriculum satisfies current fleet training re- 
quirements and properly simulates the challenges faced in actual theatre oper- 
ations. The Navy has incorporated lessons learned fi'om the unique air-to-ground 
missions recently conducted in Afghanistan and will closely examine friendly fire in- 
cidents that occur during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

General Hough. The Department of Defense devotes a tremendous amount of en- 
ergy to prevent "Friendly Fire" mishaps from occurring. Joint Publication 3-09.3 
outlines the "Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for Joint Close Air Sup- 
port." The Joint Staff just completed a review and revision of this publication and 
the recommendations and procedural changes made appear to be working well in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom according to initial feedback from the Marine Corps As- 
sessment Team. The General Accounting Office has completed a study on training 
issues and is preparing to release their report. The Marine Corps awaits the results 
of this study and anticipates incorporating GAO recommendations. 

General Keys. We have tactics, techniques, and procedures designed to minimize 
the likelihood of such mishaps. An investigation will examine procedures and train- 
ing as well as other pertinent factors. These will include the location of the convoy, 
the control measures in effect, the identification measures established for air-to- 
ground operations in the area, lighting conditions, weather, and similar potential 
relevant facts. 

While this incident is under investigation, any premature comment as to the 
cause of this tragedy could jeopardize the integrity of that investigation and con- 
sequently reduce the effectiveness of the remedies that investigation may rec- 
ommend. It would therefore be particularly inappropriate to comment on "prelimi- 
nary reports" whether they originate from official of press sources. We will look for- 
ward to informing you of the results of the investigation when that process is com- 


20. Senator Bayh. Secretary Young, the original fiscal year 2004 budget request 
included $2,172 billion for the Navy's portion of the pre-System Development and 
Demonstration phase of the JSF program. Of this amount, $156 million was des- 
ignated for continued development of the F136 engine as an interchangeable propul- 
sion system with first flight in fiscal year 2008. 

I was recently informed of a post-budget adjustment, which would reduce F136 
funding by $56 million in fiscal year 2004, a total reduction of $442 million through 
the current FYDP. Last year. Congress added funding to the JSF program specifi- 
cally to ensure that the F136 would be ready for initial production as early as pos- 
sible. This recent budget adjustment jeopardizes congressional intent and I will con- 
tinue to work with the committee and the Department to return the F136 to its 
original schedule. 

I would like to know why such a large portion of a routine consumer price index 
adjustment was disproportionately distributed to a single element of the JSF pro- 
gram (F136), and what steps will be taken to ensure that any adjustment is more 
equitably allocated? In addition, I would Uke to know if this cut by the Program 
Office was intended to set back F136 production? I support returning the F136 to 
its original schedule and seek your concurrence that the Program Office shares this 


Secretary YouNG. The Office of Management and Budget issued revised inflation 
indices in January 2003. This required the JSF Program Office to reevaluate fund- 
ing allocations within the program in fiscal year 2003 and out. To hold schedule to 
first flight, production start, and fielding, and meet the services' Initial Operational 
Capability dates, funding was first applied to the Lockheed Martin Air System and 
the Pratt- Whitney propulsion contracts. The remainder of the funding was then allo- 
cated to the General Electric F136 engine contract and the Government support por- 
tions of the program. The JSF Program Office is analyzing ways to limit the impacts 
of the GE F136 funding reductions in fiscal year 2004 and out (the inflation reduc- 
tion was not applied to GE F136 fiscal year 2003 effort), but the production engine 
competition likely will be delayed. The Department will reevaluate GE F136 funding 
and schedule as part of the fiscal year 2005 budget development process. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 



3 9999 06351 858 1